Language is not only used to inform. We often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a new pragmatic explanation for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, our model predicts a relationship between belief updating and speaker expectations: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals, implying the absence of stronger evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest potential avenues for rational models of social reasoning to further illuminate decision-making phenomena.
From photorealistic sketches to schematic diagrams, drawing provides a versatile medium for communicating about the visual world. How do images spanning such a broad range of appearances reliably convey meaning? Do viewers understand drawings based solely on their ability to resemble the entities they refer to (i.e., as images), or do they understand drawings based on shared but arbitrary associations with these entities (i.e., as symbols)? In this paper, we provide evidence for a cognitive account of pictorial meaning in which both visual and social information is integrated to support effective visual communication. To evaluate this account, we used a communication task where pairs of participants used drawings to repeatedly communicate the identity of a target object among multiple distractor objects. We manipulated social cues across three experiments and a full internal replication, finding pairs of participants develop referent-specific and interaction-specific strategies for communicating more efficiently over time, going beyond what could be explained by either task practice or a pure resemblance-based account alone. Using a combination of model-based image analyses and crowdsourced sketch annotations, we further determined that drawings did not drift toward arbitrariness, as predicted by a pure convention-based account, but systematically preserved those visual features that were most distinctive of the target object. Taken together, these findings advance theories of pictorial meaning and have implications for how successful graphical conventions emerge via complex interactions between visual perception, communicative experience, and social context.
Many real-world tasks require agents to coordinate their behavior to achieve shared goals. Successful collaboration requires not only adopting the same communicative conventions, but also grounding these conventions in the same task-appropriate conceptual abstractions. We investigate how humans use natural language to collaboratively solve physical assembly problems more effectively over time. Human participants were paired up in an online environment to reconstruct scenes containing two block towers. One participant could see the target towers, and sent assembly instructions for the other participant to reconstruct. Participants provided increasingly concise instructions across repeated attempts on each pair of towers, using higher-level referring expressions that captured each scene's hierarchical structure. To explain these findings, we extend recent probabilistic models of ad-hoc convention formation with an explicit perceptual learning mechanism. These results shed light on the inductive biases that enable intelligent agents to coordinate upon shared procedural abstractions.
Speakers communicate to influence their partner's beliefs and shape their actions. Belief- and action-based objectives have been explored independently in recent computational models, but it has been challenging to explicitly compare or integrate them. Indeed, we find that they are conflated in standard referential communication tasks. To distinguish these accounts, we introduce a new paradigm called signaling bandits, generalizing classic Lewis signaling games to a multi-armed bandit setting where all targets in the context have some relative value. We develop three speaker models: a belief-oriented speaker with a purely informative objective; an action-oriented speaker with an instrumental objective; and a combined speaker which integrates the two by inducing listener beliefs that generally lead to desirable actions. We then present a series of simulations demonstrating that grounding production choices in future listener actions results in relevance effects and flexible uses of nonliteral language. More broadly, our findings suggest that language games based on richer decision problems are a promising avenue for insight into rational communication.
There is substantial variability in the expectations that communication partners bring into interactions, creating the potential for misunderstandings. To directly probe these gaps and our ability to overcome them, we propose a communication task based on color-concept associations. In Experiment 1, we establish several key properties of the mental representations of these expectations, or \emph{lexical priors}, based on recent probabilistic theories. Associations are more variable for abstract concepts, variability is represented as uncertainty within each individual, and uncertainty enables accurate predictions about whether others are likely to share the same association. In Experiment 2, we then examine the downstream consequences of these representations for communication. Accuracy is initially low when communicating about concepts with more variable associations, but rapidly increases as participants form ad hoc conventions. Together, our findings suggest that people cope with variability by maintaining well-calibrated uncertainty about their partner and appropriately adaptable representations of their own.
Languages are powerful solutions to coordination problems: they provide stable, shared expectations about how the words we say correspond to the beliefs and intentions in our heads. Yet language use in a variable and non-stationary social environment requires linguistic representations to be flexible: old words acquire new ad hoc or partner-specific meanings on the fly. In this paper, we introduce a hierarchical Bayesian theory of convention formation that aims to reconcile the long-standing tension between these two basic observations. More specifically, we argue that the central computational problem of communication is not simply transmission, as in classical formulations, but learning and adaptation over multiple timescales. Under our account, rapid learning within dyadic interactions allows for coordination on partner-specific common ground, while social conventions are stable priors that have been abstracted away from interactions with multiple partners. We present new empirical data alongside simulations showing how our model provides a cognitive foundation for explaining several phenomena that have posed a challenge for previous accounts: (1) the convergence to more efficient referring expressions across repeated interaction with the same partner, (2) the gradual transfer of partner-specific common ground to novel partners, and (3) the influence of communicative context on which conventions eventually form.
Languages typically provide more than one grammatical construction to express certain types of messages. A speaker's choice of construction is known to depend on multiple factors, including the choice of main verb -- a phenomenon known as \emph{verb bias}. Here we introduce DAIS, a large benchmark dataset containing 50K human judgments for 5K distinct sentence pairs in the English dative alternation. This dataset includes 200 unique verbs and systematically varies the definiteness and length of arguments. We use this dataset, as well as an existing corpus of naturally occurring data, to evaluate how well recent neural language models capture human preferences. Results show that larger models perform better than smaller models, and transformer architectures (e.g. GPT-2) tend to out-perform recurrent architectures (e.g. LSTMs) even under comparable parameter and training settings. Additional analyses of internal feature representations suggest that transformers may better integrate specific lexical information with grammatical constructions.
We explore unconstrained natural language feedback as a learning signal for artificial agents. Humans use rich and varied language to teach, yet most prior work on interactive learning from language assumes a particular form of input (e.g. commands). We propose a general framework which does not make this assumption. We decompose linguistic feedback into two components: a grounding to $\textit{features}$ of a Markov decision process and $\textit{sentiment}$ about those features. We then perform an analogue of inverse reinforcement learning, regressing the teacher's sentiment on the features to infer their latent reward function. To evaluate our approach, we first collect a corpus of teaching behavior in a cooperative task where both teacher and learner are human. We use our framework to implement two artificial learners: a simple "literal" model and a "pragmatic" model with additional inductive biases. We baseline these with a neural network trained end-to-end to predict latent rewards. We then repeat our initial experiment pairing human teachers with our models. We find our "literal" and "pragmatic" models successfully learn from live human feedback and offer statistically-significant performance gains over the end-to-end baseline, with the "pragmatic" model approaching human performance on the task. Inspection reveals the end-to-end network learns representations similar to our models, suggesting they reflect emergent properties of the data. Our work thus provides insight into the information structure of naturalistic linguistic feedback as well as methods to leverage it for reinforcement learning.
A key property of linguistic conventions is that they hold over an entire community of speakers, allowing us to communicate efficiently even with people we have never met before. At the same time, much of our language use is partner-specific: we know that words may be understood differently by different people based on local common ground. This poses a challenge for accounts of convention formation. Exactly how do agents make the inferential leap to community-wide expectations while maintaining partner-specific knowledge? We propose a hierarchical Bayesian model of convention to explain how speakers and listeners abstract away meanings that seem to be shared across partners. To evaluate our model's predictions, we conducted an experiment where participants played an extended natural-language communication game with different partners in a small community. We examine several measures of generalization across partners, and find key signatures of local adaptation as well as collective convergence. These results suggest that local partner-specific learning is not only compatible with global convention formation but may facilitate it when coupled with a powerful hierarchical inductive mechanism.