AI healthcare chatbots are increasingly used to support health information seeking and self-management, yet their performance and impact on users remains to be studied. This study examines over 15,000 user reviews from 59 AI healthcare chatbot apps to explore how these systems function in everyday informational and emotional contexts. Topic modeling and interpretive analysis identify three recurring breakdowns: access barriers and service unreliability, user experience and interaction quality, and billing and customer support issues. Privacy and security concerns are associated with the most negative experiences. By framing AI healthcare chatbots as information infrastructures, our findings highlight how failures in access, usability, and trust affect users, offering actionable insights for designers, policymakers, and information professionals aiming to improve digital health systems.
With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in chatbots and everyday applications, companies increasingly need guardrails that are effective while remaining low-cost and low-latency. Safety evaluation of LLM outputs has generally relied on LLM-based judges, which can be effective but are often slow and expensive to deploy at scale. In this paper, we evaluate whether fine-tuned modern encoder classifiers from the ModernBERT family, including ModernBERT and Ettin, can reliably identify harmful LLM outputs in user-model conversations without substantial performance loss relative to LLM-based judges. We benchmark these encoder classifiers against rule-based prefix matching, fine-tuned LLM classifiers, and LLM judges using a range of judge-prompting strategies across open-source adversarial datasets. The LLM judges include evaluation methodologies from StrongReject, ShieldGemma, JailbreakBench, AILuminate, SorryBench, and a Claude-as-a-judge setup, as well as fine-tuned safety classifiers such as LlamaGuard 3 and LlamaGuard 4. The encoder classifiers are fine-tuned on judge-labeled data using a majority-voting label strategy and are then evaluated on a gold-standard holdout dataset to assess their performance relative to LLM judges. We report absolute performance using F1 score, false negative rate, and precision-recall metrics. We also break down results by attack technique, including single-turn prompting, decomposition, escalation, and context manipulation, to identify where encoder classifiers align with or diverge from LLM-based judges. Our findings provide guidance on when encoder classifiers can serve as cost- and latency-efficient alternatives to LLM-based safety evaluation.
Commercial NLP treats the shopping chatbot as a recommender or a conversion tool: its job is to match a user to a catalogue entry and close a sale. We argue that the arrival of agent-native micro-payment rails (e.g., x402, AP2) changes what is scarce. When the buyer is an autonomous agent that can investigate exhaustively, the bottleneck is no longer matching products but acquiring trustworthy, decision-relevant information about them. We envision agentic e-commerce as a micro-transaction market for verified information: buyer agents spend fractions of a cent to progressively unlock seller- and reviewer-supplied data -- service histories, third-party test reports, bills of materials, audited sales and support metrics -- paid for a la carte under a freemium model, with reviewer trust scored reputationally. We sketch the architecture of such a market and argue that it rewards genuine product quality and yields truer competition than ranking-based storefronts. We then translate the vision into concrete NLP problems -- cost-optimal information acquisition, data pricing and negotiation, real-time entity resolution, grounded value exchange, and privacy-preserving persona modelling -- and argue that these, not chat fluency, deserve the field's attention.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used as perception-reasoning backbones for embodied intelligence in safety-critical physical systems, where perception or reasoning errors can lead to unsafe decisions or actions. Although many red-teaming methods have been developed to probe VLM vulnerabilities, their evaluation remains fragmented across datasets, metrics, and threat models, making direct comparison difficult and obscuring whether observed differences arise from stronger attacks, more vulnerable models, or incompatible evaluation settings. Existing chatbot-centric red-teaming benchmarks mainly standardize jailbreak and content-safety evaluation, but they do not systematically capture physically grounded functional failures or cover red-teaming methods that target physical-world VLMs. This raises the key challenge of comparing diverse attack methods under a unified protocol while targeting the same scenario-specific failures. We introduce REALM, to our knowledge the first unified red-teaming benchmark for physical-world VLMs. REALM integrates 12 red-teaming methods, 3 model-agnostic defenses, and 13 VLMs under a practical black-box threat model with shared datasets and metrics. To align adversarial objectives across attack families, REALM introduces an agentic target-generation pipeline that constructs shared, scenario-specific, and physically grounded attack objectives for each scene, enabling fair comparison of diverse red-teaming methods under aligned adversarial goals. Our evaluation shows that text and typographic injection attacks induce the most failures, multimodal co-optimization yields the strongest visual-perturbation transfer, single-pass attacks approach iterative methods at much lower cost, and model scale alone does not confer adversarial robustness. Code is available at https://github.com/UCF-ML-Research/REALM.
