University of Texas at Austin
Abstract:We show how causal interventions in Transformer models provide insights into English syntax by focusing on a long-standing challenge for syntactic theory: syntactic islands. Extraction from coordinated verb phrases is often degraded, yet acceptability varies gradiently with lexical content (e.g., "I know what he hates art and loves" vs. "I know what he looked down and saw"). We show that modern Transformer language models replicate human judgments across this gradient. Using causal interventions that isolate functionally relevant subspaces in Transformer blocks, attention modules, and MLPs, we demonstrate that extraction from coordination islands engages the same filler-gap mechanisms as canonical wh-dependencies, but that these mechanisms are selectively blocked to varying degrees. By projecting a large corpus of unrelated text onto these causally identified subspaces, we derive a novel linguistic hypothesis: the conjunction "and" is represented differently in extractable versus non-extractable constructions, corresponding to expressions encoding relational dependencies versus purely conjunctive uses. These results illustrate how mechanistic interpretability can inform syntax, generating new hypotheses about linguistic representation and processing.
Abstract:Norm, the formal theoretical linguist, and Claudette, the computational language scientist, have a lovely time discussing whether modern language models can inform important questions in the language sciences. Just as they are about to part ways until they meet again, 25 of their closest friends show up -- from linguistics, neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, and computer science. We use this discussion to highlight what we see as some common underlying issues: the String Statistics Strawman (the mistaken idea that LMs can't be linguistically competent or interesting because they, like their Markov model predecessors, are statistical models that learn from strings) and the As Good As it Gets Assumption (the idea that LM research as it stands in 2026 is the limit of what it can tell us about linguistics). We clarify the role of LM-based work for scientific insights into human language and advocate for a more expansive research program for the language sciences in the AI age, one that takes on the commentators' concerns in order to produce a better and more robust science of both human language and of LMs.
Abstract:Understanding when Vision-Language Models (VLMs) will behave unexpectedly, whether models can reliably predict their own behavior, and if models adhere to their introspective reasoning are central challenges for trustworthy deployment. To study this, we introduce the Graded Color Attribution (GCA) dataset, a controlled benchmark designed to elicit decision rules and evaluate participant faithfulness to these rules. GCA consists of line drawings that vary pixel-level color coverage across three conditions: world-knowledge recolorings, counterfactual recolorings, and shapes with no color priors. Using GCA, both VLMs and human participants establish a threshold: the minimum percentage of pixels of a given color an object must have to receive that color label. We then compare these rules with their subsequent color attribution decisions. Our findings reveal that models systematically violate their own introspective rules. For example, GPT-5-mini violates its stated introspection rules in nearly 60\% of cases on objects with strong color priors. Human participants remain faithful to their stated rules, with any apparent violations being explained by a well-documented tendency to overestimate color coverage. In contrast, we find that VLMs are excellent estimators of color coverage, yet blatantly contradict their own reasoning in their final responses. Across all models and strategies for eliciting introspective rules, world-knowledge priors systematically degrade faithfulness in ways that do not mirror human cognition. Our findings challenge the view that VLM reasoning failures are difficulty-driven and suggest that VLM introspective self-knowledge is miscalibrated, with direct implications for high-stakes deployment.
Abstract:Introspection is a foundational cognitive ability, but its mechanism is not well understood. Recent work has shown that AI models can introspect. We study their mechanism of introspection, first extensively replicating Lindsey et al. (2025)'s thought injection detection paradigm in large open-source models. We show that these models detect injected representations via two separable mechanisms: (i) probability-matching (inferring from perceived anomaly of the prompt) and (ii) direct access to internal states. The direct access mechanism is content-agnostic: models detect that an anomaly occurred but cannot reliably identify its semantic content. The two model classes we study confabulate injected concepts that are high-frequency and concrete (e.g., "apple'"); for them correct concept guesses typically require significantly more tokens. This content-agnostic introspective mechanism is consistent with leading theories in philosophy and psychology.
