Adaptive Calibration in Non-Stationary Environments

Making calibrated online predictions is a central challenge in modern AI systems. Much of the existing literature focuses on fully adversarial environments where outcomes may be arbitrary, leading to conservative algorithms that can perform suboptimally in more benign settings, such as when outcomes are nearly stationary. This gap raises a natural question: can we design online prediction algorithms whose calibration error automatically adapts to the degree of non-stationarity in the environment, smoothly interpolating between i.i.d. and adversarial regimes? We answer this question in the affirmative and develop a suite of algorithms that achieve adaptive calibration guarantees under multiple calibration measures. Specifically, with $T$ being the number of rounds and $C\in[0,T]$ being an unknown non-stationary measure defined as the minimal $\ell_1$ deviation of the mean outcomes, our algorithms attain $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}+(TC)^{\frac{1}{3}})$ for $\ell_1$ calibration error and $\widetilde{O}((1+C)^{\frac{1}{3}})$ for both $\ell_2$ and pseudo KL calibration error. These bounds match the optimal rates in the stationary case ($C=0$) and recover known guarantees in the fully adversarial regime ($C=T$). Our approach builds on and extends prior work [Hu et al., 2026, Luo et al., 2025], introducing an epoch-based scheduling together with a novel non-uniform partition of the prediction space that allocates finer resolution near the underlying ground truth.

Safe Probabilistic Planning for Human-Robot Interaction using Conformal Risk Control

In this paper, we present a novel probabilistic safe control framework for human-robot interaction that combines control barrier functions (CBFs) with conformal risk control to provide formal safety guarantees while considering complex human behavior. The approach uses conformal risk control to quantify and control the prediction errors in CBF safety values and establishes formal guarantees on the probability of constraint satisfaction during interaction. We introduce an algorithm that dynamically adjusts the safety margins produced by conformal risk control based on the current interaction context. Through experiments on human-robot navigation scenarios, we demonstrate that our approach significantly reduces collision rates and safety violations as compared to baseline methods while maintaining high success rates in goal-reaching tasks and efficient control. The code, simulations, and other supplementary material can be found on the project website: https://jakeagonzales.github.io/crc-cbf-website/.

Strategically Robust Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation

Provably efficient and robust equilibrium computation in general-sum Markov games remains a core challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nash equilibrium is computationally intractable in general and brittle due to equilibrium multiplicity and sensitivity to approximation error. We study Risk-Sensitive Quantal Response Equilibrium (RQRE), which yields a unique, smooth solution under bounded rationality and risk sensitivity. We propose \texttt{RQRE-OVI}, an optimistic value iteration algorithm for computing RQRE with linear function approximation in large or continuous state spaces. Through finite-sample regret analysis, we establish convergence and explicitly characterize how sample complexity scales with rationality and risk-sensitivity parameters. The regret bounds reveal a quantitative tradeoff: increasing rationality tightens regret, while risk sensitivity induces regularization that enhances stability and robustness. This exposes a Pareto frontier between expected performance and robustness, with Nash recovered in the limit of perfect rationality and risk neutrality. We further show that the RQRE policy map is Lipschitz continuous in estimated payoffs, unlike Nash, and RQRE admits a distributionally robust optimization interpretation. Empirically, we demonstrate that \texttt{RQRE-OVI} achieves competitive performance under self-play while producing substantially more robust behavior under cross-play compared to Nash-based approaches. These results suggest \texttt{RQRE-OVI} offers a principled, scalable, and tunable path for equilibrium learning with improved robustness and generalization.

Revisiting the Bertrand Paradox via Equilibrium Analysis of No-regret Learners

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set $\{1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1\}$, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

Efficient Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with $\tilde{O}\!\left(T^{-1/4}\right)$ Last-Iterate Convergence in Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems over Convex Sets under Bandit Feedback

In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics. We focus on the challenging setting where players select actions from compact convex sets and receive only bandit feedback. Our main contribution is the design of an uncoupled learning algorithm that guarantees last-iterate convergence to the Nash equilibrium with high probability. We establish a convergence rate of $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/4})$ up to polynomial factors in problem parameters. Crucially, our proposed algorithm is computationally efficient, requiring only an efficient linear optimization oracle over the players' compact action sets. The algorithm is obtained by combining techniques from experimental design and the classic Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) framework, with a carefully chosen regularizer function tailored to the geometry of the action set of each learner.

TOPReward: Token Probabilities as Hidden Zero-Shot Rewards for Robotics

While Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have seen rapid progress in pretraining, their advancement in Reinforcement Learning (RL) remains hampered by low sample efficiency and sparse rewards in real-world settings. Developing generalizable process reward models is essential for providing the fine-grained feedback necessary to bridge this gap, yet existing temporal value functions often fail to generalize beyond their training domains. We introduce TOPReward, a novel, probabilistically grounded temporal value function that leverages the latent world knowledge of pretrained video Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to estimate robotic task progress. Unlike prior methods that prompt VLMs to directly output progress values, which are prone to numerical misrepresentation, TOPReward extracts task progress directly from the VLM's internal token logits. In zero-shot evaluations across 130+ distinct real-world tasks and multiple robot platforms (e.g., Franka, YAM, SO-100/101), TOPReward achieves 0.947 mean Value-Order Correlation (VOC) on Qwen3-VL, dramatically outperforming the state-of-the-art GVL baseline which achieves near-zero correlation on the same open-source model. We further demonstrate that TOPReward serves as a versatile tool for downstream applications, including success detection and reward-aligned behavior cloning.

