Elements of World Knowledge (EWOK): A cognition-inspired framework for evaluating basic world knowledge in language models

The ability to build and leverage world models is essential for a general-purpose AI agent. Testing such capabilities is hard, in part because the building blocks of world models are ill-defined. We present Elements of World Knowledge (EWOK), a framework for evaluating world modeling in language models by testing their ability to use knowledge of a concept to match a target text with a plausible/implausible context. EWOK targets specific concepts from multiple knowledge domains known to be vital for world modeling in humans. Domains range from social interactions (help/hinder) to spatial relations (left/right). Both, contexts and targets are minimal pairs. Objects, agents, and locations in the items can be flexibly filled in enabling easy generation of multiple controlled datasets. We then introduce EWOK-CORE-1.0, a dataset of 4,374 items covering 11 world knowledge domains. We evaluate 20 openweights large language models (1.3B--70B parameters) across a battery of evaluation paradigms along with a human norming study comprising 12,480 measurements. The overall performance of all tested models is worse than human performance, with results varying drastically across domains. These data highlight simple cases where even large models fail and present rich avenues for targeted research on LLM world modeling capabilities.

Learning Phonotactics from Linguistic Informants

We propose an interactive approach to language learning that utilizes linguistic acceptability judgments from an informant (a competent language user) to learn a grammar. Given a grammar formalism and a framework for synthesizing data, our model iteratively selects or synthesizes a data-point according to one of a range of information-theoretic policies, asks the informant for a binary judgment, and updates its own parameters in preparation for the next query. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our model in the domain of phonotactics, the rules governing what kinds of sound-sequences are acceptable in a language, and carry out two experiments, one with typologically-natural linguistic data and another with a range of procedurally-generated languages. We find that the information-theoretic policies that our model uses to select items to query the informant achieve sample efficiency comparable to, and sometimes greater than, fully supervised approaches.

Language models align with human judgments on key grammatical constructions

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) make human-like linguistic generalizations? Dentella et al. (2023; "DGL") prompt several LLMs ("Is the following sentence grammatically correct in English?") to elicit grammaticality judgments of 80 English sentences, concluding that LLMs demonstrate a "yes-response bias" and a "failure to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences". We re-evaluate LLM performance using well-established practices and find that DGL's data in fact provide evidence for just how well LLMs capture human behaviors. Models not only achieve high accuracy overall, but also capture fine-grained variation in human linguistic judgments.

LINC: A Neurosymbolic Approach for Logical Reasoning by Combining Language Models with First-Order Logic Provers

Logical reasoning, i.e., deductively inferring the truth value of a conclusion from a set of premises, is an important task for artificial intelligence with wide potential impacts on science, mathematics, and society. While many prompting-based strategies have been proposed to enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to do such reasoning more effectively, they still appear unsatisfactory, often failing in subtle and unpredictable ways. In this work, we investigate the validity of instead reformulating such tasks as modular neurosymbolic programming, which we call LINC: Logical Inference via Neurosymbolic Computation. In LINC, the LLM acts as a semantic parser, translating premises and conclusions from natural language to expressions in first-order logic. These expressions are then offloaded to an external theorem prover, which symbolically performs deductive inference. Leveraging this approach, we observe significant performance gains on FOLIO and a balanced subset of ProofWriter for three different models in nearly all experimental conditions we evaluate. On ProofWriter, augmenting the comparatively small open-source StarCoder+ (15.5B parameters) with LINC even outperforms GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting by an absolute 38% and 10%, respectively. When used with GPT-4, LINC scores 26% higher than CoT on ProofWriter while performing comparatively on FOLIO. Further analysis reveals that although both methods on average succeed roughly equally often on this dataset, they exhibit distinct and complementary failure modes. We thus provide promising evidence for how logical reasoning over natural language can be tackled through jointly leveraging LLMs alongside symbolic provers. All corresponding code is publicly available at https://github.com/benlipkin/linc

Probing self-supervised speech models for phonetic and phonemic information: a case study in aspiration

Textless self-supervised speech models have grown in capabilities in recent years, but the nature of the linguistic information they encode has not yet been thoroughly examined. We evaluate the extent to which these models' learned representations align with basic representational distinctions made by humans, focusing on a set of phonetic (low-level) and phonemic (more abstract) contrasts instantiated in word-initial stops. We find that robust representations of both phonetic and phonemic distinctions emerge in early layers of these models' architectures, and are preserved in the principal components of deeper layer representations. Our analyses suggest two sources for this success: some can only be explained by the optimization of the models on speech data, while some can be attributed to these models' high-dimensional architectures. Our findings show that speech-trained HuBERT derives a low-noise and low-dimensional subspace corresponding to abstract phonological distinctions.

