One-bit Flip is All You Need: When Bit-flip Attack Meets Model Training

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by \textbf{flipping only one critical bit} on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA}.

Bandit Policies for Reliable Cellular Network Handovers in Extreme Mobility

The demand for seamless Internet access under extreme user mobility, such as on high-speed trains and vehicles, has become a norm rather than an exception. However, the 4G/5G mobile network is not always reliable to meet this demand, with non-negligible failures during the handover between base stations. A fundamental challenge of reliability is to balance the exploration of more measurements for satisfactory handover, and exploitation for timely handover (before the fast-moving user leaves the serving base station's radio coverage). This paper formulates this trade-off in extreme mobility as a composition of two distinct multi-armed bandit problems. We propose Bandit and Threshold Tuning (BATT) to minimize the regret of handover failures in extreme mobility. BATT uses $\epsilon$-binary-search to optimize the threshold of the serving cell's signal strength to initiate the handover procedure with $\mathcal{O}(\log J \log T)$ regret.It further devises opportunistic Thompson sampling, which optimizes the sequence of the target cells to measure for reliable handover with $\mathcal{O}(\log T)$ regret.Our experiment over a real LTE dataset from Chinese high-speed rails validates significant regret reduction and a 29.1% handover failure reduction.