Moving the Safety Barrier: Dynamic Routing Adaptive Alignment Against White-Box Attacks

With the widespread deployment of large foundation models (LFMs) in open environments, safety threats are shifting from black-box jailbreaks toward white-box attacks that directly identify and disrupt internal safety neurons or routes. However, existing safety defenses often rely on static safety units or fixed refusal pathways, leaving models highly vulnerable to targeted route-level white-box attacks. For that, we propose dynamic routing adaptive alignment (DRAA), a framework that introduces dynamic compensatory routes to preserve robust refusal behavior when the safety route is compromised. Specifically, we first identify and localize the model's safety route by contrasting internal activations between safe and unsafe calibration samples. DRAA then masks this safety route to induce causal failure cases and selectively mines the resulting defense failures, thereby constructing failure-aware preference pairs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DRAA effectively restructures the underlying pathway dependence of model safety, substantially improving robustness against route-level white-box attacks, while preserving general utility.

No Single Neuron of Failure: Distributed Safety Alignment Against White-Box Attacks

With the rapid release of open-weight large foundation models, safety threats are shifting from black-box jailbreaks to neuron-level white-box attacks that directly identify and manipulate safety-related neurons. Existing alignment methods often investigate the safety behavior on a small number of neurons, creating fragile single point of failure with limited redundancy. To address this issue, we propose distributed safety alignment (DSA), which redundantly encodes safety capabilities across multiple computational neurons, ensuring that the model maintains its safety baseline even when critical safety neurons are disrupted. Specifically, we localize the intervention to the inputs of the down-projection layers in language-side feed-forward networks and treat each feature coordinate as the activation of an individual neuron. DSA then combines neuron activations with loss gradients to compute a direction-aware first-order Taylor score that globally identifies the neurons that contribute most to the current refusal behavior of the model. Finally, targeted disruption via deterministic masking and stochastic dropout is coupled, forcing the model to abandon narrow safety neurons and redundantly encode safety behavior across multiple compensatory neurons. Extensive experiments show that DSA substantially improves robustness against white-box neuron-level safety attacks while preserving the model's general language and multimodal utility.

AtomMem: Building Simple and Effective Memory System for LLM Agents via Atomic Facts

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning and generation abilities, but their fixed context windows limit long-term information accumulation and reuse across multi-session interactions. Existing memory-augmented systems often construct memory in a coarse and unstable manner, relying on inefficient memory representations or unstable unconstrained updates. To address these challenges, we propose AtomMem, a long-term memory system designed for value-dense storage and stable memory evolution. AtomMem introduces a Fact Executor, which selectively extracts high value atomic facts from long form interactions to serve as highly efficient memory representations. Subsequently, AtomMem organizes these facts into hierarchical event structures and temporal profiles, capturing coherent episodic contexts and tracking dynamically evolving user attributes over time. During retrieval, the system activates an associative memory graph to connect fragmented memories. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark confirm that AtomMem achieves state-of-the-art performance across various reasoning tasks, offering a scalable and economically viable solution for deploying intelligent personalized agents.

Latent Anomaly Knowledge Excavation: Unveiling Sparse Sensitive Neurons in Vision-Language Models

Large-scale vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit remarkable zero-shot capabilities, yet the internal mechanisms driving their anomaly detection (AD) performance remain poorly understood. Current methods predominantly treat VLMs as black-box feature extractors, assuming that anomaly-specific knowledge must be acquired through external adapters or memory banks. In this paper, we challenge this assumption by arguing that anomaly knowledge is intrinsically embedded within pre-trained models but remains latent and under-activated. We hypothesize that this knowledge is concentrated within a sparse subset of anomaly-sensitive neurons. To validate this, we propose latent anomaly knowledge excavation (LAKE), a training-free framework that identifies and elicits these critical neuronal signals using only a minimal set of normal samples. By isolating these sensitive neurons, LAKE constructs a highly compact normality representation that integrates visual structural deviations with cross-modal semantic activations. Extensive experiments on industrial AD benchmarks demonstrate that LAKE achieves state-of-the-art performance while providing intrinsic, neuron-level interpretability. Ultimately, our work advocates for a paradigm shift: redefining anomaly detection as the targeted activation of latent pre-trained knowledge rather than the acquisition of a downstream task.

TraceRouter: Robust Safety for Large Foundation Models via Path-Level Intervention

Despite their capabilities, large foundation models (LFMs) remain susceptible to adversarial manipulation. Current defenses predominantly rely on the "locality hypothesis", suppressing isolated neurons or features. However, harmful semantics act as distributed, cross-layer circuits, rendering such localized interventions brittle and detrimental to utility. To bridge this gap, we propose \textbf{TraceRouter}, a path-level framework that traces and disconnects the causal propagation circuits of illicit semantics. TraceRouter operates in three stages: (1) it pinpoints a sensitive onset layer by analyzing attention divergence; (2) it leverages sparse autoencoders (SAEs) and differential activation analysis to disentangle and isolate malicious features; and (3) it maps these features to downstream causal pathways via feature influence scores (FIS) derived from zero-out interventions. By selectively suppressing these causal chains, TraceRouter physically severs the flow of harmful information while leaving orthogonal computation routes intact. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TraceRouter significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving a superior trade-off between adversarial robustness and general utility. Our code will be publicly released. WARNING: This paper contains unsafe model responses.