On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods

Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants' responses are stable over time such that, all other relevant factors being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants' true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don't track. If participants' moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants' true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios was around 10-18% across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of moral preference elicitation, highlighting the role of response instability in causing value misalignment between stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments.

On the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation

Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people's preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct queries (framed as comparisons between context-specific cases) that are likely to be most informative about an agent's underlying preferences. In this work, we argue that the use of active learning for moral preference elicitation relies on certain assumptions about the underlying moral preferences, which can be violated in practice. Specifically, we highlight the following common assumptions (a) preferences are stable over time and not sensitive to the sequence of presented queries, (b) the appropriate hypothesis class is chosen to model moral preferences, and (c) noise in the agent's responses is limited. While these assumptions can be appropriate for preference elicitation in certain domains, prior research on moral psychology suggests they may not be valid for moral judgments. Through a synthetic simulation of preferences that violate the above assumptions, we observe that active learning can have similar or worse performance than a basic random query selection method in certain settings. Yet, simulation results also demonstrate that active learning can still be viable if the degree of instability or noise is relatively small and when the agent's preferences can be approximately represented with the hypothesis class used for learning. Our study highlights the nuances associated with effective moral preference elicitation in practice and advocates for the cautious use of active learning as a methodology to learn moral preferences.

Studying Up Public Sector AI: How Networks of Power Relations Shape Agency Decisions Around AI Design and Use

As public sector agencies rapidly introduce new AI tools in high-stakes domains like social services, it becomes critical to understand how decisions to adopt these tools are made in practice. We borrow from the anthropological practice to ``study up'' those in positions of power, and reorient our study of public sector AI around those who have the power and responsibility to make decisions about the role that AI tools will play in their agency. Through semi-structured interviews and design activities with 16 agency decision-makers, we examine how decisions about AI design and adoption are influenced by their interactions with and assumptions about other actors within these agencies (e.g., frontline workers and agency leaders), as well as those above (legal systems and contracted companies), and below (impacted communities). By centering these networks of power relations, our findings shed light on how infrastructural, legal, and social factors create barriers and disincentives to the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders in decisions about AI design and adoption. Agency decision-makers desired more practical support for stakeholder involvement around public sector AI to help overcome the knowledge and power differentials they perceived between them and other stakeholders (e.g., frontline workers and impacted community members). Building on these findings, we discuss implications for future research and policy around actualizing participatory AI approaches in public sector contexts.

Red-Teaming for Generative AI: Silver Bullet or Security Theater?

In response to rising concerns surrounding the safety, security, and trustworthiness of Generative AI (GenAI) models, practitioners and regulators alike have pointed to AI red-teaming as a key component of their strategies for identifying and mitigating these risks. However, despite AI red-teaming's central role in policy discussions and corporate messaging, significant questions remain about what precisely it means, what role it can play in regulation, and how precisely it relates to conventional red-teaming practices as originally conceived in the field of cybersecurity. In this work, we identify recent cases of red-teaming activities in the AI industry and conduct an extensive survey of the relevant research literature to characterize the scope, structure, and criteria for AI red-teaming practices. Our analysis reveals that prior methods and practices of AI red-teaming diverge along several axes, including the purpose of the activity (which is often vague), the artifact under evaluation, the setting in which the activity is conducted (e.g., actors, resources, and methods), and the resulting decisions it informs (e.g., reporting, disclosure, and mitigation). In light of our findings, we argue that while red-teaming may be a valuable big-tent idea for characterizing a broad set of activities and attitudes aimed at improving the behavior of GenAI models, gestures towards red-teaming as a panacea for every possible risk verge on security theater. To move toward a more robust toolbox of evaluations for generative AI, we synthesize our recommendations into a question bank meant to guide and scaffold future AI red-teaming practices.

Assessing AI Impact Assessments: A Classroom Study

Artificial Intelligence Impact Assessments ("AIIAs"), a family of tools that provide structured processes to imagine the possible impacts of a proposed AI system, have become an increasingly popular proposal to govern AI systems. Recent efforts from government or private-sector organizations have proposed many diverse instantiations of AIIAs, which take a variety of forms ranging from open-ended questionnaires to graded score-cards. However, to date that has been limited evaluation of existing AIIA instruments. We conduct a classroom study (N = 38) at a large research-intensive university (R1) in an elective course focused on the societal and ethical implications of AI. We assign students to different organizational roles (for example, an ML scientist or product manager) and ask participant teams to complete one of three existing AI impact assessments for one of two imagined generative AI systems. In our thematic analysis of participants' responses to pre- and post-activity questionnaires, we find preliminary evidence that impact assessments can influence participants' perceptions of the potential risks of generative AI systems, and the level of responsibility held by AI experts in addressing potential harm. We also discover a consistent set of limitations shared by several existing AIIA instruments, which we group into concerns about their format and content, as well as the feasibility and effectiveness of the activity in foreseeing and mitigating potential harms. Drawing on the findings of this study, we provide recommendations for future work on developing and validating AIIAs.

RELand: Risk Estimation of Landmines via Interpretable Invariant Risk Minimization

Landmines remain a threat to war-affected communities for years after conflicts have ended, partly due to the laborious nature of demining tasks. Humanitarian demining operations begin by collecting relevant information from the sites to be cleared, which is then analyzed by human experts to determine the potential risk of remaining landmines. In this paper, we propose RELand system to support these tasks, which consists of three major components. We (1) provide general feature engineering and label assigning guidelines to enhance datasets for landmine risk modeling, which are widely applicable to global demining routines, (2) formulate landmine presence as a classification problem and design a novel interpretable model based on sparse feature masking and invariant risk minimization, and run extensive evaluation under proper protocols that resemble real-world demining operations to show a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art, and (3) build an interactive web interface to suggest priority areas for demining organizations. We are currently collaborating with a humanitarian demining NGO in Colombia that is using our system as part of their field operations in two areas recently prioritized for demining.

