Randomly masking and predicting word tokens has been a successful approach in pre-training language models for a variety of downstream tasks. In this work, we observe that the same idea also applies naturally to sequential decision-making, where many well-studied tasks like behavior cloning, offline reinforcement learning, inverse dynamics, and waypoint conditioning correspond to different sequence maskings over a sequence of states, actions, and returns. We introduce the UniMASK framework, which provides a unified way to specify models which can be trained on many different sequential decision-making tasks. We show that a single UniMASK model is often capable of carrying out many tasks with performance similar to or better than single-task models. Additionally, after fine-tuning, our UniMASK models consistently outperform comparable single-task models. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/micahcarroll/uniMASK.
AI agents designed to collaborate with people benefit from models that enable them to anticipate human behavior. However, realistic models tend to require vast amounts of human data, which is often hard to collect. A good prior or initialization could make for more data-efficient training, but what makes for a good prior on human behavior? Our work leverages a very simple assumption: people generally act closer to optimal than to random chance. We show that using optimal behavior as a prior for human models makes these models vastly more data-efficient and able to generalize to new environments. Our intuition is that such a prior enables the training to focus one's precious real-world data on capturing the subtle nuances of human suboptimality, instead of on the basics of how to do the task in the first place. We also show that using these improved human models often leads to better human-AI collaboration performance compared to using models based on real human data alone.
Randomly masking and predicting word tokens has been a successful approach in pre-training language models for a variety of downstream tasks. In this work, we observe that the same idea also applies naturally to sequential decision making, where many well-studied tasks like behavior cloning, offline RL, inverse dynamics, and waypoint conditioning correspond to different sequence maskings over a sequence of states, actions, and returns. We introduce the FlexiBiT framework, which provides a unified way to specify models which can be trained on many different sequential decision making tasks. We show that a single FlexiBiT model is simultaneously capable of carrying out many tasks with performance similar to or better than specialized models. Additionally, we show that performance can be further improved by fine-tuning our general model on specific tasks of interest.
The content that a recommender system (RS) shows to users influences them. Therefore, when choosing which recommender to deploy, one is implicitly also choosing to induce specific internal states in users. Even more, systems trained via long-horizon optimization will have direct incentives to manipulate users, e.g. shift their preferences so they are easier to satisfy. In this work we focus on induced preference shifts in users. We argue that - before deployment - system designers should: estimate the shifts a recommender would induce; evaluate whether such shifts would be undesirable; and even actively optimize to avoid problematic shifts. These steps involve two challenging ingredients: estimation requires anticipating how hypothetical policies would influence user preferences if deployed - we do this by using historical user interaction data to train predictive user model which implicitly contains their preference dynamics; evaluation and optimization additionally require metrics to assess whether such influences are manipulative or otherwise unwanted - we use the notion of "safe shifts", that define a trust region within which behavior is safe. In simulated experiments, we show that our learned preference dynamics model is effective in estimating user preferences and how they would respond to new recommenders. Additionally, we show that recommenders that optimize for staying in the trust region can avoid manipulative behaviors while still generating engagement.
Models of human behavior for prediction and collaboration tend to fall into two categories: ones that learn from large amounts of data via imitation learning, and ones that assume human behavior to be noisily-optimal for some reward function. The former are very useful, but only when it is possible to gather a lot of human data in the target environment and distribution. The advantage of the latter type, which includes Boltzmann rationality, is the ability to make accurate predictions in new environments without extensive data when humans are actually close to optimal. However, these models fail when humans exhibit systematic suboptimality, i.e. when their deviations from optimal behavior are not independent, but instead consistent over time. Our key insight is that systematic suboptimality can be modeled by predicting policies, which couple action choices over time, instead of trajectories. We introduce the Boltzmann policy distribution (BPD), which serves as a prior over human policies and adapts via Bayesian inference to capture systematic deviations by observing human actions during a single episode. The BPD is difficult to compute and represent because policies lie in a high-dimensional continuous space, but we leverage tools from generative and sequence models to enable efficient sampling and inference. We show that the BPD enables prediction of human behavior and human-AI collaboration equally as well as imitation learning-based human models while using far less data.
In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).
Assuming humans are (approximately) rational enables robots to infer reward functions by observing human behavior. But people exhibit a wide array of irrationalities, and our goal with this work is to better understand the effect they can have on reward inference. The challenge with studying this effect is that there are many types of irrationality, with varying degrees of mathematical formalization. We thus operationalize irrationality in the language of MDPs, by altering the Bellman optimality equation, and use this framework to study how these alterations would affect inference. We find that wrongly modeling a systematically irrational human as noisy-rational performs a lot worse than correctly capturing these biases -- so much so that it can be better to skip inference altogether and stick to the prior! More importantly, we show that an irrational human, when correctly modelled, can communicate more information about the reward than a perfectly rational human can. That is, if a robot has the correct model of a human's irrationality, it can make an even stronger inference than it ever could if the human were rational. Irrationality fundamentally helps rather than hinder reward inference, but it needs to be correctly accounted for.
Reinforcement learning (RL) requires access to a reward function that incentivizes the right behavior, but these are notoriously hard to specify for complex tasks. Preference-based RL provides an alternative: learning policies using a teacher's preferences without pre-defined rewards, thus overcoming concerns associated with reward engineering. However, it is difficult to quantify the progress in preference-based RL due to the lack of a commonly adopted benchmark. In this paper, we introduce B-Pref: a benchmark specially designed for preference-based RL. A key challenge with such a benchmark is providing the ability to evaluate candidate algorithms quickly, which makes relying on real human input for evaluation prohibitive. At the same time, simulating human input as giving perfect preferences for the ground truth reward function is unrealistic. B-Pref alleviates this by simulating teachers with a wide array of irrationalities, and proposes metrics not solely for performance but also for robustness to these potential irrationalities. We showcase the utility of B-Pref by using it to analyze algorithmic design choices, such as selecting informative queries, for state-of-the-art preference-based RL algorithms. We hope that B-Pref can serve as a common starting point to study preference-based RL more systematically. Source code is available at https://github.com/rll-research/B-Pref.
The last decade has seen a significant increase of interest in deep learning research, with many public successes that have demonstrated its potential. As such, these systems are now being incorporated into commercial products. With this comes an additional challenge: how can we build AI systems that solve tasks where there is not a crisp, well-defined specification? While multiple solutions have been proposed, in this competition we focus on one in particular: learning from human feedback. Rather than training AI systems using a predefined reward function or using a labeled dataset with a predefined set of categories, we instead train the AI system using a learning signal derived from some form of human feedback, which can evolve over time as the understanding of the task changes, or as the capabilities of the AI system improve. The MineRL BASALT competition aims to spur forward research on this important class of techniques. We design a suite of four tasks in Minecraft for which we expect it will be hard to write down hardcoded reward functions. These tasks are defined by a paragraph of natural language: for example, "create a waterfall and take a scenic picture of it", with additional clarifying details. Participants must train a separate agent for each task, using any method they want. Agents are then evaluated by humans who have read the task description. To help participants get started, we provide a dataset of human demonstrations on each of the four tasks, as well as an imitation learning baseline that leverages these demonstrations. Our hope is that this competition will improve our ability to build AI systems that do what their designers intend them to do, even when the intent cannot be easily formalized. Besides allowing AI to solve more tasks, this can also enable more effective regulation of AI systems, as well as making progress on the value alignment problem.