Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) is a highly effective paradigm for keeping LLM-based responses up-to-date and reducing the likelihood of hallucinations. Yet, RAG was recently shown to be quite vulnerable to corpus knowledge poisoning: an attacker injects misleading documents to the corpus to steer an LLM's output to an undesired response. We argue that the standard causal attention mechanism in LLMs enables harmful cross-document interactions, specifically in cases of attacks. Accordingly, we introduce a novel defense approach for RAG: Sparse Document Attention RAG (SDAG). This is a block-sparse attention mechanism that disallows cross-attention between retrieved documents. SDAG requires a minimal inference-time change to the attention mask; furthermore, no fine-tuning or additional architectural changes are needed. We present an empirical evaluation of LLM-based question answering (QA) with a variety of attack strategies on RAG. We show that our SDAG method substantially outperforms the standard causal attention mechanism in terms of attack success rate. We further demonstrate the clear merits of integrating SDAG with state-of-the-art RAG defense methods. Specifically, the integration results in performance that is statistically significantly better than the state-of-the-art.
Artificial intelligence systems introduce complex privacy risks throughout their lifecycle, especially when processing sensitive or high-dimensional data. Beyond the seven traditional privacy threat categories defined by the LINDDUN framework, AI systems are also exposed to model-centric privacy attacks such as membership inference and model inversion, which LINDDUN does not cover. To address both classical LINDDUN threats and additional AI-driven privacy attacks, PriMod4AI introduces a hybrid privacy threat modeling approach that unifies two structured knowledge sources, a LINDDUN knowledge base representing the established taxonomy, and a model-centric privacy attack knowledge base capturing threats outside LINDDUN. These knowledge bases are embedded into a vector database for semantic retrieval and combined with system level metadata derived from Data Flow Diagram. PriMod4AI uses retrieval-augmented and Data Flow specific prompt generation to guide large language models (LLMs) in identifying, explaining, and categorizing privacy threats across lifecycle stages. The framework produces justified and taxonomy-grounded threat assessments that integrate both classical and AI-driven perspectives. Evaluation on two AI systems indicates that PriMod4AI provides broad coverage of classical privacy categories while additionally identifying model-centric privacy threats. The framework produces consistent, knowledge-grounded outputs across LLMs, as reflected in agreement scores in the observed range.
Machine unlearning (MU) is essential for enforcing the right to be forgotten in machine learning systems. A key challenge of MU is how to reliably audit whether a model has truly forgotten specified training data. Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) are widely used for unlearning auditing, where samples that evade membership detection are often regarded as successfully forgotten. After carefully revisiting the reliability of MIA, we show that this assumption is flawed: failed membership inference does not imply true forgetting. We theoretically demonstrate that MIA-based auditing, when formulated as a binary classification problem, inevitably incurs statistical errors whose magnitude cannot be observed during the auditing process. This leads to overly optimistic evaluations of unlearning performance, while incurring substantial computational overhead due to shadow model training. To address these limitations, we propose Statistical Membership Inference Attack (SMIA), a novel training-free and highly effective auditing framework. SMIA directly compares the distributions of member and non-member data using statistical tests, eliminating the need for learned attack models. Moreover, SMIA outputs both a forgetting rate and a corresponding confidence interval, enabling quantified reliability of the auditing results. Extensive experiments show that SMIA provides more reliable auditing with significantly lower computational cost than existing MIA-based approaches. Notably, the theoretical guarantees and empirical effectiveness of SMIA suggest it as a new paradigm for reliable machine unlearning auditing.
Federated Unlearning (FU) aims to efficiently remove the influence of specific client data from a federated model while preserving utility for the remaining clients. However, three key challenges remain: (1) existing unlearning objectives often compromise model utility or increase vulnerability to Membership Inference Attacks (MIA); (2) there is a persistent conflict between forgetting and utility, where further unlearning inevitably harms retained performance; and (3) support for concurrent multi-client unlearning is poor, as gradient conflicts among clients degrade the quality of forgetting. To address these issues, we propose FUPareto, an efficient unlearning framework via Pareto-augmented optimization. We first introduce the Minimum Boundary Shift (MBS) Loss, which enforces unlearning by suppressing the target class logit below the highest non-target class logit; this can improve the unlearning efficiency and mitigate MIA risks. During the unlearning process, FUPareto performs Pareto improvement steps to preserve model utility and executes Pareto expansion to guarantee forgetting. Specifically, during Pareto expansion, the framework integrates a Null-Space Projected Multiple Gradient Descent Algorithm (MGDA) to decouple gradient conflicts. This enables effective, fair, and concurrent unlearning for multiple clients while minimizing utility degradation. Extensive experiments across diverse scenarios demonstrate that FUPareto consistently outperforms state-of-the-art FU methods in both unlearning efficacy and retained utility.