The AI Incident Database as an Educational Tool to Raise Awareness of AI Harms: A Classroom Exploration of Efficacy, Limitations, & Future Improvements

Prior work has established the importance of integrating AI ethics topics into computer and data sciences curricula. We provide evidence suggesting that one of the critical objectives of AI Ethics education must be to raise awareness of AI harms. While there are various sources to learn about such harms, The AI Incident Database (AIID) is one of the few attempts at offering a relatively comprehensive database indexing prior instances of harms or near harms stemming from the deployment of AI technologies in the real world. This study assesses the effectiveness of AIID as an educational tool to raise awareness regarding the prevalence and severity of AI harms in socially high-stakes domains. We present findings obtained through a classroom study conducted at an R1 institution as part of a course focused on the societal and ethical considerations around AI and ML. Our qualitative findings characterize students' initial perceptions of core topics in AI ethics and their desire to close the educational gap between their technical skills and their ability to think systematically about ethical and societal aspects of their work. We find that interacting with the database helps students better understand the magnitude and severity of AI harms and instills in them a sense of urgency around (a) designing functional and safe AI and (b) strengthening governance and accountability mechanisms. Finally, we compile students' feedback about the tool and our class activity into actionable recommendations for the database development team and the broader community to improve awareness of AI harms in AI ethics education.

Toward Operationalizing Pipeline-aware ML Fairness: A Research Agenda for Developing Practical Guidelines and Tools

While algorithmic fairness is a thriving area of research, in practice, mitigating issues of bias often gets reduced to enforcing an arbitrarily chosen fairness metric, either by enforcing fairness constraints during the optimization step, post-processing model outputs, or by manipulating the training data. Recent work has called on the ML community to take a more holistic approach to tackle fairness issues by systematically investigating the many design choices made through the ML pipeline, and identifying interventions that target the issue's root cause, as opposed to its symptoms. While we share the conviction that this pipeline-based approach is the most appropriate for combating algorithmic unfairness on the ground, we believe there are currently very few methods of \emph{operationalizing} this approach in practice. Drawing on our experience as educators and practitioners, we first demonstrate that without clear guidelines and toolkits, even individuals with specialized ML knowledge find it challenging to hypothesize how various design choices influence model behavior. We then consult the fair-ML literature to understand the progress to date toward operationalizing the pipeline-aware approach: we systematically collect and organize the prior work that attempts to detect, measure, and mitigate various sources of unfairness through the ML pipeline. We utilize this extensive categorization of previous contributions to sketch a research agenda for the community. We hope this work serves as the stepping stone toward a more comprehensive set of resources for ML researchers, practitioners, and students interested in exploring, designing, and testing pipeline-oriented approaches to algorithmic fairness.

Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Models

Major advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) increasingly take the form of developing and releasing general-purpose models. These models are designed to be adapted by other businesses and agencies to perform a particular, domain-specific function. This process has become known as adaptation or fine-tuning. This paper offers a model of the fine-tuning process where a Generalist brings the technological product (here an ML model) to a certain level of performance, and one or more Domain-specialist(s) adapts it for use in a particular domain. Both entities are profit-seeking and incur costs when they invest in the technology, and they must reach a bargaining agreement on how to share the revenue for the technology to reach the market. For a relatively general class of cost and revenue functions, we characterize the conditions under which the fine-tuning game yields a profit-sharing solution. We observe that any potential domain-specialization will either contribute, free-ride, or abstain in their uptake of the technology, and we provide conditions yielding these different strategies. We show how methods based on bargaining solutions and sub-game perfect equilibria provide insights into the strategic behavior of firms in these types of interactions, and we find that profit-sharing can still arise even when one firm has significantly higher costs than another. We also provide methods for identifying Pareto-optimal bargaining arrangements for a general set of utility functions.

Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority?

With Artificial Intelligence systems increasingly applied in consequential domains, researchers have begun to ask how these systems ought to act in ethically charged situations where even humans lack consensus. In the Moral Machine project, researchers crowdsourced answers to "Trolley Problems" concerning autonomous vehicles. Subsequently, Noothigattu et al. (2018) proposed inferring linear functions that approximate each individual's preferences and aggregating these linear models by averaging parameters across the population. In this paper, we examine this averaging mechanism, focusing on fairness concerns in the presence of strategic effects. We investigate a simple setting where the population consists of two groups, with the minority constituting an {\alpha} < 0.5 share of the population. To simplify the analysis, we consider the extreme case in which within-group preferences are homogeneous. Focusing on the fraction of contested cases where the minority group prevails, we make the following observations: (a) even when all parties report their preferences truthfully, the fraction of disputes where the minority prevails is less than proportionate in {\alpha}; (b) the degree of sub-proportionality grows more severe as the level of disagreement between the groups increases; (c) when parties report preferences strategically, pure strategy equilibria do not always exist; and (d) whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, the majority group prevails 100% of the time. These findings raise concerns about stability and fairness of preference vector averaging as a mechanism for aggregating diverging voices. Finally, we discuss alternatives, including randomized dictatorship and median-based mechanisms.