Meta-learning is a framework for learning learning algorithms through repeated interactions with an environment as opposed to designing them by hand. In recent years, this framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition. Yet, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We rely on three key pillars to accomplish this goal. We first point out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms. This result not only implies that any behavioral phenomenon that can be explained by a Bayesian model can also be explained by a meta-learned model but also allows us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional Bayesian methods. In particular, we argue that meta-learning can be applied to situations where Bayesian inference is impossible and that it enables us to make rational models of cognition more realistic, either by incorporating limited computational resources or neuroscientific knowledge. Finally, we reexamine prior studies from psychology and neuroscience that have applied meta-learning and put them into the context of these new insights. In summary, our work highlights that meta-learning considerably extends the scope of rational analysis and thereby of cognitive theories more generally.
Reasoning in a complex and ambiguous environment is a key goal for Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents. While some sophisticated RL agents can successfully solve difficult tasks, they require a large amount of training data and often struggle to generalize to new unseen environments and new tasks. On the other hand, Large Scale Language Models (LSLMs) have exhibited strong reasoning ability and the ability to to adapt to new tasks through in-context learning. However, LSLMs do not inherently have the ability to interrogate or intervene on the environment. In this work, we investigate how to combine these complementary abilities in a single system consisting of three parts: a Planner, an Actor, and a Reporter. The Planner is a pre-trained language model that can issue commands to a simple embodied agent (the Actor), while the Reporter communicates with the Planner to inform its next command. We present a set of tasks that require reasoning, test this system's ability to generalize zero-shot and investigate failure cases, and demonstrate how components of this system can be trained with reinforcement-learning to improve performance.
Instruction-following agents must ground language into their observation and action spaces. Learning to ground language is challenging, typically requiring domain-specific engineering or large quantities of human interaction data. To address this challenge, we propose using pretrained vision-language models (VLMs) to supervise embodied agents. We combine ideas from model distillation and hindsight experience replay (HER), using a VLM to retroactively generate language describing the agent's behavior. Simple prompting allows us to control the supervision signal, teaching an agent to interact with novel objects based on their names (e.g., planes) or their features (e.g., colors) in a 3D rendered environment. Fewshot prompting lets us teach abstract category membership, including pre-existing categories (food vs toys) and ad-hoc ones (arbitrary preferences over objects). Our work outlines a new and effective way to use internet-scale VLMs, repurposing the generic language grounding acquired by such models to teach task-relevant groundings to embodied agents.
A fundamental ability of an intelligent web-based agent is seeking out and acquiring new information. Internet search engines reliably find the correct vicinity but the top results may be a few links away from the desired target. A complementary approach is navigation via hyperlinks, employing a policy that comprehends local content and selects a link that moves it closer to the target. In this paper, we show that behavioral cloning of randomly sampled trajectories is sufficient to learn an effective link selection policy. We demonstrate the approach on a graph version of Wikipedia with 38M nodes and 387M edges. The model is able to efficiently navigate between nodes 5 and 20 steps apart 96% and 92% of the time, respectively. We then use the resulting embeddings and policy in downstream fact verification and question answering tasks where, in combination with basic TF-IDF search and ranking methods, they are competitive results to the state-of-the-art methods.
Transformer models can use two fundamentally different kinds of information: information stored in weights during training, and information provided ``in-context'' at inference time. In this work, we show that transformers exhibit different inductive biases in how they represent and generalize from the information in these two sources. In particular, we characterize whether they generalize via parsimonious rules (rule-based generalization) or via direct comparison with observed examples (exemplar-based generalization). This is of important practical consequence, as it informs whether to encode information in weights or in context, depending on how we want models to use that information. In transformers trained on controlled stimuli, we find that generalization from weights is more rule-based whereas generalization from context is largely exemplar-based. In contrast, we find that in transformers pre-trained on natural language, in-context learning is significantly rule-based, with larger models showing more rule-basedness. We hypothesise that rule-based generalization from in-context information might be an emergent consequence of large-scale training on language, which has sparse rule-like structure. Using controlled stimuli, we verify that transformers pretrained on data containing sparse rule-like structure exhibit more rule-based generalization.
Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.
Strong inductive biases are a key component of human intelligence, allowing people to quickly learn a variety of tasks. Although meta-learning has emerged as an approach for endowing neural networks with useful inductive biases, agents trained by meta-learning may acquire very different strategies from humans. We show that co-training these agents on predicting representations from natural language task descriptions and from programs induced to generate such tasks guides them toward human-like inductive biases. Human-generated language descriptions and program induction with library learning both result in more human-like behavior in downstream meta-reinforcement learning agents than less abstract controls (synthetic language descriptions, program induction without library learning), suggesting that the abstraction supported by these representations is key.
Large language models can perform new tasks by adapting to a few in-context examples. For humans, rapid learning from examples can benefit from explanations that connect examples to task principles. We therefore investigate whether explanations of few-shot examples can allow language models to adapt more effectively. We annotate a set of 40 challenging tasks from BIG-Bench with explanations of answers to a small subset of questions, as well as a variety of matched control explanations. We evaluate the effects of various zero-shot and few-shot prompts that include different types of explanations, instructions, and controls on the performance of a range of large language models. We analyze these results using statistical multilevel modeling techniques that account for the nested dependencies among conditions, tasks, prompts, and models. We find that explanations of examples can improve performance. Adding untuned explanations to a few-shot prompt offers a modest improvement in performance; about 1/3 the effect size of adding few-shot examples, but twice the effect size of task instructions. We then show that explanations tuned for performance on a small validation set offer substantially larger benefits; building a prompt by selecting examples and explanations together substantially improves performance over selecting examples alone. Hand-tuning explanations can substantially improve performance on challenging tasks. Furthermore, even untuned explanations outperform carefully matched controls, suggesting that the benefits are due to the link between an example and its explanation, rather than lower-level features of the language used. However, only large models can benefit from explanations. In summary, explanations can support the in-context learning abilities of large language models on
The ability to acquire abstract knowledge is a hallmark of human intelligence and is believed by many to be one of the core differences between humans and neural network models. Agents can be endowed with an inductive bias towards abstraction through meta-learning, where they are trained on a distribution of tasks that share some abstract structure that can be learned and applied. However, because neural networks are hard to interpret, it can be difficult to tell whether agents have learned the underlying abstraction, or alternatively statistical patterns that are characteristic of that abstraction. In this work, we compare the performance of humans and agents in a meta-reinforcement learning paradigm in which tasks are generated from abstract rules. We define a novel methodology for building "task metamers" that closely match the statistics of the abstract tasks but use a different underlying generative process, and evaluate performance on both abstract and metamer tasks. In our first set of experiments, we found that humans perform better at abstract tasks than metamer tasks whereas a widely-used meta-reinforcement learning agent performs worse on the abstract tasks than the matched metamers. In a second set of experiments, we base the tasks on abstractions derived directly from empirically identified human priors. We utilize the same procedure to generate corresponding metamer tasks, and see the same double dissociation between humans and agents. This work provides a foundation for characterizing differences between humans and machine learning that can be used in future work towards developing machines with human-like behavior.
Explanations play a considerable role in human learning, especially in areas that remain major challenges for AI -- forming abstractions, and learning about the relational and causal structure of the world. Here, we explore whether reinforcement learning agents might likewise benefit from explanations. We outline a family of relational tasks that involve selecting an object that is the odd one out in a set (i.e., unique along one of many possible feature dimensions). Odd-one-out tasks require agents to reason over multi-dimensional relationships among a set of objects. We show that agents do not learn these tasks well from reward alone, but achieve >90% performance when they are also trained to generate language explaining object properties or why a choice is correct or incorrect. In further experiments, we show how predicting explanations enables agents to generalize appropriately from ambiguous, causally-confounded training, and even to meta-learn to perform experimental interventions to identify causal structure. We show that explanations help overcome the tendency of agents to fixate on simple features, and explore which aspects of explanations make them most beneficial. Our results suggest that learning from explanations is a powerful principle that could offer a promising path towards training more robust and general machine learning systems.