Data Sharing Markets

With the growing use of distributed machine learning techniques, there is a growing need for data markets that allows agents to share data with each other. Nevertheless data has unique features that separates it from other commodities including replicability, cost of sharing, and ability to distort. We study a setup where each agent can be both buyer and seller of data. For this setup, we consider two cases: bilateral data exchange (trading data with data) and unilateral data exchange (trading data with money). We model bilateral sharing as a network formation game and show the existence of strongly stable outcome under the top agents property by allowing limited complementarity. We propose ordered match algorithm which can find the stable outcome in O(N^2) (N is the number of agents). For the unilateral sharing, under the assumption of additive cost structure, we construct competitive prices that can implement any social welfare maximizing outcome. Finally for this setup when agents have private information, we propose mixed-VCG mechanism which uses zero cost data distortion of data sharing with its isolated impact to achieve budget balance while truthfully implementing socially optimal outcomes to the exact level of budget imbalance of standard VCG mechanisms. Mixed-VCG uses data distortions as data money for this purpose. We further relax zero cost data distortion assumption by proposing distorted-mixed-VCG. We also extend our model and results to data sharing via incremental inquiries and differential privacy costs.

On Constraints in First-Order Optimization: A View from Non-Smooth Dynamical Systems

We introduce a class of first-order methods for smooth constrained optimization that are based on an analogy to non-smooth dynamical systems. Two distinctive features of our approach are that (i) projections or optimizations over the entire feasible set are avoided, in stark contrast to projected gradient methods or the Frank-Wolfe method, and (ii) iterates are allowed to become infeasible, which differs from active set or feasible direction methods, where the descent motion stops as soon as a new constraint is encountered. The resulting algorithmic procedure is simple to implement even when constraints are nonlinear, and is suitable for large-scale constrained optimization problems in which the feasible set fails to have a simple structure. The key underlying idea is that constraints are expressed in terms of velocities instead of positions, which has the algorithmic consequence that optimizations over feasible sets at each iteration are replaced with optimizations over local, sparse convex approximations. The result is a simplified suite of algorithms and an expanded range of possible applications in machine learning.

Robust Learning of Optimal Auctions

We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight upper bounds on the revenue we can obtain with a corrupted distribution under a population model, for both regular valuation distributions and distributions with monotone hazard rate (MHR). We then propose new algorithms that, given only an ``approximate distribution'' for the bidder's valuation, can learn a mechanism whose revenue is nearly optimal simultaneously for all ``true distributions'' that are $\alpha$-close to the original distribution in Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance. The proposed algorithms operate beyond the setting of bounded distributions that have been studied in prior works, and are guaranteed to obtain a fraction $1-O(\alpha)$ of the optimal revenue under the true distribution when the distributions are MHR. Moreover, they are guaranteed to yield at least a fraction $1-O(\sqrt{\alpha})$ of the optimal revenue when the distributions are regular. We prove that these upper bounds cannot be further improved, by providing matching lower bounds. Lastly, we derive sample complexity upper bounds for learning a near-optimal auction for both MHR and regular distributions.

Evaluating Sensitivity to the Stick-Breaking Prior in Bayesian Nonparametrics

Bayesian models based on the Dirichlet process and other stick-breaking priors have been proposed as core ingredients for clustering, topic modeling, and other unsupervised learning tasks. Prior specification is, however, relatively difficult for such models, given that their flexibility implies that the consequences of prior choices are often relatively opaque. Moreover, these choices can have a substantial effect on posterior inferences. Thus, considerations of robustness need to go hand in hand with nonparametric modeling. In the current paper, we tackle this challenge by exploiting the fact that variational Bayesian methods, in addition to having computational advantages in fitting complex nonparametric models, also yield sensitivities with respect to parametric and nonparametric aspects of Bayesian models. In particular, we demonstrate how to assess the sensitivity of conclusions to the choice of concentration parameter and stick-breaking distribution for inferences under Dirichlet process mixtures and related mixture models. We provide both theoretical and empirical support for our variational approach to Bayesian sensitivity analysis.

On the Convergence of Stochastic Extragradient for Bilinear Games with Restarted Iteration Averaging

We study the stochastic bilinear minimax optimization problem, presenting an analysis of the Stochastic ExtraGradient (SEG) method with constant step size, and presenting variations of the method that yield favorable convergence. We first note that the last iterate of the basic SEG method only contracts to a fixed neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, independent of the step size. This contrasts sharply with the standard setting of minimization where standard stochastic algorithms converge to a neighborhood that vanishes in proportion to the square-root (constant) step size. Under the same setting, however, we prove that when augmented with iteration averaging, SEG provably converges to the Nash equilibrium, and such a rate is provably accelerated by incorporating a scheduled restarting procedure. In the interpolation setting, we achieve an optimal convergence rate up to tight constants. We present numerical experiments that validate our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the SEG method when equipped with iteration averaging and restarting.

