semantic-features: A User-Friendly Tool for Studying Contextual Word Embeddings in Interpretable Semantic Spaces

We introduce semantic-features, an extensible, easy-to-use library based on Chronis et al. (2023) for studying contextualized word embeddings of LMs by projecting them into interpretable spaces. We apply this tool in an experiment where we measure the contextual effect of the choice of dative construction (prepositional or double object) on the semantic interpretation of utterances (Bresnan, 2007). Specifically, we test whether "London" in "I sent London the letter." is more likely to be interpreted as an animate referent (e.g., as the name of a person) than in "I sent the letter to London." To this end, we devise a dataset of 450 sentence pairs, one in each dative construction, with recipients being ambiguous with respect to person-hood vs. place-hood. By applying semantic-features, we show that the contextualized word embeddings of three masked language models show the expected sensitivities. This leaves us optimistic about the usefulness of our tool.

Is It JUST Semantics? A Case Study of Discourse Particle Understanding in LLMs

Discourse particles are crucial elements that subtly shape the meaning of text. These words, often polyfunctional, give rise to nuanced and often quite disparate semantic/discourse effects, as exemplified by the diverse uses of the particle "just" (e.g., exclusive, temporal, emphatic). This work investigates the capacity of LLMs to distinguish the fine-grained senses of English "just", a well-studied example in formal semantics, using data meticulously created and labeled by expert linguists. Our findings reveal that while LLMs exhibit some ability to differentiate between broader categories, they struggle to fully capture more subtle nuances, highlighting a gap in their understanding of discourse particles.

Causal Interventions Reveal Shared Structure Across English Filler-Gap Constructions

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful sources of evidence for linguists seeking to develop theories of syntax. In this paper, we argue that causal interpretability methods, applied to LLMs, can greatly enhance the value of such evidence by helping us characterize the abstract mechanisms that LLMs learn to use. Our empirical focus is a set of English filler-gap dependency constructions (e.g., questions, relative clauses). Linguistic theories largely agree that these constructions share many properties. Using experiments based in Distributed Interchange Interventions, we show that LLMs converge on similar abstract analyses of these constructions. These analyses also reveal previously overlooked factors -- relating to frequency, filler type, and surrounding context -- that could motivate changes to standard linguistic theory. Overall, these results suggest that mechanistic, internal analyses of LLMs can push linguistic theory forward.

A suite of LMs comprehend puzzle statements as well as humans

Recent claims suggest that large language models (LMs) underperform humans in comprehending minimally complex English statements (Dentella et al., 2024). Here, we revisit those findings and argue that human performance was overestimated, while LLM abilities were underestimated. Using the same stimuli, we report a preregistered study comparing human responses in two conditions: one allowed rereading (replicating the original study), and one that restricted rereading (a more naturalistic comprehension test). Human accuracy dropped significantly when rereading was restricted (73%), falling below that of Falcon-180B-Chat (76%) and GPT-4 (81%). The newer GPT-o1 model achieves perfect accuracy. Results further show that both humans and models are disproportionately challenged by queries involving potentially reciprocal actions (e.g., kissing), suggesting shared pragmatic sensitivities rather than model-specific deficits. Additional analyses using Llama-2-70B log probabilities, a recoding of open-ended model responses, and grammaticality ratings of other sentences reveal systematic underestimation of model performance. We find that GPT-4o can align with either naive or expert grammaticality judgments, depending on prompt framing. These findings underscore the need for more careful experimental design and coding practices in LLM evaluation, and they challenge the assumption that current models are inherently weaker than humans at language comprehension.

On Language Models' Sensitivity to Suspicious Coincidences

Humans are sensitive to suspicious coincidences when generalizing inductively over data, as they make assumptions as to how the data was sampled. This results in smaller, more specific hypotheses being favored over more general ones. For instance, when provided the set {Austin, Dallas, Houston}, one is more likely to think that this is sampled from "Texas Cities" over "US Cities" even though both are compatible. Suspicious coincidence is strongly connected to pragmatic reasoning, and can serve as a testbed to analyze systems on their sensitivity towards the communicative goals of the task (i.e., figuring out the true category underlying the data). In this paper, we analyze whether suspicious coincidence effects are reflected in language models' (LMs) behavior. We do so in the context of two domains: 1) the number game, where humans made judgments of whether a number (e.g., 4) fits a list of given numbers (e.g., 16, 32, 2); and 2) by extending the number game setup to prominent cities. For both domains, the data is compatible with multiple hypotheses and we study which hypothesis is most consistent with the models' behavior. On analyzing five models, we do not find strong evidence for suspicious coincidences in LMs' zero-shot behavior. However, when provided access to the hypotheses space via chain-of-thought or explicit prompting, LMs start to show an effect resembling suspicious coincidences, sometimes even showing effects consistent with humans. Our study suggests that inductive reasoning behavior in LMs can be enhanced with explicit access to the hypothesis landscape.

