Incentives in Private Collaborative Machine Learning

Collaborative machine learning involves training models on data from multiple parties but must incentivize their participation. Existing data valuation methods fairly value and reward each party based on shared data or model parameters but neglect the privacy risks involved. To address this, we introduce differential privacy (DP) as an incentive. Each party can select its required DP guarantee and perturb its sufficient statistic (SS) accordingly. The mediator values the perturbed SS by the Bayesian surprise it elicits about the model parameters. As our valuation function enforces a privacy-valuation trade-off, parties are deterred from selecting excessive DP guarantees that reduce the utility of the grand coalition's model. Finally, the mediator rewards each party with different posterior samples of the model parameters. Such rewards still satisfy existing incentives like fairness but additionally preserve DP and a high similarity to the grand coalition's posterior. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our approach on synthetic and real-world datasets.

DeRDaVa: Deletion-Robust Data Valuation for Machine Learning

Data valuation is concerned with determining a fair valuation of data from data sources to compensate them or to identify training examples that are the most or least useful for predictions. With the rising interest in personal data ownership and data protection regulations, model owners will likely have to fulfil more data deletion requests. This raises issues that have not been addressed by existing works: Are the data valuation scores still fair with deletions? Must the scores be expensively recomputed? The answer is no. To avoid recomputations, we propose using our data valuation framework DeRDaVa upfront for valuing each data source's contribution to preserving robust model performance after anticipated data deletions. DeRDaVa can be efficiently approximated and will assign higher values to data that are more useful or less likely to be deleted. We further generalize DeRDaVa to Risk-DeRDaVa to cater to risk-averse/seeking model owners who are concerned with the worst/best-cases model utility. We also empirically demonstrate the practicality of our solutions.

Probably Approximate Shapley Fairness with Applications in Machine Learning

The Shapley value (SV) is adopted in various scenarios in machine learning (ML), including data valuation, agent valuation, and feature attribution, as it satisfies their fairness requirements. However, as exact SVs are infeasible to compute in practice, SV estimates are approximated instead. This approximation step raises an important question: do the SV estimates preserve the fairness guarantees of exact SVs? We observe that the fairness guarantees of exact SVs are too restrictive for SV estimates. Thus, we generalise Shapley fairness to probably approximate Shapley fairness and propose fidelity score, a metric to measure the variation of SV estimates, that determines how probable the fairness guarantees hold. Our last theoretical contribution is a novel greedy active estimation (GAE) algorithm that will maximise the lowest fidelity score and achieve a better fairness guarantee than the de facto Monte-Carlo estimation. We empirically verify GAE outperforms several existing methods in guaranteeing fairness while remaining competitive in estimation accuracy in various ML scenarios using real-world datasets.

Collaborative Machine Learning with Incentive-Aware Model Rewards

Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives, such as a guaranteed fair reward based on their contributions. This motivates the need for measuring a party's contribution and designing an incentive-aware reward scheme accordingly. This paper proposes to value a party's reward based on Shapley value and information gain on model parameters given its data. Subsequently, we give each party a model as a reward. To formally incentivize the collaboration, we define some desirable properties (e.g., fairness and stability) which are inspired by cooperative game theory but adapted for our model reward that is uniquely freely replicable. Then, we propose a novel model reward scheme to satisfy fairness and trade off between the desirable properties via an adjustable parameter. The value of each party's model reward determined by our scheme is attained by injecting Gaussian noise to the aggregated training data with an optimized noise variance. We empirically demonstrate interesting properties of our scheme and evaluate its performance using synthetic and real-world datasets.