Certification of Iterative Predictions in Bayesian Neural Networks

We consider the problem of computing reach-avoid probabilities for iterative predictions made with Bayesian neural network (BNN) models. Specifically, we leverage bound propagation techniques and backward recursion to compute lower bounds for the probability that trajectories of the BNN model reach a given set of states while avoiding a set of unsafe states. We use the lower bounds in the context of control and reinforcement learning to provide safety certification for given control policies, as well as to synthesize control policies that improve the certification bounds. On a set of benchmarks, we demonstrate that our framework can be employed to certify policies over BNNs predictions for problems of more than $10$ dimensions, and to effectively synthesize policies that significantly increase the lower bound on the satisfaction probability.

Adversarial Robustness Guarantees for Gaussian Processes

Gaussian processes (GPs) enable principled computation of model uncertainty, making them attractive for safety-critical applications. Such scenarios demand that GP decisions are not only accurate, but also robust to perturbations. In this paper we present a framework to analyse adversarial robustness of GPs, defined as invariance of the model's decision to bounded perturbations. Given a compact subset of the input space $T\subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$, a point $x^*$ and a GP, we provide provable guarantees of adversarial robustness of the GP by computing lower and upper bounds on its prediction range in $T$. We develop a branch-and-bound scheme to refine the bounds and show, for any $\epsilon > 0$, that our algorithm is guaranteed to converge to values $\epsilon$-close to the actual values in finitely many iterations. The algorithm is anytime and can handle both regression and classification tasks, with analytical formulation for most kernels used in practice. We evaluate our methods on a collection of synthetic and standard benchmark datasets, including SPAM, MNIST and FashionMNIST. We study the effect of approximate inference techniques on robustness and demonstrate how our method can be used for interpretability. Our empirical results suggest that the adversarial robustness of GPs increases with accurate posterior estimation.

Bayesian Inference with Certifiable Adversarial Robustness

We consider adversarial training of deep neural networks through the lens of Bayesian learning, and present a principled framework for adversarial training of Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs) with certifiable guarantees. We rely on techniques from constraint relaxation of non-convex optimisation problems and modify the standard cross-entropy error model to enforce posterior robustness to worst-case perturbations in $\epsilon$-balls around input points. We illustrate how the resulting framework can be combined with methods commonly employed for approximate inference of BNNs. In an empirical investigation, we demonstrate that the presented approach enables training of certifiably robust models on MNIST, FashionMNIST and CIFAR-10 and can also be beneficial for uncertainty calibration. Our method is the first to directly train certifiable BNNs, thus facilitating their deployment in safety-critical applications.

Gradient-Free Adversarial Attacks for Bayesian Neural Networks

The existence of adversarial examples underscores the importance of understanding the robustness of machine learning models. Bayesian neural networks (BNNs), due to their calibrated uncertainty, have been shown to posses favorable adversarial robustness properties. However, when approximate Bayesian inference methods are employed, the adversarial robustness of BNNs is still not well understood. In this work, we employ gradient-free optimization methods in order to find adversarial examples for BNNs. In particular, we consider genetic algorithms, surrogate models, as well as zeroth order optimization methods and adapt them to the goal of finding adversarial examples for BNNs. In an empirical evaluation on the MNIST and Fashion MNIST datasets, we show that for various approximate Bayesian inference methods the usage of gradient-free algorithms can greatly improve the rate of finding adversarial examples compared to state-of-the-art gradient-based methods.

Assessing Robustness of Text Classification through Maximal Safe Radius Computation

Neural network NLP models are vulnerable to small modifications of the input that maintain the original meaning but result in a different prediction. In this paper, we focus on robustness of text classification against word substitutions, aiming to provide guarantees that the model prediction does not change if a word is replaced with a plausible alternative, such as a synonym. As a measure of robustness, we adopt the notion of the maximal safe radius for a given input text, which is the minimum distance in the embedding space to the decision boundary. Since computing the exact maximal safe radius is not feasible in practice, we instead approximate it by computing a lower and upper bound. For the upper bound computation, we employ Monte Carlo Tree Search in conjunction with syntactic filtering to analyse the effect of single and multiple word substitutions. The lower bound computation is achieved through an adaptation of the linear bounding techniques implemented in tools CNN-Cert and POPQORN, respectively for convolutional and recurrent network models. We evaluate the methods on sentiment analysis and news classification models for four datasets (IMDB, SST, AG News and NEWS) and a range of embeddings, and provide an analysis of robustness trends. We also apply our framework to interpretability analysis and compare it with LIME.

