The Values Encoded in Machine Learning Research

Machine learning (ML) currently exerts an outsized influence on the world, increasingly affecting communities and institutional practices. It is therefore critical that we question vague conceptions of the field as value-neutral or universally beneficial, and investigate what specific values the field is advancing. In this paper, we present a rigorous examination of the values of the field by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing 100 highly cited ML papers published at premier ML conferences, ICML and NeurIPS. We annotate key features of papers which reveal their values: how they justify their choice of project, which aspects they uplift, their consideration of potential negative consequences, and their institutional affiliations and funding sources. We find that societal needs are typically very loosely connected to the choice of project, if mentioned at all, and that consideration of negative consequences is extremely rare. We identify 67 values that are uplifted in machine learning research, and, of these, we find that papers most frequently justify and assess themselves based on performance, generalization, efficiency, researcher understanding, novelty, and building on previous work. We present extensive textual evidence and analysis of how these values are operationalized. Notably, we find that each of these top values is currently being defined and applied with assumptions and implications generally supporting the centralization of power. Finally, we find increasingly close ties between these highly cited papers and tech companies and elite universities.

Value-laden Disciplinary Shifts in Machine Learning

As machine learning models are increasingly used for high-stakes decision making, scholars have sought to intervene to ensure that such models do not encode undesirable social and political values. However, little attention thus far has been given to how values influence the machine learning discipline as a whole. How do values influence what the discipline focuses on and the way it develops? If undesirable values are at play at the level of the discipline, then intervening on particular models will not suffice to address the problem. Instead, interventions at the disciplinary-level are required. This paper analyzes the discipline of machine learning through the lens of philosophy of science. We develop a conceptual framework to evaluate the process through which types of machine learning models (e.g. neural networks, support vector machines, graphical models) become predominant. The rise and fall of model-types is often framed as objective progress. However, such disciplinary shifts are more nuanced. First, we argue that the rise of a model-type is self-reinforcing--it influences the way model-types are evaluated. For example, the rise of deep learning was entangled with a greater focus on evaluations in compute-rich and data-rich environments. Second, the way model-types are evaluated encodes loaded social and political values. For example, a greater focus on evaluations in compute-rich and data-rich environments encodes values about centralization of power, privacy, and environmental concerns.