WaveFuzz: A Clean-Label Poisoning Attack to Protect Your Voice

People are not always receptive to their voice data being collected and misused. Training the audio intelligence systems needs these data to build useful features, but the cost for getting permissions or purchasing data is very high, which inevitably encourages hackers to collect these voice data without people's awareness. To discourage the hackers from proactively collecting people's voice data, we are the first to propose a clean-label poisoning attack, called WaveFuzz, which can prevent intelligence audio models from building useful features from protected (poisoned) voice data but still preserve the semantic information to the humans. Specifically, WaveFuzz perturbs the voice data to cause Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) (typical representations of audio signals) to generate the poisoned frequency features. These poisoned features are then fed to audio prediction models, which degrades the performance of audio intelligence systems. Empirically, we show the efficacy of WaveFuzz by attacking two representative types of intelligent audio systems, i.e., speaker recognition system (SR) and speech command recognition system (SCR). For example, the accuracies of models are declined by $19.78\%$ when only $10\%$ of the poisoned voice data is to fine-tune models, and the accuracies of models declined by $6.07\%$ when only $10\%$ of the training voice data is poisoned. Consequently, WaveFuzz is an effective technique that enables people to fight back to protect their own voice data, which sheds new light on ameliorating privacy issues.

Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Commercial Speech Platforms with Minimal Information

Adversarial attacks against commercial black-box speech platforms, including cloud speech APIs and voice control devices, have received little attention until recent years. The current "black-box" attacks all heavily rely on the knowledge of prediction/confidence scores to craft effective adversarial examples, which can be intuitively defended by service providers without returning these messages. In this paper, we propose two novel adversarial attacks in more practical and rigorous scenarios. For commercial cloud speech APIs, we propose Occam, a decision-only black-box adversarial attack, where only final decisions are available to the adversary. In Occam, we formulate the decision-only AE generation as a discontinuous large-scale global optimization problem, and solve it by adaptively decomposing this complicated problem into a set of sub-problems and cooperatively optimizing each one. Our Occam is a one-size-fits-all approach, which achieves 100% success rates of attacks with an average SNR of 14.23dB, on a wide range of popular speech and speaker recognition APIs, including Google, Alibaba, Microsoft, Tencent, iFlytek, and Jingdong, outperforming the state-of-the-art black-box attacks. For commercial voice control devices, we propose NI-Occam, the first non-interactive physical adversarial attack, where the adversary does not need to query the oracle and has no access to its internal information and training data. We combine adversarial attacks with model inversion attacks, and thus generate the physically-effective audio AEs with high transferability without any interaction with target devices. Our experimental results show that NI-Occam can successfully fool Apple Siri, Microsoft Cortana, Google Assistant, iFlytek and Amazon Echo with an average SRoA of 52% and SNR of 9.65dB, shedding light on non-interactive physical attacks against voice control devices.