Why Larger Models Learn More: Effects of Capacity, Interference, and Rare-Task Retention

Larger models learn tasks smaller models do not. What drives this phenomenon? We develop a simple phenomenological argument that power-law scaling already suggests that a larger model will be able to learn a part of the data distribution that a smaller model fails to learn, even with infinite training data. To validate this claim and identify its causes, we study the effects of model scaling on a synthetic setup consisting of a mixture of tasks that show monotonic scaling curves. The results point to a data-induced competition over resources (neurons). Specifically, smaller models allocate their neurons to high frequency or low complexity tasks, and so they learn solutions that perform poorly on rare and complex tasks. Moreover, this happens even when solutions capable of expressing the desired task exist. We then assess how a larger model circumvents this data-centric bottleneck, finding that it traces to a reduced interference mechanism: larger models can allocate enough resources to common tasks that the gradient updates for those tasks become weak, which means that they do not overwrite rare-task features as they slowly accumulate. Finally, to further validate these claims, we pretrain OLMo models (4M to 4B parameters) on novel tasks of varying frequency and complexity. The results mirror those from our synthetic data experiments: only the larger OLMo models learn the infrequent and complex tasks, and these larger models embed more task features in their representations and show less gradient interference between tasks. Overall, we offer a data-centric account of why larger models learn tasks that smaller models fail to. This helps explain why larger models are better in practice, and it can inform practical questions concerning model sizing and training data mixtures.

Stories in Space: In-Context Learning Trajectories in Conceptual Belief Space

Large Language Models (LLMs) update their behavior in context, which can be viewed as a form of Bayesian inference. However, the structure of the latent hypothesis space over which this inference operates remains unclear. In this work, we propose that LLMs assign beliefs over a low-dimensional geometric space - a conceptual belief space - and that in-context learning corresponds to a trajectory through this space as beliefs are updated over time. Using story understanding as a natural setting for dynamic belief updating, we combine behavioral and representational analyses to study these trajectories. We find that (1) belief updates are well-described as trajectories on low-dimensional, structured manifolds; (2) this structure is reflected consistently in both model behavior and internal representations and can be decoded with simple linear probes to predict behavior; and (3) interventions on these representations causally steer belief trajectories, with effects that can be predicted from the geometry of the conceptual space. Together, our results provide a geometric account of belief dynamics in LLMs, grounding Bayesian interpretations of in-context learning in structured conceptual representations.

Manifold Steering Reveals the Shared Geometry of Neural Network Representation and Behavior

Neural representations carry rich geometric structure; but does that structure causally shape behavior? To address this question, we intervene along paths through activation space defined by different geometries, and measure the behavioral trajectories they induce. In particular, we test whether interventions that respect the geometry of activation space will yield behaviors close to those the model exhibits naturally. Concretely, we first fit an activation manifold $M_h$ to representations and a behavior manifold $M_y$ to output probability distributions. We then test the link $M_h \leftrightarrow M_y$ via interventions: we find that steering along $M_h$, which we term manifold steering, yields behavioral trajectories that follow $M_y$, while linear steering -- which assumes a Euclidean geometry -- cuts through off-manifold regions and hence produces unnatural outputs. Moreover, optimizing interventions in activation space to produce paths along $M_y$ recovers activation trajectories that trace the curvature of $M_h$. We demonstrate this bidirectional relationship between the geometry of representation and behavior across tasks and modalities. In language models, we use reasoning tasks with cyclic and sequential geometries as well as in-context learning tasks with more complex graph geometries. In a video world model, we use a task with geometry corresponding to physical dynamics. Overall, our work shows that geometry in neural representation is not merely incidental, but is in fact the proper object for enabling principled control via intervention on internals. This recasts the core problem of steering from finding the right direction to finding the right geometry.

The Shape of Beliefs: Geometry, Dynamics, and Interventions along Representation Manifolds of Language Models' Posteriors

Large language models (LLMs) represent prompt-conditioned beliefs (posteriors over answers and claims), but we lack a mechanistic account of how these beliefs are encoded in representation space, how they update with new evidence, and how interventions reshape them. We study a controlled setting in which Llama-3.2 generates samples from a normal distribution by implicitly inferring its parameters (mean and standard deviation) given only samples from the distribution in context. We find representations of curved "belief manifolds" for these parameters form with sufficient in-context learning and study how the model adapts when the distribution suddenly changes. While standard linear steering often pushes the model off-manifold and induces coupled, out-of-distribution shifts, geometry and field-aware steering better preserves the intended belief family. Our work demonstrates an example of linear field probing (LFP) as a simple approach to tile the data manifold and make interventions that respect the underlying geometry. We conclude that rich structure emerges naturally in LLMs and that purely linear concept representations are often an inadequate abstraction.

Scaling up the think-aloud method

The think-aloud method, where participants voice their thoughts as they solve a task, is a valuable source of rich data about human reasoning processes. Yet, it has declined in popularity in contemporary cognitive science, largely because labor-intensive transcription and annotation preclude large sample sizes. Here, we develop methods to automate the transcription and annotation of verbal reports of reasoning using natural language processing tools, allowing for large-scale analysis of think-aloud data. In our study, 640 participants thought aloud while playing the Game of 24, a mathematical reasoning task. We automatically transcribed the recordings and coded the transcripts as search graphs, finding moderate inter-rater reliability with humans. We analyze these graphs and characterize consistency and variation in human reasoning traces. Our work demonstrates the value of think-aloud data at scale and serves as a proof of concept for the automated analysis of verbal reports.

Inverse Scaling: When Bigger Isn't Better

Work on scaling laws has found that large language models (LMs) show predictable improvements to overall loss with increased scale (model size, training data, and compute). Here, we present evidence for the claim that LMs may show inverse scaling, or worse task performance with increased scale, e.g., due to flaws in the training objective and data. We present empirical evidence of inverse scaling on 11 datasets collected by running a public contest, the Inverse Scaling Prize, with a substantial prize pool. Through analysis of the datasets, along with other examples found in the literature, we identify four potential causes of inverse scaling: (i) preference to repeat memorized sequences over following in-context instructions, (ii) imitation of undesirable patterns in the training data, (iii) tasks containing an easy distractor task which LMs could focus on, rather than the harder real task, and (iv) correct but misleading few-shot demonstrations of the task. We release the winning datasets at https://inversescaling.com/data to allow for further investigation of inverse scaling. Our tasks have helped drive the discovery of U-shaped and inverted-U scaling trends, where an initial trend reverses, suggesting that scaling trends are less reliable at predicting the behavior of larger-scale models than previously understood. Overall, our results suggest that there are tasks for which increased model scale alone may not lead to progress, and that more careful thought needs to go into the data and objectives for training language models.