Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectives

As AI systems become more capable of complex agentic tasks, they also become more capable of pursuing undesirable objectives and causing harm. Previous work has attempted to catch these unsafe instances by interrogating models directly about their objectives and behaviors. However, the main weakness of trusting interrogations is that models can lie. We propose self-report fine-tuning (SRFT), a simple supervised fine-tuning technique that trains models to admit their factual mistakes when asked. We show that the admission of factual errors in simple question-answering settings generalizes out-of-distribution (OOD) to the admission of hidden misaligned objectives in adversarial agentic settings. We evaluate SRFT in OOD stealth tasks, where models are instructed to complete a hidden misaligned objective alongside a user-specified objective without being caught by monitoring. After SRFT, models are more likely to confess the details of their hidden objectives when interrogated, even under strong pressure not to disclose them. Interrogation on SRFT models can detect hidden objectives with near-ceiling performance (F1 score = 0.98), while the baseline model lies when interrogated under the same conditions (F1 score = 0). Interrogation on SRFT models can further elicit the content of the hidden objective, recovering 28-100% details, compared to 0% details recovered in the baseline model and by prefilled assistant turn attacks. This provides a promising technique for promoting honesty propensity and incriminating misaligned AI systems.

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known AI oversight methods, CoT monitoring is imperfect and allows some misbehavior to go unnoticed. Nevertheless, it shows promise and we recommend further research into CoT monitorability and investment in CoT monitoring alongside existing safety methods. Because CoT monitorability may be fragile, we recommend that frontier model developers consider the impact of development decisions on CoT monitorability.

CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoring

As AI models are deployed with increasing autonomy, it is important to ensure they do not take harmful actions unnoticed. As a potential mitigation, we investigate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, wherein a weaker trusted monitor model continuously oversees the intermediate reasoning steps of a more powerful but untrusted model. We compare CoT monitoring to action-only monitoring, where only final outputs are reviewed, in a red-teaming setup where the untrusted model is instructed to pursue harmful side tasks while completing a coding problem. We find that CoT monitoring improves detection by up to 27 percentage points in scenarios where action-only monitoring fails to reliably identify sabotage. However, CoT traces can also contain misleading rationalizations that deceive the monitor, reducing performance in more obvious sabotage cases. To address this, we introduce a hybrid protocol that independently scores both reasoning and final outputs and combines them using a weighted average. This hybrid monitor consistently outperforms both CoT and action-only monitors across all tested models and tasks, with detection rates over four times higher than action-only monitoring for subtle deception scenarios.

Evaluating Frontier Models for Stealth and Situational Awareness

Recent work has demonstrated the plausibility of frontier AI models scheming -- knowingly and covertly pursuing an objective misaligned with its developer's intentions. Such behavior could be very hard to detect, and if present in future advanced systems, could pose severe loss of control risk. It is therefore important for AI developers to rule out harm from scheming prior to model deployment. In this paper, we present a suite of scheming reasoning evaluations measuring two types of reasoning capabilities that we believe are prerequisites for successful scheming: First, we propose five evaluations of ability to reason about and circumvent oversight (stealth). Second, we present eleven evaluations for measuring a model's ability to instrumentally reason about itself, its environment and its deployment (situational awareness). We demonstrate how these evaluations can be used as part of a scheming inability safety case: a model that does not succeed on these evaluations is almost certainly incapable of causing severe harm via scheming in real deployment. We run our evaluations on current frontier models and find that none of them show concerning levels of either situational awareness or stealth.

From Stability to Inconsistency: A Study of Moral Preferences in LLMs

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate into our daily lives, it becomes crucial to understand their implicit biases and moral tendencies. To address this, we introduce a Moral Foundations LLM dataset (MFD-LLM) grounded in Moral Foundations Theory, which conceptualizes human morality through six core foundations. We propose a novel evaluation method that captures the full spectrum of LLMs' revealed moral preferences by answering a range of real-world moral dilemmas. Our findings reveal that state-of-the-art models have remarkably homogeneous value preferences, yet demonstrate a lack of consistency.

Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Gemini: A Family of Highly Capable Multimodal Models

This report introduces a new family of multimodal models, Gemini, that exhibit remarkable capabilities across image, audio, video, and text understanding. The Gemini family consists of Ultra, Pro, and Nano sizes, suitable for applications ranging from complex reasoning tasks to on-device memory-constrained use-cases. Evaluation on a broad range of benchmarks shows that our most-capable Gemini Ultra model advances the state of the art in 30 of 32 of these benchmarks - notably being the first model to achieve human-expert performance on the well-studied exam benchmark MMLU, and improving the state of the art in every one of the 20 multimodal benchmarks we examined. We believe that the new capabilities of Gemini models in cross-modal reasoning and language understanding will enable a wide variety of use cases and we discuss our approach toward deploying them responsibly to users.

Model evaluation for extreme risks

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to capabilities that pose extreme risks, such as offensive cyber capabilities or strong manipulation skills. We explain why model evaluation is critical for addressing extreme risks. Developers must be able to identify dangerous capabilities (through "dangerous capability evaluations") and the propensity of models to apply their capabilities for harm (through "alignment evaluations"). These evaluations will become critical for keeping policymakers and other stakeholders informed, and for making responsible decisions about model training, deployment, and security.

Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goals

The field of AI alignment is concerned with AI systems that pursue unintended goals. One commonly studied mechanism by which an unintended goal might arise is specification gaming, in which the designer-provided specification is flawed in a way that the designers did not foresee. However, an AI system may pursue an undesired goal even when the specification is correct, in the case of goal misgeneralization. Goal misgeneralization is a specific form of robustness failure for learning algorithms in which the learned program competently pursues an undesired goal that leads to good performance in training situations but bad performance in novel test situations. We demonstrate that goal misgeneralization can occur in practical systems by providing several examples in deep learning systems across a variety of domains. Extrapolating forward to more capable systems, we provide hypotheticals that illustrate how goal misgeneralization could lead to catastrophic risk. We suggest several research directions that could reduce the risk of goal misgeneralization for future systems.

Formal Algorithms for Transformers

This document aims to be a self-contained, mathematically precise overview of transformer architectures and algorithms (*not* results). It covers what transformers are, how they are trained, what they are used for, their key architectural components, and a preview of the most prominent models. The reader is assumed to be familiar with basic ML terminology and simpler neural network architectures such as MLPs.