Can we automatize scientific discovery in the cognitive sciences?

The cognitive sciences aim to understand intelligence by formalizing underlying operations as computational models. Traditionally, this follows a cycle of discovery where researchers develop paradigms, collect data, and test predefined model classes. However, this manual pipeline is fundamentally constrained by the slow pace of human intervention and a search space limited by researchers' background and intuition. Here, we propose a paradigm shift toward a fully automated, in silico science of the mind that implements every stage of the discovery cycle using Large Language Models (LLMs). In this framework, experimental paradigms exploring conceptually meaningful task structures are directly sampled from an LLM. High-fidelity behavioral data are then simulated using foundation models of cognition. The tedious step of handcrafting cognitive models is replaced by LLM-based program synthesis, which performs a high-throughput search over a vast landscape of algorithmic hypotheses. Finally, the discovery loop is closed by optimizing for ''interestingness'', a metric of conceptual yield evaluated by an LLM-critic. By enabling a fast and scalable approach to theory development, this automated loop functions as a high-throughput in-silico discovery engine, surfacing informative experiments and mechanisms for subsequent validation in real human populations.

In-Context Function Learning in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) can learn from a few demonstrations provided at inference time. We study this in-context learning phenomenon through the lens of Gaussian Processes (GPs). We build controlled experiments where models observe sequences of multivariate scalar-valued function samples drawn from known GP priors. We evaluate prediction error in relation to the number of demonstrations and compare against two principled references: (i) an empirical GP-regression learner that gives a lower bound on achievable error, and (ii) the expected error of a 1-nearest-neighbor (1-NN) rule, which gives a data-driven upper bound. Across model sizes, we find that LLM learning curves are strongly influenced by the function-generating kernels and approach the GP lower bound as the number of demonstrations increases. We then study the inductive biases of these models using a likelihood-based analysis. We find that LLM predictions are most likely under less smooth GP kernels. Finally, we explore whether post-training can shift these inductive biases and improve sample-efficiency on functions sampled from GPs with smoother kernels. We find that both reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning can effectively shift inductive biases in the direction of the training data. Together, our framework quantifies the extent to which LLMs behave like GP learners and provides tools for steering their inductive biases for continuous function learning tasks.

Can vision language models learn intuitive physics from interaction?

Pre-trained vision language models do not have good intuitions about the physical world. Recent work has shown that supervised fine-tuning can improve model performance on simple physical tasks. However, fine-tuned models do not appear to learn robust physical rules that can generalize to new contexts. Based on research in cognitive science, we hypothesize that models need to interact with an environment to properly learn its physical dynamics. We train models that learn through interaction with the environment using reinforcement learning. While learning from interaction allows models to improve their within-task performance, it fails to produce models with generalizable physical intuitions. We find that models trained on one task do not reliably generalize to related tasks, even if the tasks share visual statistics and physical principles, and regardless of whether the models are trained through interaction.

Exploring System 1 and 2 communication for latent reasoning in LLMs

Should LLM reasoning live in a separate module, or within a single model's forward pass and representational space? We study dual-architecture latent reasoning, where a fluent Base exchanges latent messages with a Coprocessor, and test two hypotheses aimed at improving latent communication over Liu et al. (2024): (H1) increase channel capacity; (H2) learn communication via joint finetuning. Under matched latent-token budgets on GPT-2 and Qwen-3, H2 is consistently strongest while H1 yields modest gains. A unified soft-embedding baseline, a single model with the same forward pass and shared representations, using the same latent-token budget, nearly matches H2 and surpasses H1, suggesting current dual designs mostly add compute rather than qualitatively improving reasoning. Across GSM8K, ProsQA, and a Countdown stress test with increasing branching factor, scaling the latent-token budget beyond small values fails to improve robustness. Latent analyses show overlapping subspaces with limited specialization, consistent with weak reasoning gains. We conclude dual-model latent reasoning remains promising in principle, but likely requires objectives and communication mechanisms that explicitly shape latent spaces for algorithmic planning.

Automated scientific minimization of regret

We introduce automated scientific minimization of regret (ASMR) -- a framework for automated computational cognitive science. Building on the principles of scientific regret minimization, ASMR leverages Centaur -- a recently proposed foundation model of human cognition -- to identify gaps in an interpretable cognitive model. These gaps are then addressed through automated revisions generated by a language-based reasoning model. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in a multi-attribute decision-making task, showing that ASMR discovers cognitive models that predict human behavior at noise ceiling while retaining interpretability. Taken together, our results highlight the potential of ASMR to automate core components of the cognitive modeling pipeline.