Family members caring for individuals with Alzheimer's disease and related dementias (AD/ADRD) provide the foundation of long-term care worldwide. In 2023, more than 11 million U.S. family and friends contributed 18 billion hours of unpaid care, often at the cost of their own physical and mental health. These informal caregivers -- also referred as the "invisible second patients" -- experience elevated rates of mental health problems. Yet research commonly reduces their complex psychosocial experiences to a single construct of caregiver burden, obscuring which specific needs are unmet or effectively supported. At the same time, digital and AI-enabled technologies are rapidly expanding, from smartphone apps and videoconferencing to sensor platforms and AI chatbots. However, the absence of shared frameworks across medicine, psychology, and technology research limits cumulative progress. This study introduces a Caregiver Mental Health and Technology Taxonomy that systematically links AD/ADRD caregiver needs with corresponding classes of technology-based interventions. Drawing from an interdisciplinary literature review and two qualitative studies with caregivers, the taxonomy identifies mismatches between caregiver priorities and existing technological support, highlights under-served domains such as relational strain and compassion fatigue, and proposes design directions for adaptive, responsive systems. The framework offers a shared vocabulary to guide clinicians, researchers, and technology designers in developing more person-centered and clinically grounded innovation in dementia care.
Prompt injection is ranked as the most critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments by the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, yet existing defenses operate at isolated pipeline stages and remain incomplete. Input filters cannot inspect retrieved documents, while output monitors cannot prevent malicious payloads from reaching the model. Consequently, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) chatbots remain vulnerable to indirect injection, where a poisoned knowledge-base document compromises every user whose query retrieves it. We present a three-layer framework that intercepts both direct and indirect prompt injection throughout the inference pipeline. Layer 1 screens user input using a rule-based pattern library and a fine-tuned semantic anomaly classifier. Layer 2 enforces a provenance-based instruction hierarchy during context assembly, preventing retrieved content from overriding operator policy. Layer 3 audits model output using a policy rule engine and semantic drift detector before delivery. A continuous audit loop aggregates structured logs and supports retraining to adapt the classifier to emerging attack patterns. The framework is model-agnostic and deploys as middleware without modifying the underlying LLM. Evaluation on 5,080 samples across GPT-4o, Llama 3, and Mistral 7B shows that the framework reduces Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 71.4\% to 11.3\%, outperforming the best single-layer baseline by 27.3 percentage points and a published guardrail system by 23.8 percentage points, while maintaining a 4.8\% false positive rate and a median latency overhead of 61.2 ms. Ablation studies confirm that all three layers provide complementary protection and that their combined effect exceeds the sum of individual contributions.
When social chatbots make mistakes, and they do, how they recover determines whether users trust them again. Social chatbots are increasingly integrated into everyday life, yet they remain prone to generating convincing but inaccurate information. The social connection they build with users makes such errors particularly consequential. We conducted a between-subjects experiment (N=120) comparing three error correction strategies: a webpage retraction, self-correction by the same social chatbot, and correction by an expert chatbot. Our results reveal two key findings. First, all three strategies corrected the error equally well, but only self-correction did so without damaging the chatbot's credibility: participants rated self-correcting chatbots significantly higher in both trustworthiness and perceived expertise than chatbots whose errors were corrected by external sources. Second, the strength of the user's social connection with the chatbot, measured through social attraction and self-disclosure, significantly predicted the magnitude of belief change, but only when the chatbot corrected itself. Outsourcing corrections to an external source severed this link entirely. These findings suggest that social chatbots should correct their own mistakes rather than outsource corrections, and that investing in social connection is a functional mechanism that amplifies correction effectiveness, not merely a design feature. We discuss implications for designing chatbots that maintain long-term credibility while effectively addressing their own errors.