Variational Refinement for Importance Sampling Using the Forward Kullback-Leibler Divergence

Variational Inference (VI) is a popular alternative to asymptotically exact sampling in Bayesian inference. Its main workhorse is optimization over a reverse Kullback-Leibler divergence (RKL), which typically underestimates the tail of the posterior leading to miscalibration and potential degeneracy. Importance sampling (IS), on the other hand, is often used to fine-tune and de-bias the estimates of approximate Bayesian inference procedures. The quality of IS crucially depends on the choice of the proposal distribution. Ideally, the proposal distribution has heavier tails than the target, which is rarely achievable by minimizing the RKL. We thus propose a novel combination of optimization and sampling techniques for approximate Bayesian inference by constructing an IS proposal distribution through the minimization of a forward KL (FKL) divergence. This approach guarantees asymptotic consistency and a fast convergence towards both the optimal IS estimator and the optimal variational approximation. We empirically demonstrate on real data that our method is competitive with variational boosting and MCMC.

Taming Nonconvexity in Kernel Feature Selection---Favorable Properties of the Laplace Kernel

Kernel-based feature selection is an important tool in nonparametric statistics. Despite many practical applications of kernel-based feature selection, there is little statistical theory available to support the method. A core challenge is the objective function of the optimization problems used to define kernel-based feature selection are nonconvex. The literature has only studied the statistical properties of the \emph{global optima}, which is a mismatch, given that the gradient-based algorithms available for nonconvex optimization are only able to guarantee convergence to local minima. Studying the full landscape associated with kernel-based methods, we show that feature selection objectives using the Laplace kernel (and other $\ell_1$ kernels) come with statistical guarantees that other kernels, including the ubiquitous Gaussian kernel (or other $\ell_2$ kernels) do not possess. Based on a sharp characterization of the gradient of the objective function, we show that $\ell_1$ kernels eliminate unfavorable stationary points that appear when using an $\ell_2$ kernel. Armed with this insight, we establish statistical guarantees for $\ell_1$ kernel-based feature selection which do not require reaching the global minima. In particular, we establish model-selection consistency of $\ell_1$-kernel-based feature selection in recovering main effects and hierarchical interactions in the nonparametric setting with $n \sim \log p$ samples.

On component interactions in two-stage recommender systems

Thanks to their scalability, two-stage recommenders are used by many of today's largest online platforms, including YouTube, LinkedIn, and Pinterest. These systems produce recommendations in two steps: (i) multiple nominators -- tuned for low prediction latency -- preselect a small subset of candidates from the whole item pool; (ii)~a slower but more accurate ranker further narrows down the nominated items, and serves to the user. Despite their popularity, the literature on two-stage recommenders is relatively scarce, and the algorithms are often treated as the sum of their parts. Such treatment presupposes that the two-stage performance is explained by the behavior of individual components if they were deployed independently. This is not the case: using synthetic and real-world data, we demonstrate that interactions between the ranker and the nominators substantially affect the overall performance. Motivated by these findings, we derive a generalization lower bound which shows that careful choice of each nominator's training set is sometimes the only difference between a poor and an optimal two-stage recommender. Since searching for a good choice manually is difficult, we learn one instead. In particular, using a Mixture-of-Experts approach, we train the nominators (experts) to specialize on different subsets of the item pool. This significantly improves performance.

Instance-optimality in optimal value estimation: Adaptivity via variance-reduced Q-learning

Various algorithms in reinforcement learning exhibit dramatic variability in their convergence rates and ultimate accuracy as a function of the problem structure. Such instance-specific behavior is not captured by existing global minimax bounds, which are worst-case in nature. We analyze the problem of estimating optimal $Q$-value functions for a discounted Markov decision process with discrete states and actions and identify an instance-dependent functional that controls the difficulty of estimation in the $\ell_\infty$-norm. Using a local minimax framework, we show that this functional arises in lower bounds on the accuracy on any estimation procedure. In the other direction, we establish the sharpness of our lower bounds, up to factors logarithmic in the state and action spaces, by analyzing a variance-reduced version of $Q$-learning. Our theory provides a precise way of distinguishing "easy" problems from "hard" ones in the context of $Q$-learning, as illustrated by an ensemble with a continuum of difficulty.

The Stereotyping Problem in Collaboratively Filtered Recommender Systems

Recommender systems -- and especially matrix factorization-based collaborative filtering algorithms -- play a crucial role in mediating our access to online information. We show that such algorithms induce a particular kind of stereotyping: if preferences for a \textit{set} of items are anti-correlated in the general user population, then those items may not be recommended together to a user, regardless of that user's preferences and ratings history. First, we introduce a notion of \textit{joint accessibility}, which measures the extent to which a set of items can jointly be accessed by users. We then study joint accessibility under the standard factorization-based collaborative filtering framework, and provide theoretical necessary and sufficient conditions when joint accessibility is violated. Moreover, we show that these conditions can easily be violated when the users are represented by a single feature vector. To improve joint accessibility, we further propose an alternative modelling fix, which is designed to capture the diverse multiple interests of each user using a multi-vector representation. We conduct extensive experiments on real and simulated datasets, demonstrating the stereotyping problem with standard single-vector matrix factorization models.