The Reasonable Crowd: Towards evidence-based and interpretable models of driving behavior

Autonomous vehicles must balance a complex set of objectives. There is no consensus on how they should do so, nor on a model for specifying a desired driving behavior. We created a dataset to help address some of these questions in a limited operating domain. The data consists of 92 traffic scenarios, with multiple ways of traversing each scenario. Multiple annotators expressed their preference between pairs of scenario traversals. We used the data to compare an instance of a rulebook, carefully hand-crafted independently of the dataset, with several interpretable machine learning models such as Bayesian networks, decision trees, and logistic regression trained on the dataset. To compare driving behavior, these models use scores indicating by how much different scenario traversals violate each of 14 driving rules. The rules are interpretable and designed by subject-matter experts. First, we found that these rules were enough for these models to achieve a high classification accuracy on the dataset. Second, we found that the rulebook provides high interpretability without excessively sacrificing performance. Third, the data pointed to possible improvements in the rulebook and the rules, and to potential new rules. Fourth, we explored the interpretability vs performance trade-off by also training non-interpretable models such as a random forest. Finally, we make the dataset publicly available to encourage a discussion from the wider community on behavior specification for AVs. Please find it at github.com/bassam-motional/Reasonable-Crowd.

Fair Multi-party Machine Learning -- a Game Theoretic approach

High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data providers to pool their data together to learn a unified predictive model, which performs better. However, these providers are usually profit-driven and would only agree to participate inthe data sharing process if the process is deemed both profitable and fair for themselves. Due to the lack of existing literature, it is unclear whether a fair and stable outcome is possible in such data sharing processes. Hence, we wish to investigate the outcomes surrounding these scenarios and study if data providers would even agree to collaborate in the first place. Tapping on cooperative game concepts in Game Theory, we introduce the data sharing process between a group of agents as a new class of cooperative games with modified definition of stability and fairness. Using these new definitions, we then theoretically study the optimal and suboptimal outcomes of such data sharing processes and their sensitivity to perturbation.Through experiments, we present intuitive insights regarding theoretical results analysed in this paper and discuss various ways in which data can be valued reasonably.