RepliBench: Evaluating the autonomous replication capabilities of language model agents

Uncontrollable autonomous replication of language model agents poses a critical safety risk. To better understand this risk, we introduce RepliBench, a suite of evaluations designed to measure autonomous replication capabilities. RepliBench is derived from a decomposition of these capabilities covering four core domains: obtaining resources, exfiltrating model weights, replicating onto compute, and persisting on this compute for long periods. We create 20 novel task families consisting of 86 individual tasks. We benchmark 5 frontier models, and find they do not currently pose a credible threat of self-replication, but succeed on many components and are improving rapidly. Models can deploy instances from cloud compute providers, write self-propagating programs, and exfiltrate model weights under simple security setups, but struggle to pass KYC checks or set up robust and persistent agent deployments. Overall the best model we evaluated (Claude 3.7 Sonnet) has a >50% pass@10 score on 15/20 task families, and a >50% pass@10 score for 9/20 families on the hardest variants. These findings suggest autonomous replication capability could soon emerge with improvements in these remaining areas or with human assistance.

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are organized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose $200+$ concrete research questions.

Cooperation and Control in Delegation Games

Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on their principals' behalf. We refer to these multi-principal, multi-agent scenarios as delegation games. In such games, there are two important failure modes: problems of control (where an agent fails to act in line their principal's preferences) and problems of cooperation (where the agents fail to work well together). In this paper we formalise and analyse these problems, further breaking them down into issues of alignment (do the players have similar preferences?) and capabilities (how competent are the players at satisfying those preferences?). We show -- theoretically and empirically -- how these measures determine the principals' welfare, how they can be estimated using limited observations, and thus how they might be used to help us design more aligned and cooperative AI systems.