Activation steering is a practical post-training model alignment technique to enhance the utility of Large Language Models (LLMs). Prior to deploying a model as a service, developers can steer a pre-trained model toward specific behavioral objectives, such as compliance or instruction adherence, without the need for retraining. This process is as simple as adding a steering vector to the model's internal representations. However, this capability unintentionally introduces critical and under-explored safety risks. We identify a phenomenon termed Steering Externalities, where steering vectors derived from entirely benign datasets-such as those enforcing strict compliance or specific output formats like JSON-inadvertently erode safety guardrails. Experiments reveal that these interventions act as a force multiplier, creating new vulnerabilities to jailbreaks and increasing attack success rates to over 80% on standard benchmarks by bypassing the initial safety alignment. Ultimately, our results expose a critical blind spot in deployment: benign activation steering systematically erodes the "safety margin," rendering models more vulnerable to black-box attacks and proving that inference-time utility improvements must be rigorously audited for unintended safety externalities.
Deep neural networks demonstrate impressive performance in visual recognition, but they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that is imperceptible to the human. Although existing defense strategies such as adversarial training and purification have achieved progress, diffusion-based purification often involves high computational costs and information loss. To address these challenges, we introduce Shape Guided Purification (ShapePuri), a novel defense framework enhances robustness by aligning model representations with stable structural invariants. ShapePuri integrates two components: a Shape Encoding Module (SEM) that provides dense geometric guidance through Signed Distance Functions (SDF), and a Global Appearance Debiasing (GAD) module that mitigates appearance bias via stochastic transformations. In our experiments, ShapePuri achieves $84.06\%$ clean accuracy and $81.64\%$ robust accuracy under the AutoAttack protocol, representing the first defense framework to surpass the $80\%$ threshold on this benchmark. Our approach provides a scalable and efficient adversarial defense that preserves prediction stability during inference without requiring auxiliary modules or additional computational cost.
Unmanned underwater vehicles are increasingly employed for maintenance and surveying tasks at sea, but their operation in shallow waters is often hindered by hydrodynamic disturbances such as waves, currents, and turbulence. These unsteady flows can induce rapid changes in direction and speed, compromising vehicle stability and manoeuvrability. Marine organisms contend with such conditions by combining proprioceptive feedback with flexible fins and tails to reject disturbances. Inspired by this strategy, we propose soft morphing wings endowed with proprioceptive sensing to mitigate environmental perturbations. The wing's continuous deformation provides a natural means to infer dynamic disturbances: sudden changes in camber directly reflect variations in the oncoming flow. By interpreting this proprioceptive signal, a disturbance observer can reconstruct flow parameters in real time. To enable this, we develop and experimentally validate a dynamic model of a hydraulically actuated soft wing with controllable camber. We then show that curvature-based sensing allows accurate estimation of disturbances in the angle of attack. Finally, we demonstrate that a controller leveraging these proprioceptive estimates can reject disturbances in the lift response of the soft wing. By combining proprioceptive sensing with a disturbance observer, this technique mirrors biological strategies and provides a pathway for soft underwater vehicles to maintain stability in hazardous environments.
Downstream fine-tuning of vision-language-action (VLA) models enhances robotics, yet exposes the pipeline to backdoor risks. Attackers can pretrain VLAs on poisoned data to implant backdoors that remain stealthy but can trigger harmful behavior during inference. However, existing defenses either lack mechanistic insight into multimodal backdoors or impose prohibitive computational costs via full-model retraining. To this end, we uncover a deep-layer attention grabbing mechanism: backdoors redirect late-stage attention and form compact embedding clusters near the clean manifold. Leveraging this insight, we introduce Bera, a test-time backdoor erasure framework that detects tokens with anomalous attention via latent-space localization, masks suspicious regions using deep-layer cues, and reconstructs a trigger-free image to break the trigger-unsafe-action mapping while restoring correct behavior. Unlike prior defenses, Bera requires neither retraining of VLAs nor any changes to the training pipeline. Extensive experiments across multiple embodied platforms and tasks show that Bera effectively maintains nominal performance, significantly reduces attack success rates, and consistently restores benign behavior from backdoored outputs, thereby offering a robust and practical defense mechanism for securing robotic systems.
We present a text-reconstruction attack on mixture-of-experts (MoE) language models that recovers tokens from expert selections alone. In MoE models, each token is routed to a subset of expert subnetworks; we show these routing decisions leak substantially more information than previously understood. Prior work using logistic regression achieves limited reconstruction; we show that a 3-layer MLP improves this to 63.1% top-1 accuracy, and that a transformer-based sequence decoder recovers 91.2% of tokens top-1 (94.8% top-10) on 32-token sequences from OpenWebText after training on 100M tokens. These results connect MoE routing to the broader literature on embedding inversion. We outline practical leakage scenarios (e.g., distributed inference and side channels) and show that adding noise reduces but does not eliminate reconstruction. Our findings suggest that expert selections in MoE deployments should be treated as sensitive as the underlying text.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) achieve strong image classification performance but lack interpretability and are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Neuro-fuzzy hybrids such as DCNFIS replace fully connected CNN classifiers with Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference Systems (ANFIS) to improve interpretability, yet their robustness remains underexplored. This work compares standard CNNs (ConvNet, VGG, ResNet18) with their ANFIS-augmented counterparts on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 under gradient-based (PGD) and gradient-free (Square) attacks. Results show that ANFIS integration does not consistently improve clean accuracy and has architecture-dependent effects on robustness: ResNet18-ANFIS exhibits improved adversarial robustness, while VGG-ANFIS often underperforms its baseline. These findings suggest that neuro-fuzzy augmentation can enhance robustness in specific architectures but is not universally beneficial.