Meta-learning as a principle for human-like visual representations

The structure of human visual representations underpins our capacity for adaptive behaviour. While pretrained neural networks model human visual representations with unprecedented success, a large discrepancy remains. We propose one reason: these networks optimise a single fixed objective, whereas human representations must support open-ended tasks. We hypothesise this flexibility arises from meta-learning (learning to learn), a pressure shaping representations to acquire new tasks from few observations. To test this, we train a sequence model, without any supervision from human data, across thousands of semantically rich tasks mapping images to high-level concepts. Compared to their pretrained base encoders, meta-learned representations better predict human similarity judgements, semantic rule learning, and high-level visual cortex. Behavioural gains depend on disentangled, high-level task distributions, while brain alignment is driven primarily by the learning-to-learn pressure. Our results suggest the flexibility of human visual representations reflects the functional demand to learn new semantic relationships on the fly.

Closing the Loop to Discover Psychological Theories with an Automated Cognitive Scientist

Across the sciences, autonomous systems are increasingly being used in closed-loop discovery, proposing new theories and designing and running experiments to test them. This approach is yet to be applied in the field of cognitive science, where the central bottleneck is theory-building: the creative step of turning the accumulated failures of existing models into better ones. Theory generation has remained manual even as data collection, modeling, and experiment design have been automated. We present the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a fully autonomous agentic-AI system that closes this loop. Large-language-model agents advocate competing theories, each expressed as an executable cognitive model, design experiments that best discriminate them, collect behavioral data from participants recruited online, score theories against collected data based on their generative performance, diagnose why they fail, and synthesize a better successor. Repeating this cycle allows them to search the space of theories, models, and experiments. In the domain of decision-making, AutoCog recovered known decision-making strategies from simulated behavior, including unconventional ones, showing that its discoveries are ultimately driven by the data rather than strictly bound by the priors of the underlying language models. When run with human participants, it produced theories that outperformed the established theories it was seeded with and generalized to held-out studies in two different experimental settings. It also surfaced a novel theory of multi-cue decision-making in which choices show diminishing sensitivity to feature values. The distinctive predictions of this theory were confirmed in a preregistered study with new participants. AutoCog demonstrates how an automated discovery system can be used to turn cognitive theory-building into an explicit, executable, and cumulative science.

Unifying Goal-Conditioned RL and Unsupervised Skill Learning via Control-Maximization

Unsupervised pretraining has driven empirical advances in goal-conditioned reinforcement learning (GCRL), but its theoretical foundations remain poorly understood. In particular, an influential class of methods, mutual information skill learning (MISL), discovers behaviorally diverse skills that can later be used for downstream goal-reaching. However, it remains a theoretical mystery why skills learned through MISL should support goal-reaching. A subtle challenge is that both GCRL and MISL are umbrella terms: different GCRL tasks use distinct criteria for measuring goal-reaching performance, while different MISL methods optimize distinct notions of behavioral diversity. We address this challenge and unify GCRL and MISL as instances of control maximization. We identify three canonical GCRL formulations and prove that they are fundamentally inequivalent: they can induce incompatible optimal policies even in the same environment. Nevertheless, they all share a common interpretation: a well-performing goal-conditioned policy is one whose future trajectory is highly sensitive to the commanded goal, with the precise notion of sensitivity determined by the GCRL formulation. Noting that MISL objectives can be understood as measures of skill-sensitivity akin to goal-sensitivity, we show that MISL objectives are bounded by formulation-specific downstream goal-sensitivities. These bounds establish a precise correspondence between MISL methods and downstream GCRL tasks: for every GCRL formulation, there exists a matching MISL objective for which more diverse skills afford greater downstream goal sensitivity. Our results thus lay a theoretical foundation for RL pretraining and have important practical implications, such as suggesting which pretraining objectives to use when a user cares about a specific class of downstream tasks.

Can we automatize scientific discovery in the cognitive sciences?

The cognitive sciences aim to understand intelligence by formalizing underlying operations as computational models. Traditionally, this follows a cycle of discovery where researchers develop paradigms, collect data, and test predefined model classes. However, this manual pipeline is fundamentally constrained by the slow pace of human intervention and a search space limited by researchers' background and intuition. Here, we propose a paradigm shift toward a fully automated, in silico science of the mind that implements every stage of the discovery cycle using Large Language Models (LLMs). In this framework, experimental paradigms exploring conceptually meaningful task structures are directly sampled from an LLM. High-fidelity behavioral data are then simulated using foundation models of cognition. The tedious step of handcrafting cognitive models is replaced by LLM-based program synthesis, which performs a high-throughput search over a vast landscape of algorithmic hypotheses. Finally, the discovery loop is closed by optimizing for ''interestingness'', a metric of conceptual yield evaluated by an LLM-critic. By enabling a fast and scalable approach to theory development, this automated loop functions as a high-throughput in-silico discovery engine, surfacing informative experiments and mechanisms for subsequent validation in real human populations.