Online Learning for Uninformed Markov Games: Empirical Nash-Value Regret and Non-Stationarity Adaptation

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an exponential dependence on the episode length $H$. They then turn to the weaker notion of Nash-value regret and propose a V-learning algorithm with regret $O(K^{2/3})$ after $K$ episodes. However, their algorithm and guarantee do not adapt to the difficulty of the problem: even in the case where the opponent follows a fixed policy and thus $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret is well-known to be achievable, their result is still the worse rate $O(K^{2/3})$ on a weaker metric. In this work, we fully address both limitations. First, we introduce empirical Nash-value regret, a new regret notion that is strictly stronger than Nash-value regret and naturally reduces to external regret when the opponent follows a fixed policy. Moreover, under this new metric, we propose a parameter-free algorithm that achieves an $O(\min \{\sqrt{K} + (CK)^{1/3},\sqrt{LK}\})$ regret bound, where $C$ quantifies the variance of the opponent's policies and $L$ denotes the number of policy switches (both at most $O(K)$). Therefore, our results not only recover the two extremes -- $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret when the opponent is fixed and $O(K^{2/3})$ Nash-value regret in the worst case -- but also smoothly interpolate between these extremes by automatically adapting to the opponent's non-stationarity. We achieve so by first providing a new analysis of the epoch-based V-learning algorithm by Mao et al. (2022), establishing an $O(ηC + \sqrt{K/η})$ regret bound, where $η$ is the epoch incremental factor. Next, we show how to adaptively restart this algorithm with an appropriate $η$ in response to the potential non-stationarity of the opponent, eventually achieving our final results.

dUltra: Ultra-Fast Diffusion Language Models via Reinforcement Learning

Masked diffusion language models (MDLMs) offer the potential for parallel token generation, but most open-source MDLMs decode fewer than 5 tokens per model forward pass even with sophisticated sampling strategies. As a result, their sampling speeds are often comparable to AR + speculative decoding schemes, limiting their advantage over mainstream autoregressive approaches. Existing distillation-based accelerators (dParallel, d3LLM) finetune MDLMs on trajectories generated by a base model, which can become off-policy during finetuning and restrict performance to the quality of the base model's samples. We propose \texttt{dUltra}, an on-policy reinforcement learning framework based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) that learns unmasking strategies for efficient parallel decoding. dUltra introduces an unmasking planner head that predicts per-token unmasking likelihoods under independent Bernoulli distributions. We jointly optimize the base diffusion LLM and the unmasking order planner using reward signals combining verifiable reward, distillation reward, and the number of unmasking steps. Across mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks, dUltra improves the accuracy--efficiency trade-off over state-of-the-art heuristic and distillation baselines, moving towards achieving ``diffusion supremacy'' over autoregressive models.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals

We initiate the study of a repeated principal-agent problem over a finite horizon $T$, where a principal sequentially interacts with $K\geq 2$ types of agents arriving in an adversarial order. At each round, the principal strategically chooses one of the $N$ arms to incentivize for an arriving agent of unknown type. The agent then chooses an arm based on its own utility and the provided incentive, and the principal receives a corresponding reward. The objective is to minimize regret against the best incentive in hindsight. Without prior knowledge of agent behavior, we show that the problem becomes intractable, leading to linear regret. We analyze two key settings where sublinear regret is achievable. In the first setting, the principal knows the arm each agent type would select greedily for any given incentive. Under this setting, we propose an algorithm that achieves a regret bound of $O(\min\{\sqrt{KT\log N},K\sqrt{T}\})$ and provide a matching lower bound up to a $\log K$ factor. In the second setting, an agent's response varies smoothly with the incentive and is governed by a Lipschitz constant $L\geq 1$. Under this setting, we show that there is an algorithm with a regret bound of $\tilde{O}((LN)^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ and establish a matching lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Finally, we extend our algorithmic results for both settings by allowing the principal to incentivize multiple arms simultaneously in each round.

Improved Regret and Contextual Linear Extension for Pandora's Box and Prophet Inequality

We study the Pandora's Box problem in an online learning setting with semi-bandit feedback. In each round, the learner sequentially pays to open up to $n$ boxes with unknown reward distributions, observes rewards upon opening, and decides when to stop. The utility of the learner is the maximum observed reward minus the cumulative cost of opened boxes, and the goal is to minimize regret defined as the gap between the cumulative expected utility and that of the optimal policy. We propose a new algorithm that achieves $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$ regret after $T$ rounds, which improves the $\widetilde{O}(n\sqrt{T})$ bound of Agarwal et al. [2024] and matches the known lower bound up to logarithmic factors. To better capture real-life applications, we then extend our results to a natural but challenging contextual linear setting, where each box's expected reward is linear in some known but time-varying $d$-dimensional context and the noise distribution is fixed over time. We design an algorithm that learns both the linear function and the noise distributions, achieving $\widetilde{O}(nd\sqrt{T})$ regret. Finally, we show that our techniques also apply to the online Prophet Inequality problem, where the learner must decide immediately whether or not to accept a revealed reward. In both non-contextual and contextual settings, our approach achieves similar improvements and regret bounds.