Both Direct and Indirect Evidence Contribute to Dative Alternation Preferences in Language Models

Language models (LMs) tend to show human-like preferences on a number of syntactic phenomena, but the extent to which these are attributable to direct exposure to the phenomena or more general properties of language is unclear. We explore this with the English dative alternation (DO: "gave Y the X" vs. PO: "gave the X to Y"), using a controlled rearing paradigm wherein we iteratively train small LMs on systematically manipulated input. We focus on properties that affect the choice of alternant: length and animacy. Both properties are directly present in datives but also reflect more global tendencies for shorter elements to precede longer ones and animates to precede inanimates. First, by manipulating and ablating datives for these biases in the input, we show that direct evidence of length and animacy matters, but easy-first preferences persist even without such evidence. Then, using LMs trained on systematically perturbed datasets to manipulate global length effects (re-linearizing sentences globally while preserving dependency structure), we find that dative preferences can emerge from indirect evidence. We conclude that LMs' emergent syntactic preferences come from a mix of direct and indirect sources.

Language Models Fail to Introspect About Their Knowledge of Language

There has been recent interest in whether large language models (LLMs) can introspect about their own internal states. Such abilities would make LLMs more interpretable, and also validate the use of standard introspective methods in linguistics to evaluate grammatical knowledge in models (e.g., asking "Is this sentence grammatical?"). We systematically investigate emergent introspection across 21 open-source LLMs, in two domains where introspection is of theoretical interest: grammatical knowledge and word prediction. Crucially, in both domains, a model's internal linguistic knowledge can be theoretically grounded in direct measurements of string probability. We then evaluate whether models' responses to metalinguistic prompts faithfully reflect their internal knowledge. We propose a new measure of introspection: the degree to which a model's prompted responses predict its own string probabilities, beyond what would be predicted by another model with nearly identical internal knowledge. While both metalinguistic prompting and probability comparisons lead to high task accuracy, we do not find evidence that LLMs have privileged "self-access". Our findings complicate recent results suggesting that models can introspect, and add new evidence to the argument that prompted responses should not be conflated with models' linguistic generalizations.

Constructions are Revealed in Word Distributions

Construction grammar posits that constructions (form-meaning pairings) are acquired through experience with language (the distributional learning hypothesis). But how much information about constructions does this distribution actually contain? Corpus-based analyses provide some answers, but text alone cannot answer counterfactual questions about what caused a particular word to occur. For that, we need computable models of the distribution over strings -- namely, pretrained language models (PLMs). Here we treat a RoBERTa model as a proxy for this distribution and hypothesize that constructions will be revealed within it as patterns of statistical affinity. We support this hypothesis experimentally: many constructions are robustly distinguished, including (i) hard cases where semantically distinct constructions are superficially similar, as well as (ii) schematic constructions, whose "slots" can be filled by abstract word classes. Despite this success, we also provide qualitative evidence that statistical affinity alone may be insufficient to identify all constructions from text. Thus, statistical affinity is likely an important, but partial, signal available to learners.

Linguistic Generalizations are not Rules: Impacts on Evaluation of LMs

Linguistic evaluations of how well LMs generalize to produce or understand novel text often implicitly take for granted that natural languages are generated by symbolic rules. Grammaticality is thought to be determined by whether or not sentences obey such rules. Interpretation is believed to be compositionally generated by syntactic rules operating on meaningful words. Semantic parsing is intended to map sentences into formal logic. Failures of LMs to obey strict rules have been taken to reveal that LMs do not produce or understand language like humans. Here we suggest that LMs' failures to obey symbolic rules may be a feature rather than a bug, because natural languages are not based on rules. New utterances are produced and understood by a combination of flexible interrelated and context-dependent schemata or constructions. We encourage researchers to reimagine appropriate benchmarks and analyses that acknowledge the rich flexible generalizations that comprise natural languages.

How Linguistics Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Language Models

Language models can produce fluent, grammatical text. Nonetheless, some maintain that language models don't really learn language and also that, even if they did, that would not be informative for the study of human learning and processing. On the other side, there have been claims that the success of LMs obviates the need for studying linguistic theory and structure. We argue that both extremes are wrong. LMs can contribute to fundamental questions about linguistic structure, language processing, and learning. They force us to rethink arguments about learning and are informative for major questions in linguistic theory. But they do not replace linguistic structure and theory. We offer an optimistic take on the relationship between language models and linguistics.