Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a reliable approach to aligning large language models (LLMs) to human preferences. Among the plethora of RLHF techniques, proximal policy optimization (PPO) is of the most widely used methods. Despite its popularity, however, PPO may suffer from mode collapse, instability, and poor sample efficiency. We show that these issues can be alleviated by a novel algorithm that we refer to as Advantage-Induced Policy Alignment (APA), which leverages a squared error loss function based on the estimated advantages. We demonstrate empirically that APA consistently outperforms PPO in language tasks by a large margin, when a separate reward model is employed as the evaluator. In addition, compared with PPO, APA offers a more stable form of control over the deviation from the model's initial policy, ensuring that the model improves its performance without collapsing to deterministic output. In addition to empirical results, we also provide a theoretical justification supporting the design of our loss function.
Large Language Models (LLMs) and other large foundation models have achieved noteworthy success, but their size exacerbates existing resource consumption and latency challenges. In particular, the large-scale deployment of these models is hindered by the significant resource requirements during inference. In this paper, we study two approaches for mitigating these challenges: employing a cache to store previous queries and learning a model multiplexer to choose from an ensemble of models for query processing. Theoretically, we provide an optimal algorithm for jointly optimizing both approaches to reduce the inference cost in both offline and online tabular settings. By combining a caching algorithm, namely Greedy Dual Size with Frequency (GDSF) or Least Expected Cost (LEC), with a model multiplexer, we achieve optimal rates in both offline and online settings. Empirically, simulations show that the combination of our caching and model multiplexing algorithms greatly improves over the baselines, with up to $50\times$ improvement over the baseline when the ratio between the maximum cost and minimum cost is $100$. Experiments on real datasets show a $4.3\times$ improvement in FLOPs over the baseline when the ratio for FLOPs is $10$, and a $1.8\times$ improvement in latency when the ratio for average latency is $1.85$.
Self-training is an important technique for solving semi-supervised learning problems. It leverages unlabeled data by generating pseudo-labels and combining them with a limited labeled dataset for training. The effectiveness of self-training heavily relies on the accuracy of these pseudo-labels. In this paper, we introduce doubly robust self-training, a novel semi-supervised algorithm that provably balances between two extremes. When the pseudo-labels are entirely incorrect, our method reduces to a training process solely using labeled data. Conversely, when the pseudo-labels are completely accurate, our method transforms into a training process utilizing all pseudo-labeled data and labeled data, thus increasing the effective sample size. Through empirical evaluations on both the ImageNet dataset for image classification and the nuScenes autonomous driving dataset for 3D object detection, we demonstrate the superiority of the doubly robust loss over the standard self-training baseline.
The creator economy has revolutionized the way individuals can profit through online platforms. In this paper, we initiate the study of online learning in the creator economy by modeling the creator economy as a three-party game between the users, platform, and content creators, with the platform interacting with the content creator under a principal-agent model through contracts to encourage better content. Additionally, the platform interacts with the users to recommend new content, receive an evaluation, and ultimately profit from the content, which can be modeled as a recommender system. Our study aims to explore how the platform can jointly optimize the contract and recommender system to maximize the utility in an online learning fashion. We primarily analyze and compare two families of contracts: return-based contracts and feature-based contracts. Return-based contracts pay the content creator a fraction of the reward the platform gains. In contrast, feature-based contracts pay the content creator based on the quality or features of the content, regardless of the reward the platform receives. We show that under smoothness assumptions, the joint optimization of return-based contracts and recommendation policy provides a regret $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. For the feature-based contract, we introduce a definition of intrinsic dimension $d$ to characterize the hardness of learning the contract and provide an upper bound on the regret $\mathcal{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. The upper bound is tight for the linear family.
We consider the sequential decision-making problem where the mean outcome is a non-linear function of the chosen action. Compared with the linear model, two curious phenomena arise in non-linear models: first, in addition to the "learning phase" with a standard parametric rate for estimation or regret, there is an "burn-in period" with a fixed cost determined by the non-linear function; second, achieving the smallest burn-in cost requires new exploration algorithms. For a special family of non-linear functions named ridge functions in the literature, we derive upper and lower bounds on the optimal burn-in cost, and in addition, on the entire learning trajectory during the burn-in period via differential equations. In particular, a two-stage algorithm that first finds a good initial action and then treats the problem as locally linear is statistically optimal. In contrast, several classical algorithms, such as UCB and algorithms relying on regression oracles, are provably suboptimal.
We propose A-Crab (Actor-Critic Regularized by Average Bellman error), a new algorithm for offline reinforcement learning (RL) in complex environments with insufficient data coverage. Our algorithm combines the marginalized importance sampling framework with the actor-critic paradigm, where the critic returns evaluations of the actor (policy) that are pessimistic relative to the offline data and have a small average (importance-weighted) Bellman error. Compared to existing methods, our algorithm simultaneously offers a number of advantages: (1) It is practical and achieves the optimal statistical rate of $1/\sqrt{N}$ -- where $N$ is the size of the offline dataset -- in converging to the best policy covered in the offline dataset, even when combined with general function approximations. (2) It relies on a weaker average notion of policy coverage (compared to the $\ell_\infty$ single-policy concentrability) that exploits the structure of policy visitations. (3) It outperforms the data-collection behavior policy over a wide-range of hyperparameters and is the first algorithm to do so without solving a minimax optimization problem.
We provide a theoretical framework for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Our analysis shows that when the true reward function is linear, the widely used maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) converges under both the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model and the Plackett-Luce (PL) model. However, we show that when training a policy based on the learned reward model, MLE fails while a pessimistic MLE provides policies with improved performance under certain coverage assumptions. Additionally, we demonstrate that under the PL model, the true MLE and an alternative MLE that splits the $K$-wise comparison into pairwise comparisons both converge. Moreover, the true MLE is asymptotically more efficient. Our results validate the empirical success of existing RLHF algorithms in InstructGPT and provide new insights for algorithm design. Furthermore, our results unify the problem of RLHF and max-entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), and provide the first sample complexity bound for max-entropy IRL.
We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.
We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome. The agent then makes a strategic choice of action that maximizes her own utility, but the action is not directly observable by the principal. The principal observes the outcome and receives utility from the agent's choice of action. Based on past observations, the principal dynamically adjusts the contracts with the goal of maximizing her utility. We introduce an online learning algorithm and provide an upper bound on its Stackelberg regret. We show that when the contract space is $[0,1]^m$, the Stackelberg regret is upper bounded by $\widetilde O(\sqrt{m} \cdot T^{1-C/m})$, and lower bounded by $\Omega(T^{1-1/(m+2)})$. This result shows that exponential-in-$m$ samples are both sufficient and necessary to learn a near-optimal contract, resolving an open problem on the hardness of online contract design. When contracts are restricted to some subset $\mathcal{F} \subset [0,1]^m$, we define an intrinsic dimension of $\mathcal{F}$ that depends on the covering number of the spherical code in the space and bound the regret in terms of this intrinsic dimension. When $\mathcal{F}$ is the family of linear contracts, the Stackelberg regret grows exactly as $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. The contract design problem is challenging because the utility function is discontinuous. Bounding the discretization error in this setting has been an open problem. In this paper, we identify a limited set of directions in which the utility function is continuous, allowing us to design a new discretization method and bound its error. This approach enables the first upper bound with no restrictions on the contract and action space.