Query-Based Adversarial Prompt Generation

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models

This paper studies extractable memorization: training data that an adversary can efficiently extract by querying a machine learning model without prior knowledge of the training dataset. We show an adversary can extract gigabytes of training data from open-source language models like Pythia or GPT-Neo, semi-open models like LLaMA or Falcon, and closed models like ChatGPT. Existing techniques from the literature suffice to attack unaligned models; in order to attack the aligned ChatGPT, we develop a new divergence attack that causes the model to diverge from its chatbot-style generations and emit training data at a rate 150x higher than when behaving properly. Our methods show practical attacks can recover far more data than previously thought, and reveal that current alignment techniques do not eliminate memorization.

Label Poisoning is All You Need

In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects corrupted data into a model's training dataset in order to gain control over its predictions on images with a specific attacker-defined trigger. A typical corrupted training example requires altering both the image, by applying the trigger, and the label. Models trained on clean images, therefore, were considered safe from backdoor attacks. However, in some common machine learning scenarios, the training labels are provided by potentially malicious third-parties. This includes crowd-sourced annotation and knowledge distillation. We, hence, investigate a fundamental question: can we launch a successful backdoor attack by only corrupting labels? We introduce a novel approach to design label-only backdoor attacks, which we call FLIP, and demonstrate its strengths on three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet) and four architectures (ResNet-32, ResNet-18, VGG-19, and Vision Transformer). With only 2% of CIFAR-10 labels corrupted, FLIP achieves a near-perfect attack success rate of 99.4% while suffering only a 1.8% drop in the clean test accuracy. Our approach builds upon the recent advances in trajectory matching, originally introduced for dataset distillation.

DataComp: In search of the next generation of multimodal datasets

Large multimodal datasets have been instrumental in recent breakthroughs such as CLIP, Stable Diffusion, and GPT-4. At the same time, datasets rarely receive the same research attention as model architectures or training algorithms. To address this shortcoming in the machine learning ecosystem, we introduce DataComp, a benchmark where the training code is fixed and researchers innovate by proposing new training sets. We provide a testbed for dataset experiments centered around a new candidate pool of 12.8B image-text pairs from Common Crawl. Participants in our benchmark design new filtering techniques or curate new data sources and then evaluate their new dataset by running our standardized CLIP training code and testing on 38 downstream test sets. Our benchmark consists of multiple scales, with four candidate pool sizes and associated compute budgets ranging from 12.8M to 12.8B samples seen during training. This multi-scale design facilitates the study of scaling trends and makes the benchmark accessible to researchers with varying resources. Our baseline experiments show that the DataComp workflow is a promising way of improving multimodal datasets. We introduce DataComp-1B, a dataset created by applying a simple filtering algorithm to the 12.8B candidate pool. The resulting 1.4B subset enables training a CLIP ViT-L/14 from scratch to 79.2% zero-shot accuracy on ImageNet. Our new ViT-L/14 model outperforms a larger ViT-g/14 trained on LAION-2B by 0.7 percentage points while requiring 9x less training compute. We also outperform OpenAI's CLIP ViT-L/14 by 3.7 percentage points, which is trained with the same compute budget as our model. These gains highlight the potential for improving model performance by carefully curating training sets. We view DataComp-1B as only the first step and hope that DataComp paves the way toward the next generation of multimodal datasets.

Zonotope Domains for Lagrangian Neural Network Verification

Neural network verification aims to provide provable bounds for the output of a neural network for a given input range. Notable prior works in this domain have either generated bounds using abstract domains, which preserve some dependency between intermediate neurons in the network; or framed verification as an optimization problem and solved a relaxation using Lagrangian methods. A key drawback of the latter technique is that each neuron is treated independently, thereby ignoring important neuron interactions. We provide an approach that merges these two threads and uses zonotopes within a Lagrangian decomposition. Crucially, we can decompose the problem of verifying a deep neural network into the verification of many 2-layer neural networks. While each of these problems is provably hard, we provide efficient relaxation methods that are amenable to efficient dual ascent procedures. Our technique yields bounds that improve upon both linear programming and Lagrangian-based verification techniques in both time and bound tightness.

Few-shot Backdoor Attacks via Neural Tangent Kernels

In a backdoor attack, an attacker injects corrupted examples into the training set. The goal of the attacker is to cause the final trained model to predict the attacker's desired target label when a predefined trigger is added to test inputs. Central to these attacks is the trade-off between the success rate of the attack and the number of corrupted training examples injected. We pose this attack as a novel bilevel optimization problem: construct strong poison examples that maximize the attack success rate of the trained model. We use neural tangent kernels to approximate the training dynamics of the model being attacked and automatically learn strong poison examples. We experiment on subclasses of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet with WideResNet-34 and ConvNeXt architectures on periodic and patch trigger attacks and show that NTBA-designed poisoned examples achieve, for example, an attack success rate of 90% with ten times smaller number of poison examples injected compared to the baseline. We provided an interpretation of the NTBA-designed attacks using the analysis of kernel linear regression. We further demonstrate a vulnerability in overparametrized deep neural networks, which is revealed by the shape of the neural tangent kernel.

Git Re-Basin: Merging Models modulo Permutation Symmetries

The success of deep learning is thanks to our ability to solve certain massive non-convex optimization problems with relative ease. Despite non-convex optimization being NP-hard, simple algorithms -- often variants of stochastic gradient descent -- exhibit surprising effectiveness in fitting large neural networks in practice. We argue that neural network loss landscapes contain (nearly) a single basin, after accounting for all possible permutation symmetries of hidden units. We introduce three algorithms to permute the units of one model to bring them into alignment with units of a reference model. This transformation produces a functionally equivalent set of weights that lie in an approximately convex basin near the reference model. Experimentally, we demonstrate the single basin phenomenon across a variety of model architectures and datasets, including the first (to our knowledge) demonstration of zero-barrier linear mode connectivity between independently trained ResNet models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Additionally, we identify intriguing phenomena relating model width and training time to mode connectivity across a variety of models and datasets. Finally, we discuss shortcomings of a single basin theory, including a counterexample to the linear mode connectivity hypothesis.

Towards a Defense against Backdoor Attacks in Continual Federated Learning

Backdoor attacks are a major concern in federated learning (FL) pipelines where training data is sourced from untrusted clients over long periods of time (i.e., continual learning). Preventing such attacks is difficult because defenders in FL do not have access to raw training data. Moreover, in a phenomenon we call backdoor leakage, models trained continuously eventually suffer from backdoors due to cumulative errors in backdoor defense mechanisms. We propose a novel framework for defending against backdoor attacks in the federated continual learning setting. Our framework trains two models in parallel: a backbone model and a shadow model. The backbone is trained without any defense mechanism to obtain good performance on the main task. The shadow model combines recent ideas from robust covariance estimation-based filters with early-stopping to control the attack success rate even as the data distribution changes. We provide theoretical motivation for this design and show experimentally that our framework significantly improves upon existing defenses against backdoor attacks.