Probabilistic Safety for Bayesian Neural Networks

We study probabilistic safety for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs) under adversarial input perturbations. Given a compact set of input points, T \subseteq R^m, we study the probability w.r.t. the BNN posterior that all the points in T are mapped to the same, given region S in the output space. In particular, this can be used to evaluate the probability that a network sampled from the BNN is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We rely on relaxation techniques from non-convex optimization to develop a method for computing a lower bound on probabilistic safety for BNNs, deriving explicit procedures for the case of interval and linear function propagation techniques. We apply our methods to BNNs trained on a regression task, airborne collision avoidance, and MNIST, empirically showing that our approach allows one to certify probabilistic safety of BNNs with thousands of neurons.

Robustness of Bayesian Neural Networks to Gradient-Based Attacks

Vulnerability to adversarial attacks is one of the principal hurdles to the adoption of deep learning in safety-critical applications. Despite significant efforts, both practical and theoretical, the problem remains open. In this paper, we analyse the geometry of adversarial attacks in the large-data, overparametrized limit for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). We show that, in the limit, vulnerability to gradient-based attacks arises as a result of degeneracy in the data distribution, i.e., when the data lies on a lower-dimensional submanifold of the ambient space. As a direct consequence, we demonstrate that in the limit BNN posteriors are robust to gradient-based adversarial attacks. Experimental results on the MNIST and Fashion MNIST datasets with BNNs trained with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo and Variational Inference support this line of argument, showing that BNNs can display both high accuracy and robustness to gradient based adversarial attacks.

Safety Guarantees for Planning Based on Iterative Gaussian Processes

Gaussian Processes (GPs) are widely employed in control and learning because of their principled treatment of uncertainty. However, tracking uncertainty for iterative, multi-step predictions in general leads to an analytically intractable problem. While approximation methods exist, they do not come with guarantees, making it difficult to estimate their reliability and to trust their predictions. In this work, we derive formal probability error bounds for iterative prediction and planning with GPs. Building on GP properties, we bound the probability that random trajectories lie in specific regions around the predicted values. Namely, given a tolerance $\epsilon > 0 $, we compute regions around the predicted trajectory values, such that GP trajectories are guaranteed to lie inside them with probability at least $1-\epsilon$. We verify experimentally that our method tracks the predictive uncertainty correctly, even when current approximation techniques fail. Furthermore, we show how the proposed bounds can be employed within a safe reinforcement learning framework to verify the safety of candidate control policies, guiding the synthesis of provably safe controllers.

Uncertainty Quantification with Statistical Guarantees in End-to-End Autonomous Driving Control

Deep neural network controllers for autonomous driving have recently benefited from significant performance improvements, and have begun deployment in the real world. Prior to their widespread adoption, safety guarantees are needed on the controller behaviour that properly take account of the uncertainty within the model as well as sensor noise. Bayesian neural networks, which assume a prior over the weights, have been shown capable of producing such uncertainty measures, but properties surrounding their safety have not yet been quantified for use in autonomous driving scenarios. In this paper, we develop a framework based on a state-of-the-art simulator for evaluating end-to-end Bayesian controllers. In addition to computing pointwise uncertainty measures that can be computed in real time and with statistical guarantees, we also provide a method for estimating the probability that, given a scenario, the controller keeps the car safe within a finite horizon. We experimentally evaluate the quality of uncertainty computation by several Bayesian inference methods in different scenarios and show how the uncertainty measures can be combined and calibrated for use in collision avoidance. Our results suggest that uncertainty estimates can greatly aid decision making in autonomous driving.

Robustness Quantification for Classification with Gaussian Processes

We consider Bayesian classification with Gaussian processes (GPs) and define robustness of a classifier in terms of the worst-case difference in the classification probabilities with respect to input perturbations. For a subset of the input space $T\subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ such properties reduce to computing the infimum and supremum of the classification probabilities for all points in $T$. Unfortunately, computing the above values is very challenging, as the classification probabilities cannot be expressed analytically. Nevertheless, using the theory of Gaussian processes, we develop a framework that, for a given dataset $\mathcal{D}$, a compact set of input points $T\subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and an error threshold $\epsilon>0$, computes lower and upper bounds of the classification probabilities by over-approximating the exact range with an error bounded by $\epsilon$. We provide experimental comparison of several approximate inference methods for classification on tasks associated to MNIST and SPAM datasets showing that our results enable quantification of uncertainty in adversarial classification settings.