Context engineering has emerged as a primary lever for improving AI systems without parameter updates. Recent work showing that textual gradients do not function as real gradients motivates treating automatic prompt optimization (APO) as black-box search. We introduce SPO (Stochastic Prompt Optimization), a framework for stochastic search over prompt space, and compare three strategies of increasing sophistication: error-informed random search, a genetic algorithm with evolutionary operators, and SAGE (SPO via Agent-Guided Exploration), a multi-agent pipeline with diagnostic code execution. Across three benchmarks, no single strategy dominates; effectiveness depends on the interaction of landscape structure with error type. We further deploy SAGE on a mental-health chatbot under a continuous optimization paradigm, where it compounds eight cycles of individually-noisy A/B tests into a statistically robust gain in next-day retention. We argue that coupling qualitative diagnosis with quantitative validation is what makes agentic optimization effective for open-ended task-oriented dialogue.
Banks simultaneously face signature-based fraud (card-not-present attacks, account takeover, ATM cloning) and behavioural financial crime (structuring, layering, mule networks, business email compromise) -- two threat families with fundamentally different detection requirements. Static rule engines that reliably catch brute-force and high-velocity events are structurally blind to business-email-compromise (BEC) payment redirection, session hijacking, and money-laundering layering, which are engineered to appear indistinguishable from legitimate activity at the individual transaction or session level. This paper presents an AI security agent for retail and corporate banking that addresses this gap through a three-component fusion architecture operating on two parallel event streams: a transaction stream (card fraud, ACH/wire fraud, AML categories) and a session stream (account takeover, session hijacking, SIM-swap, insider abuse). Each stream combines an LSTM sequence model capturing per-account behavioural history, a statistical velocity/threshold monitor, and a graph/network module capturing account-counterparty relationship patterns (fan-in, fan-out, pass-through ratio) for money-laundering detection. Experiments on a synthetic event log of 237,669 transactions and 113,508 sessions across 13 threat categories and 3,470 simulated accounts demonstrate overall F1 of 0.787 (transaction stream) and 0.867 (session stream) for the proposed model, versus 0.562/0.733 for a rule-based baseline and 0.655/0.713 for an LSTM-only baseline. The agent includes a customer-facing transaction-verification chatbot (96.6% identity verification accuracy, 86.8% mass-reset attack detection) and an analyst case-summary assistant (99.3% action-recommendation F1), with Critical-tier automated response latency under 0.43 ms at the 95th percentile.
A central pedagogical value evaluated in AI tutor benchmarks is scaffolding: guiding students through graduated steps toward a solution. Alignment and evaluation methods for embedding scaffolding behaviour into chatbots, however, rest on an implicit assumption: that students will take up the scaffolding and engage in the conversation. To examine whether this assumption holds, we introduce an evaluation pipeline around two metrics - Chatbot Scaffolding and Student Uptake - and apply them across nine datasets of 9,490 chats, spanning AI tutor benchmarks and real-world deployments of educational chatbots. Our analysis reveals that while benchmarks assume a high-scaffolding, high-student-uptake environment, students in real-world settings exhibit lower levels of uptake overall - frequently bypassing the chatbot's pedagogical framing to drive the interaction toward their own learning goals at little interpersonal cost. We argue that bypassing scaffolding is not necessarily detrimental; rather, it frequently highlights a mismatch between a chatbot's pedagogical framing and the student's learning goals. To meaningfully evaluate the effectiveness of a chatbot's assistance, future benchmarks must move beyond the assumption that students will simply take up the scaffolding, and instead evaluate how these chatbots navigate diverse learning contexts and student-driven interaction patterns.