In-Context Function Learning in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) can learn from a few demonstrations provided at inference time. We study this in-context learning phenomenon through the lens of Gaussian Processes (GPs). We build controlled experiments where models observe sequences of multivariate scalar-valued function samples drawn from known GP priors. We evaluate prediction error in relation to the number of demonstrations and compare against two principled references: (i) an empirical GP-regression learner that gives a lower bound on achievable error, and (ii) the expected error of a 1-nearest-neighbor (1-NN) rule, which gives a data-driven upper bound. Across model sizes, we find that LLM learning curves are strongly influenced by the function-generating kernels and approach the GP lower bound as the number of demonstrations increases. We then study the inductive biases of these models using a likelihood-based analysis. We find that LLM predictions are most likely under less smooth GP kernels. Finally, we explore whether post-training can shift these inductive biases and improve sample-efficiency on functions sampled from GPs with smoother kernels. We find that both reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning can effectively shift inductive biases in the direction of the training data. Together, our framework quantifies the extent to which LLMs behave like GP learners and provides tools for steering their inductive biases for continuous function learning tasks.

Can vision language models learn intuitive physics from interaction?

Pre-trained vision language models do not have good intuitions about the physical world. Recent work has shown that supervised fine-tuning can improve model performance on simple physical tasks. However, fine-tuned models do not appear to learn robust physical rules that can generalize to new contexts. Based on research in cognitive science, we hypothesize that models need to interact with an environment to properly learn its physical dynamics. We train models that learn through interaction with the environment using reinforcement learning. While learning from interaction allows models to improve their within-task performance, it fails to produce models with generalizable physical intuitions. We find that models trained on one task do not reliably generalize to related tasks, even if the tasks share visual statistics and physical principles, and regardless of whether the models are trained through interaction.

Exploring System 1 and 2 communication for latent reasoning in LLMs

Should LLM reasoning live in a separate module, or within a single model's forward pass and representational space? We study dual-architecture latent reasoning, where a fluent Base exchanges latent messages with a Coprocessor, and test two hypotheses aimed at improving latent communication over Liu et al. (2024): (H1) increase channel capacity; (H2) learn communication via joint finetuning. Under matched latent-token budgets on GPT-2 and Qwen-3, H2 is consistently strongest while H1 yields modest gains. A unified soft-embedding baseline, a single model with the same forward pass and shared representations, using the same latent-token budget, nearly matches H2 and surpasses H1, suggesting current dual designs mostly add compute rather than qualitatively improving reasoning. Across GSM8K, ProsQA, and a Countdown stress test with increasing branching factor, scaling the latent-token budget beyond small values fails to improve robustness. Latent analyses show overlapping subspaces with limited specialization, consistent with weak reasoning gains. We conclude dual-model latent reasoning remains promising in principle, but likely requires objectives and communication mechanisms that explicitly shape latent spaces for algorithmic planning.

Automated scientific minimization of regret

We introduce automated scientific minimization of regret (ASMR) -- a framework for automated computational cognitive science. Building on the principles of scientific regret minimization, ASMR leverages Centaur -- a recently proposed foundation model of human cognition -- to identify gaps in an interpretable cognitive model. These gaps are then addressed through automated revisions generated by a language-based reasoning model. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in a multi-attribute decision-making task, showing that ASMR discovers cognitive models that predict human behavior at noise ceiling while retaining interpretability. Taken together, our results highlight the potential of ASMR to automate core components of the cognitive modeling pipeline.

Concept-Guided Interpretability via Neural Chunking

Neural networks are often black boxes, reflecting the significant challenge of understanding their internal workings. We propose a different perspective that challenges the prevailing view: rather than being inscrutable, neural networks exhibit patterns in their raw population activity that mirror regularities in the training data. We refer to this as the Reflection Hypothesis and provide evidence for this phenomenon in both simple recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and complex large language models (LLMs). Building on this insight, we propose to leverage cognitively-inspired methods of chunking to segment high-dimensional neural population dynamics into interpretable units that reflect underlying concepts. We propose three methods to extract these emerging entities, complementing each other based on label availability and dimensionality. Discrete sequence chunking (DSC) creates a dictionary of entities; population averaging (PA) extracts recurring entities that correspond to known labels; and unsupervised chunk discovery (UCD) can be used when labels are absent. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these methods in extracting entities across varying model sizes, ranging from inducing compositionality in RNNs to uncovering recurring neural population states in large models with diverse architectures, and illustrate their advantage over other methods. Throughout, we observe a robust correspondence between the extracted entities and concrete or abstract concepts. Artificially inducing the extracted entities in neural populations effectively alters the network's generation of associated concepts. Our work points to a new direction for interpretability, one that harnesses both cognitive principles and the structure of naturalistic data to reveal the hidden computations of complex learning systems, gradually transforming them from black boxes into systems we can begin to understand.

Bringing Comparative Cognition To Computers

Researchers are increasingly subjecting artificial intelligence systems to psychological testing. But to rigorously compare their cognitive capacities with humans and other animals, we must avoid both over- and under-stating our similarities and differences. By embracing a comparative approach, we can integrate AI cognition research into the broader cognitive sciences.