Concept-Guided Interpretability via Neural Chunking

Neural networks are often black boxes, reflecting the significant challenge of understanding their internal workings. We propose a different perspective that challenges the prevailing view: rather than being inscrutable, neural networks exhibit patterns in their raw population activity that mirror regularities in the training data. We refer to this as the Reflection Hypothesis and provide evidence for this phenomenon in both simple recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and complex large language models (LLMs). Building on this insight, we propose to leverage cognitively-inspired methods of chunking to segment high-dimensional neural population dynamics into interpretable units that reflect underlying concepts. We propose three methods to extract these emerging entities, complementing each other based on label availability and dimensionality. Discrete sequence chunking (DSC) creates a dictionary of entities; population averaging (PA) extracts recurring entities that correspond to known labels; and unsupervised chunk discovery (UCD) can be used when labels are absent. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these methods in extracting entities across varying model sizes, ranging from inducing compositionality in RNNs to uncovering recurring neural population states in large models with diverse architectures, and illustrate their advantage over other methods. Throughout, we observe a robust correspondence between the extracted entities and concrete or abstract concepts. Artificially inducing the extracted entities in neural populations effectively alters the network's generation of associated concepts. Our work points to a new direction for interpretability, one that harnesses both cognitive principles and the structure of naturalistic data to reveal the hidden computations of complex learning systems, gradually transforming them from black boxes into systems we can begin to understand.

Bringing Comparative Cognition To Computers

Researchers are increasingly subjecting artificial intelligence systems to psychological testing. But to rigorously compare their cognitive capacities with humans and other animals, we must avoid both over- and under-stating our similarities and differences. By embracing a comparative approach, we can integrate AI cognition research into the broader cognitive sciences.

Testing the limits of fine-tuning to improve reasoning in vision language models

Pre-trained vision language models still fall short of human visual cognition. In an effort to improve visual cognition and align models with human behavior, we introduce visual stimuli and human judgments on visual cognition tasks, allowing us to systematically evaluate performance across cognitive domains under a consistent environment. We fine-tune models on ground truth data for intuitive physics and causal reasoning and find that this improves model performance in the respective fine-tuning domain. Furthermore, it can improve model alignment with human behavior. However, we find that fine-tuning does not contribute to robust human-like generalization to data with other visual characteristics or to tasks in other cognitive domains.

Discovering Chunks in Neural Embeddings for Interpretability

Understanding neural networks is challenging due to their high-dimensional, interacting components. Inspired by human cognition, which processes complex sensory data by chunking it into recurring entities, we propose leveraging this principle to interpret artificial neural population activities. Biological and artificial intelligence share the challenge of learning from structured, naturalistic data, and we hypothesize that the cognitive mechanism of chunking can provide insights into artificial systems. We first demonstrate this concept in recurrent neural networks (RNNs) trained on artificial sequences with imposed regularities, observing that their hidden states reflect these patterns, which can be extracted as a dictionary of chunks that influence network responses. Extending this to large language models (LLMs) like LLaMA, we identify similar recurring embedding states corresponding to concepts in the input, with perturbations to these states activating or inhibiting the associated concepts. By exploring methods to extract dictionaries of identifiable chunks across neural embeddings of varying complexity, our findings introduce a new framework for interpreting neural networks, framing their population activity as structured reflections of the data they process.

Towards Automation of Cognitive Modeling using Large Language Models

Computational cognitive models, which formalize theories of cognition, enable researchers to quantify cognitive processes and arbitrate between competing theories by fitting models to behavioral data. Traditionally, these models are handcrafted, which requires significant domain knowledge, coding expertise, and time investment. Previous work has demonstrated that Large Language Models (LLMs) are adept at pattern recognition in-context, solving complex problems, and generating executable code. In this work, we leverage these abilities to explore the potential of LLMs in automating the generation of cognitive models based on behavioral data. We evaluated the LLM in two different tasks: model identification (relating data to a source model), and model generation (generating the underlying cognitive model). We performed these tasks across two cognitive domains - decision making and learning. In the case of data simulated from canonical cognitive models, we found that the LLM successfully identified and generated the ground truth model. In the case of human data, where behavioral noise and lack of knowledge of the true underlying process pose significant challenges, the LLM generated models that are identical or close to the winning model from cognitive science literature. Our findings suggest that LLMs can have a transformative impact on cognitive modeling. With this project, we aim to contribute to an ongoing effort of automating scientific discovery in cognitive science.