Data-Adaptive Tradeoffs among Multiple Risks in Distribution-Free Prediction

Decision-making pipelines are generally characterized by tradeoffs among various risk functions. It is often desirable to manage such tradeoffs in a data-adaptive manner. As we demonstrate, if this is done naively, state-of-the art uncertainty quantification methods can lead to significant violations of putative risk guarantees. To address this issue, we develop methods that permit valid control of risk when threshold and tradeoff parameters are chosen adaptively. Our methodology supports monotone and nearly-monotone risks, but otherwise makes no distributional assumptions. To illustrate the benefits of our approach, we carry out numerical experiments on synthetic data and the large-scale vision dataset MS-COCO.

Online conformal prediction with decaying step sizes

We introduce a method for online conformal prediction with decaying step sizes. Like previous methods, ours possesses a retrospective guarantee of coverage for arbitrary sequences. However, unlike previous methods, we can simultaneously estimate a population quantile when it exists. Our theory and experiments indicate substantially improved practical properties: in particular, when the distribution is stable, the coverage is close to the desired level for every time point, not just on average over the observed sequence.

Delegating Data Collection in Decentralized Machine Learning

Motivated by the emergence of decentralized machine learning ecosystems, we study the delegation of data collection. Taking the field of contract theory as our starting point, we design optimal and near-optimal contracts that deal with two fundamental machine learning challenges: lack of certainty in the assessment of model quality and lack of knowledge regarding the optimal performance of any model. We show that lack of certainty can be dealt with via simple linear contracts that achieve 1-1/e fraction of the first-best utility, even if the principal has a small test set. Furthermore, we give sufficient conditions on the size of the principal's test set that achieves a vanishing additive approximation to the optimal utility. To address the lack of a priori knowledge regarding the optimal performance, we give a convex program that can adaptively and efficiently compute the optimal contract.

Incentive-Theoretic Bayesian Inference for Collaborative Science

Contemporary scientific research is a distributed, collaborative endeavor, carried out by teams of researchers, regulatory institutions, funding agencies, commercial partners, and scientific bodies, all interacting with each other and facing different incentives. To maintain scientific rigor, statistical methods should acknowledge this state of affairs. To this end, we study hypothesis testing when there is an agent (e.g., a researcher or a pharmaceutical company) with a private prior about an unknown parameter and a principal (e.g., a policymaker or regulator) who wishes to make decisions based on the parameter value. The agent chooses whether to run a statistical trial based on their private prior and then the result of the trial is used by the principal to reach a decision. We show how the principal can conduct statistical inference that leverages the information that is revealed by an agent's strategic behavior -- their choice to run a trial or not. In particular, we show how the principal can design a policy to elucidate partial information about the agent's private prior beliefs and use this to control the posterior probability of the null. One implication is a simple guideline for the choice of significance threshold in clinical trials: the type-I error level should be set to be strictly less than the cost of the trial divided by the firm's profit if the trial is successful.

Class-Conditional Conformal Prediction With Many Classes

Standard conformal prediction methods provide a marginal coverage guarantee, which means that for a random test point, the conformal prediction set contains the true label with a user-chosen probability. In many classification problems, we would like to obtain a stronger guarantee -- that for test points of a specific class, the prediction set contains the true label with the same user-chosen probability. Existing conformal prediction methods do not work well when there is a limited amount of labeled data per class, as is often the case in real applications where the number of classes is large. We propose a method called clustered conformal prediction, which clusters together classes that have "similar" conformal scores and then performs conformal prediction at the cluster level. Based on empirical evaluation across four image data sets with many (up to 1000) classes, we find that clustered conformal typically outperforms existing methods in terms of class-conditional coverage and set size metrics.

Operationalizing Counterfactual Metrics: Incentives, Ranking, and Information Asymmetry

From the social sciences to machine learning, it has been well documented that metrics to be optimized are not always aligned with social welfare. In healthcare, Dranove et al. [12] showed that publishing surgery mortality metrics actually harmed the welfare of sicker patients by increasing provider selection behavior. Using a principal-agent model, we directly study the incentive misalignments that arise from such average treated outcome metrics, and show that the incentives driving treatment decisions would align with maximizing total patient welfare if the metrics (i) accounted for counterfactual untreated outcomes and (ii) considered total welfare instead of average welfare among treated patients. Operationalizing this, we show how counterfactual metrics can be modified to satisfy desirable properties when used for ranking. Extending to realistic settings when the providers observe more about patients than the regulatory agencies do, we bound the decay in performance by the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. In doing so, our model connects principal-agent information asymmetry with unobserved heterogeneity in causal inference.

Prediction-Powered Inference

We introduce prediction-powered inference $\unicode{x2013}$ a framework for performing valid statistical inference when an experimental data set is supplemented with predictions from a machine-learning system. Our framework yields provably valid conclusions without making any assumptions on the machine-learning algorithm that supplies the predictions. Higher accuracy of the predictions translates to smaller confidence intervals, permitting more powerful inference. Prediction-powered inference yields simple algorithms for computing valid confidence intervals for statistical objects such as means, quantiles, and linear and logistic regression coefficients. We demonstrate the benefits of prediction-powered inference with data sets from proteomics, genomics, electronic voting, remote sensing, census analysis, and ecology.

The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design

We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome. The agent then makes a strategic choice of action that maximizes her own utility, but the action is not directly observable by the principal. The principal observes the outcome and receives utility from the agent's choice of action. Based on past observations, the principal dynamically adjusts the contracts with the goal of maximizing her utility. We introduce an online learning algorithm and provide an upper bound on its Stackelberg regret. We show that when the contract space is $[0,1]^m$, the Stackelberg regret is upper bounded by $\widetilde O(\sqrt{m} \cdot T^{1-C/m})$, and lower bounded by $\Omega(T^{1-1/(m+2)})$. This result shows that exponential-in-$m$ samples are both sufficient and necessary to learn a near-optimal contract, resolving an open problem on the hardness of online contract design. When contracts are restricted to some subset $\mathcal{F} \subset [0,1]^m$, we define an intrinsic dimension of $\mathcal{F}$ that depends on the covering number of the spherical code in the space and bound the regret in terms of this intrinsic dimension. When $\mathcal{F}$ is the family of linear contracts, the Stackelberg regret grows exactly as $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. The contract design problem is challenging because the utility function is discontinuous. Bounding the discretization error in this setting has been an open problem. In this paper, we identify a limited set of directions in which the utility function is continuous, allowing us to design a new discretization method and bound its error. This approach enables the first upper bound with no restrictions on the contract and action space.

Conformal Prediction is Robust to Label Noise

We study the robustness of conformal prediction, a powerful tool for uncertainty quantification, to label noise. Our analysis tackles both regression and classification problems, characterizing when and how it is possible to construct uncertainty sets that correctly cover the unobserved noiseless ground truth labels. Through stylized theoretical examples and practical experiments, we argue that naive conformal prediction covers the noiseless ground truth label unless the noise distribution is adversarially designed. This leads us to believe that correcting for label noise is unnecessary except for pathological data distributions or noise sources. In such cases, we can also correct for noise of bounded size in the conformal prediction algorithm in order to ensure correct coverage of the ground truth labels without score or data regularity.