Abstract:Language-model post-training is the main stage at which model behavior is shaped, yet it still largely involves optimization of scalar rewards that summarize diverse desiderata. This abstraction gives practitioners little visibility into what their data actually teaches models, allowing spurious correlations to be learned by a model and inducing undesirable behaviors such as over-stylization and sycophancy. To address this problem, we ask: can we inspect a preference dataset before optimization and decide, at the level of concepts, which behaviors a model should be allowed to learn? Motivated by this, we introduce a data-centric post-training pipeline that uses interpretability protocols to develop statistical hypotheses for the latent concepts separating preferred from dispreferred generations, making them explicit for fine-grained user feedback. Building on this view, we unify several interpretability-based training protocols as ways of shaping rewards via feature or data interventions. Empirically, we show that our pipeline diagnoses undesirable signals in existing preference data, mitigates off-target learning, and can also help amplify or shape desired properties such as safeguards and model personality. More broadly, our results suggest that interpretability can turn post-training from optimizing opaque proxy rewards into a process of auditing and sculpting the learning signal itself.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) update their behavior in context, which can be viewed as a form of Bayesian inference. However, the structure of the latent hypothesis space over which this inference operates remains unclear. In this work, we propose that LLMs assign beliefs over a low-dimensional geometric space - a conceptual belief space - and that in-context learning corresponds to a trajectory through this space as beliefs are updated over time. Using story understanding as a natural setting for dynamic belief updating, we combine behavioral and representational analyses to study these trajectories. We find that (1) belief updates are well-described as trajectories on low-dimensional, structured manifolds; (2) this structure is reflected consistently in both model behavior and internal representations and can be decoded with simple linear probes to predict behavior; and (3) interventions on these representations causally steer belief trajectories, with effects that can be predicted from the geometry of the conceptual space. Together, our results provide a geometric account of belief dynamics in LLMs, grounding Bayesian interpretations of in-context learning in structured conceptual representations.
Abstract:Neural representations carry rich geometric structure; but does that structure causally shape behavior? To address this question, we intervene along paths through activation space defined by different geometries, and measure the behavioral trajectories they induce. In particular, we test whether interventions that respect the geometry of activation space will yield behaviors close to those the model exhibits naturally. Concretely, we first fit an activation manifold $M_h$ to representations and a behavior manifold $M_y$ to output probability distributions. We then test the link $M_h \leftrightarrow M_y$ via interventions: we find that steering along $M_h$, which we term manifold steering, yields behavioral trajectories that follow $M_y$, while linear steering -- which assumes a Euclidean geometry -- cuts through off-manifold regions and hence produces unnatural outputs. Moreover, optimizing interventions in activation space to produce paths along $M_y$ recovers activation trajectories that trace the curvature of $M_h$. We demonstrate this bidirectional relationship between the geometry of representation and behavior across tasks and modalities. In language models, we use reasoning tasks with cyclic and sequential geometries as well as in-context learning tasks with more complex graph geometries. In a video world model, we use a task with geometry corresponding to physical dynamics. Overall, our work shows that geometry in neural representation is not merely incidental, but is in fact the proper object for enabling principled control via intervention on internals. This recasts the core problem of steering from finding the right direction to finding the right geometry.
Abstract:We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.
Abstract:Language models trained on large-scale datasets have been shown to learn features that encode abstract concepts such as factuality or intent. Such features are traditionally used for test-time monitoring or steering. We present an alternative affordance: features as scalable supervision for open-ended tasks. We consider the case of hallucination-reduction as a desirable, yet open-ended behavior and design a reinforcement learning (RL) pipeline, titled RLFR (Reinforcement Learning from Feature Rewards), that uses features as reward functions. Grounded in a novel probing framework that identifies candidate hallucinated claims, our pipeline teaches a model to intervene and correct its completions when it is uncertain of their factuality. Furthermore, the pipeline enables scalable test-time compute, guided once more by our reward features. This end-to-end process operationalized on Gemma-3-12B-IT results in a policy that is 58% less likely to hallucinate compared to the original model (when run in tandem with our probing harness), while preserving performance on standard benchmarks. Taken together, by grounding supervision in the language of features, this paper introduces a novel paradigm in the use of interpretability for learning open-ended tasks.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) represent prompt-conditioned beliefs (posteriors over answers and claims), but we lack a mechanistic account of how these beliefs are encoded in representation space, how they update with new evidence, and how interventions reshape them. We study a controlled setting in which Llama-3.2 generates samples from a normal distribution by implicitly inferring its parameters (mean and standard deviation) given only samples from the distribution in context. We find representations of curved "belief manifolds" for these parameters form with sufficient in-context learning and study how the model adapts when the distribution suddenly changes. While standard linear steering often pushes the model off-manifold and induces coupled, out-of-distribution shifts, geometry and field-aware steering better preserves the intended belief family. Our work demonstrates an example of linear field probing (LFP) as a simple approach to tile the data manifold and make interventions that respect the underlying geometry. We conclude that rich structure emerges naturally in LLMs and that purely linear concept representations are often an inadequate abstraction.
Abstract:Can we localize the weights and mechanisms used by a language model to memorize and recite entire paragraphs of its training data? In this paper, we show that while memorization is spread across multiple layers and model components, gradients of memorized paragraphs have a distinguishable spatial pattern, being larger in lower model layers than gradients of non-memorized examples. Moreover, the memorized examples can be unlearned by fine-tuning only the high-gradient weights. We localize a low-layer attention head that appears to be especially involved in paragraph memorization. This head is predominantly focusing its attention on distinctive, rare tokens that are least frequent in a corpus-level unigram distribution. Next, we study how localized memorization is across the tokens in the prefix by perturbing tokens and measuring the caused change in the decoding. A few distinctive tokens early in a prefix can often corrupt the entire continuation. Overall, memorized continuations are not only harder to unlearn, but also to corrupt than non-memorized ones.