A Cross-Linguistic Pressure for Uniform Information Density in Word Order

While natural languages differ widely in both canonical word order and word order flexibility, their word orders still follow shared cross-linguistic statistical patterns, often attributed to functional pressures. In the effort to identify these pressures, prior work has compared real and counterfactual word orders. Yet one functional pressure has been overlooked in such investigations: the uniform information density (UID) hypothesis, which holds that information should be spread evenly throughout an utterance. Here, we ask whether a pressure for UID may have influenced word order patterns cross-linguistically. To this end, we use computational models to test whether real orders lead to greater information uniformity than counterfactual orders. In our empirical study of 10 typologically diverse languages, we find that: (i) among SVO languages, real word orders consistently have greater uniformity than reverse word orders, and (ii) only linguistically implausible counterfactual orders consistently exceed the uniformity of real orders. These findings are compatible with a pressure for information uniformity in the development and usage of natural languages.

Prompt-based methods may underestimate large language models' linguistic generalizations

Prompting is now a dominant method for evaluating the linguistic knowledge of large language models (LLMs). While other methods directly read out models' probability distributions over strings, prompting requires models to access this internal information by processing linguistic input, thereby implicitly testing a new type of emergent ability: metalinguistic judgment. In this study, we compare metalinguistic prompting and direct probability measurements as ways of measuring models' knowledge of English. Broadly, we find that LLMs' metalinguistic judgments are inferior to quantities directly derived from representations. Furthermore, consistency gets worse as the prompt diverges from direct measurements of next-word probabilities. Our findings suggest that negative results relying on metalinguistic prompts cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that an LLM lacks a particular linguistic competence. Our results also highlight the lost value with the move to closed APIs where access to probability distributions is limited.

The neural dynamics of auditory word recognition and integration

Listeners recognize and integrate words in rapid and noisy everyday speech by combining expectations about upcoming content with incremental sensory evidence. We present a computational model of word recognition which formalizes this perceptual process in Bayesian decision theory. We fit this model to explain scalp EEG signals recorded as subjects passively listened to a fictional story, revealing both the dynamics of the online auditory word recognition process and the neural correlates of the recognition and integration of words. The model reveals distinct neural processing of words depending on whether or not they can be quickly recognized. While all words trigger a neural response characteristic of probabilistic integration -- voltage modulations predicted by a word's surprisal in context -- these modulations are amplified for words which require more than roughly 100 ms of input to be recognized. We observe no difference in the latency of these neural responses according to words' recognition times.Our results support a two-part model of speech comprehension, combining an eager and rapid process of word recognition with a temporally independent process of word integration.

Expectations over Unspoken Alternatives Predict Pragmatic Inferences

Scalar inferences (SI) are a signature example of how humans interpret language based on unspoken alternatives. While empirical studies have demonstrated that human SI rates are highly variable -- both within instances of a single scale, and across different scales -- there have been few proposals that quantitatively explain both cross- and within-scale variation. Furthermore, while it is generally assumed that SIs arise through reasoning about unspoken alternatives, it remains debated whether humans reason about alternatives as linguistic forms, or at the level of concepts. Here, we test a shared mechanism explaining SI rates within and across scales: context-driven expectations about the unspoken alternatives. Using neural language models to approximate human predictive distributions, we find that SI rates are captured by the expectedness of the strong scalemate as an alternative. Crucially, however, expectedness robustly predicts cross-scale variation only under a meaning-based view of alternatives. Our results suggest that pragmatic inferences arise from context-driven expectations over alternatives, and these expectations operate at the level of concepts.

Language model acceptability judgements are not always robust to context

Targeted syntactic evaluations of language models ask whether models show stable preferences for syntactically acceptable content over minimal-pair unacceptable inputs. Most targeted syntactic evaluation datasets ask models to make these judgements with just a single context-free sentence as input. This does not match language models' training regime, in which input sentences are always highly contextualized by the surrounding corpus. This mismatch raises an important question: how robust are models' syntactic judgements in different contexts? In this paper, we investigate the stability of language models' performance on targeted syntactic evaluations as we vary properties of the input context: the length of the context, the types of syntactic phenomena it contains, and whether or not there are violations of grammaticality. We find that model judgements are generally robust when placed in randomly sampled linguistic contexts. However, they are substantially unstable for contexts containing syntactic structures matching those in the critical test content. Among all tested models (GPT-2 and five variants of OPT), we significantly improve models' judgements by providing contexts with matching syntactic structures, and conversely significantly worsen them using unacceptable contexts with matching but violated syntactic structures. This effect is amplified by the length of the context, except for unrelated inputs. We show that these changes in model performance are not explainable by simple features matching the context and the test inputs, such as lexical overlap and dependency overlap. This sensitivity to highly specific syntactic features of the context can only be explained by the models' implicit in-context learning abilities.