Abstract:Living languages are shaped by a host of conflicting internal and external evolutionary pressures. While some of these pressures are universal across languages and cultures, others differ depending on the social and conversational context: language use in newspapers is subject to very different constraints than language use on social media. Prior distributional semantic work on English word emergence (neology) identified two factors correlated with creation of new words by analyzing a corpus consisting primarily of historical published texts (Ryskina et al., 2020, arXiv:2001.07740). Extending this methodology to contextual embeddings in addition to static ones and applying it to a new corpus of Twitter posts, we show that the same findings hold for both domains, though the topic popularity growth factor may contribute less to neology on Twitter than in published writing. We hypothesize that this difference can be explained by the two domains favouring different neologism formation mechanisms.
Abstract:Humans align to one another in conversation -- adopting shared conventions that ease communication. We test whether LLMs form the same kinds of conventions in a multimodal communication game. Both humans and LLMs display evidence of convention-formation (increasing the accuracy and consistency of their turns while decreasing their length) when communicating in same-type dyads (humans with humans, AI with AI). However, heterogenous human-AI pairs fail -- suggesting differences in communicative tendencies. In Experiment 2, we ask whether LLMs can be induced to behave more like human conversants, by prompting them to produce superficially humanlike behavior. While the length of their messages matches that of human pairs, accuracy and lexical overlap in human-LLM pairs continues to lag behind that of both human-human and AI-AI pairs. These results suggest that conversational alignment requires more than just the ability to mimic previous interactions, but also shared interpretative biases toward the meanings that are conveyed.
Abstract:Large vision-language models (VLMs) are highly capable, yet often hallucinate by favoring textual prompts over visual evidence. We study this failure mode in a controlled object-counting setting, where the prompt overstates the number of objects in the image (e.g., asking a model to describe four waterlilies when only three are present). At low object counts, models often correct the overestimation, but as the number of objects increases, they increasingly conform to the prompt regardless of the discrepancy. Through mechanistic analysis of three VLMs, we identify a small set of attention heads whose ablation substantially reduces prompt-induced hallucinations (PIH) by at least 40% without additional training. Across models, PIH-heads mediate prompt copying in model-specific ways. We characterize these differences and show that PIH ablation increases correction toward visual evidence. Our findings offer insights into the internal mechanisms driving prompt-induced hallucinations, revealing model-specific differences in how these behaviors are implemented.




Abstract:In this paper, we investigate the convergence of language models (LMs) trained under different random seeds, measuring convergence as the expected per-token Kullback--Leibler (KL) divergence across seeds. By comparing LM convergence as a function of model size and training checkpoint, we identify a four-phase convergence pattern: (i) an initial uniform phase, (ii) a sharp-convergence phase, (iii) a sharp-divergence phase, and (iv) a slow-reconvergence phase. Further, we observe that larger models reconverge faster in later training stages, while smaller models never actually reconverge; these results suggest that a certain model size may be necessary to learn stable distributions. Restricting our analysis to specific token frequencies or part-of-speech (PoS) tags further reveals that convergence is uneven across linguistic categories: frequent tokens and function words converge faster and more reliably than their counterparts (infrequent tokens and content words). Overall, our findings highlight factors that influence the stability of the learned distributions in model training.
Abstract:Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.




Abstract:We introduce semantic-features, an extensible, easy-to-use library based on Chronis et al. (2023) for studying contextualized word embeddings of LMs by projecting them into interpretable spaces. We apply this tool in an experiment where we measure the contextual effect of the choice of dative construction (prepositional or double object) on the semantic interpretation of utterances (Bresnan, 2007). Specifically, we test whether "London" in "I sent London the letter." is more likely to be interpreted as an animate referent (e.g., as the name of a person) than in "I sent the letter to London." To this end, we devise a dataset of 450 sentence pairs, one in each dative construction, with recipients being ambiguous with respect to person-hood vs. place-hood. By applying semantic-features, we show that the contextualized word embeddings of three masked language models show the expected sensitivities. This leaves us optimistic about the usefulness of our tool.