Causal Evidence that Language Models use Confidence to Drive Behavior

Metacognition -- the ability to assess one's own cognitive performance -- is documented across species, with internal confidence estimates serving as a key signal for adaptive behavior. While confidence can be extracted from Large Language Model (LLM) outputs, whether models actively use these signals to regulate behavior remains a fundamental question. We investigate this through a four-phase abstention paradigm.Phase 1 established internal confidence estimates in the absence of an abstention option. Phase 2 revealed that LLMs apply implicit thresholds to these estimates when deciding to answer or abstain. Confidence emerged as the dominant predictor of behavior, with effect sizes an order of magnitude larger than knowledge retrieval accessibility (RAG scores) or surface-level semantic features. Phase 3 provided causal evidence through activation steering: manipulating internal confidence signals correspondingly shifted abstention rates. Finally, Phase 4 demonstrated that models can systematically vary abstention policies based on instructed thresholds.Our findings indicate that abstention arises from the joint operation of internal confidence representations and threshold-based policies, mirroring the two-stage metacognitive control found in biological systems. This capacity is essential as LLMs transition into autonomous agents that must recognize their own uncertainty to decide when to act or seek help.

How do LLMs Compute Verbal Confidence

Verbal confidence -- prompting LLMs to state their confidence as a number or category -- is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from black-box models. However, how LLMs internally generate such scores remains unknown. We address two questions: first, when confidence is computed - just-in-time when requested, or automatically during answer generation and cached for later retrieval; and second, what verbal confidence represents - token log-probabilities, or a richer evaluation of answer quality? Focusing on Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B, we provide convergent evidence for cached retrieval. Activation steering, patching, noising, and swap experiments reveal that confidence representations emerge at answer-adjacent positions before appearing at the verbalization site. Attention blocking pinpoints the information flow: confidence is gathered from answer tokens, cached at the first post-answer position, then retrieved for output. Critically, linear probing and variance partitioning reveal that these cached representations explain substantial variance in verbal confidence beyond token log-probabilities, suggesting a richer answer-quality evaluation rather than a simple fluency readout. These findings demonstrate that verbal confidence reflects automatic, sophisticated self-evaluation -- not post-hoc reconstruction -- with implications for understanding metacognition in LLMs and improving calibration.

A Theory of Appropriateness That Accounts for Norms of Rationality

We propose a society-first theory of normative appropriateness where individuals, modeled as pre-trained actors with cognitive architectures analogous to Large Language Models (LLMs), generate behavior via predictive pattern completion. Our theory posits that individuals act by completing distributed symbolic patterns based on context, answering questions such as "What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?". This sense-making mechanism provides a parsimonious account of the key features of human norms: their context-dependence, arbitrariness, automaticity, dynamism, and their support from social sanctioning. It challenges rational-choice theories of social norms by accounting for their key features without needing to exogenously posit scalar rewards or preference relations. By distinguishing between explicit norms, which we associate with in-context adaptation, and implicit norms, which we associate with long-term memory, the theory reconceptualizes several foundational ideas in cognitive science. In particular, it gives an alternative account to the data traditionally seen as supporting dual-process models, and it flips the role of rationality, allowing us to construe it as adherence to culturally-contingent justification standards.

Intelligent AI Delegation

AI agents are able to tackle increasingly complex tasks. To achieve more ambitious goals, AI agents need to be able to meaningfully decompose problems into manageable sub-components, and safely delegate their completion across to other AI agents and humans alike. Yet, existing task decomposition and delegation methods rely on simple heuristics, and are not able to dynamically adapt to environmental changes and robustly handle unexpected failures. Here we propose an adaptive framework for intelligent AI delegation - a sequence of decisions involving task allocation, that also incorporates transfer of authority, responsibility, accountability, clear specifications regarding roles and boundaries, clarity of intent, and mechanisms for establishing trust between the two (or more) parties. The proposed framework is applicable to both human and AI delegators and delegatees in complex delegation networks, aiming to inform the development of protocols in the emerging agentic web.

Perplexity Cannot Always Tell Right from Wrong

Perplexity -- a function measuring a model's overall level of "surprise" when encountering a particular output -- has gained significant traction in recent years, both as a loss function and as a simple-to-compute metric of model quality. Prior studies have pointed out several limitations of perplexity, often from an empirical manner. Here we leverage recent results on Transformer continuity to show in a rigorous manner how perplexity may be an unsuitable metric for model selection. Specifically, we prove that, if there is any sequence that a compact decoder-only Transformer model predicts accurately and confidently -- a necessary pre-requisite for strong generalisation -- it must imply existence of another sequence with very low perplexity, but not predicted correctly by that same model. Further, by analytically studying iso-perplexity plots, we find that perplexity will not always select for the more accurate model -- rather, any increase in model confidence must be accompanied by a commensurate rise in accuracy for the new model to be selected.

Distributional AGI Safety

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

Societal and technological progress as sewing an ever-growing, ever-changing, patchy, and polychrome quilt

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

Wanting to be Understood

This paper explores an intrinsic motivation for mutual awareness, hypothesizing that humans possess a fundamental drive to understand and to be understood even in the absence of extrinsic rewards. Through simulations of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we explore the effect of various internal reward functions in reinforcement learning agents. The drive to understand is implemented as an active inference type artificial curiosity reward, whereas the drive to be understood is implemented through intrinsic rewards for imitation, influence/impressionability, and sub-reaction time anticipation of the other. Results indicate that while artificial curiosity alone does not lead to a preference for social interaction, rewards emphasizing reciprocal understanding successfully drive agents to prioritize interaction. We demonstrate that this intrinsic motivation can facilitate cooperation in tasks where only one agent receives extrinsic reward for the behaviour of the other.

A theory of appropriateness with applications to generative artificial intelligence

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

TRecViT: A Recurrent Video Transformer

We propose a novel block for video modelling. It relies on a time-space-channel factorisation with dedicated blocks for each dimension: gated linear recurrent units (LRUs) perform information mixing over time, self-attention layers perform mixing over space, and MLPs over channels. The resulting architecture TRecViT performs well on sparse and dense tasks, trained in supervised or self-supervised regimes. Notably, our model is causal and outperforms or is on par with a pure attention model ViViT-L on large scale video datasets (SSv2, Kinetics400), while having $3\times$ less parameters, $12\times$ smaller memory footprint, and $5\times$ lower FLOPs count. Code and checkpoints will be made available online at https://github.com/google-deepmind/trecvit.