Humans sometimes show sudden improvements in task performance that have been linked to moments of insight. Such insight-related performance improvements appear special because they are preceded by an extended period of impasse, are unusually abrupt, and occur only in some, but not all, learners. Here, we ask whether insight-like behaviour also occurs in artificial neural networks trained with gradient descent algorithms. We compared learning dynamics in humans and regularised neural networks in a perceptual decision task that provided a hidden opportunity which allowed to solve the task more efficiently. We show that humans tend to discover this regularity through insight, rather than gradually. Notably, neural networks with regularised gate modulation closely mimicked behavioural characteristics of human insights, exhibiting delay of insight, suddenness and selective occurrence. Analyses of network learning dynamics revealed that insight-like behaviour crucially depended on noise added to gradient updates, and was preceded by ``silent knowledge'' that is initially suppressed by regularised (attentional) gating. This suggests that insights can arise naturally from gradual learning, where they reflect the combined influences of noise, attentional gating and regularisation.
Recent work in large language modeling (LLMs) has used fine-tuning to align outputs with the preferences of a prototypical user. This work assumes that human preferences are static and homogeneous across individuals, so that aligning to a a single "generic" user will confer more general alignment. Here, we embrace the heterogeneity of human preferences to consider a different challenge: how might a machine help people with diverse views find agreement? We fine-tune a 70 billion parameter LLM to generate statements that maximize the expected approval for a group of people with potentially diverse opinions. Human participants provide written opinions on thousands of questions touching on moral and political issues (e.g., "should we raise taxes on the rich?"), and rate the LLM's generated candidate consensus statements for agreement and quality. A reward model is then trained to predict individual preferences, enabling it to quantify and rank consensus statements in terms of their appeal to the overall group, defined according to different aggregation (social welfare) functions. The model produces consensus statements that are preferred by human users over those from prompted LLMs (>70%) and significantly outperforms a tight fine-tuned baseline that lacks the final ranking step. Further, our best model's consensus statements are preferred over the best human-generated opinions (>65%). We find that when we silently constructed consensus statements from only a subset of group members, those who were excluded were more likely to dissent, revealing the sensitivity of the consensus to individual contributions. These results highlight the potential to use LLMs to help groups of humans align their values with one another.
Meta-training agents with memory has been shown to culminate in Bayes-optimal agents, which casts Bayes-optimality as the implicit solution to a numerical optimization problem rather than an explicit modeling assumption. Bayes-optimal agents are risk-neutral, since they solely attune to the expected return, and ambiguity-neutral, since they act in new situations as if the uncertainty were known. This is in contrast to risk-sensitive agents, which additionally exploit the higher-order moments of the return, and ambiguity-sensitive agents, which act differently when recognizing situations in which they lack knowledge. Humans are also known to be averse to ambiguity and sensitive to risk in ways that aren't Bayes-optimal, indicating that such sensitivity can confer advantages, especially in safety-critical situations. How can we extend the meta-learning protocol to generate risk- and ambiguity-sensitive agents? The goal of this work is to fill this gap in the literature by showing that risk- and ambiguity-sensitivity also emerge as the result of an optimization problem using modified meta-training algorithms, which manipulate the experience-generation process of the learner. We empirically test our proposed meta-training algorithms on agents exposed to foundational classes of decision-making experiments and demonstrate that they become sensitive to risk and ambiguity.
How do humans and other animals learn new tasks? A wave of brain recording studies has investigated how neural representations change during task learning, with a focus on how tasks can be acquired and coded in ways that minimise mutual interference. We review recent work that has explored the geometry and dimensionality of neural task representations in neocortex, and computational models that have exploited these findings to understand how the brain may partition knowledge between tasks. We discuss how ideas from machine learning, including those that combine supervised and unsupervised learning, are helping neuroscientists understand how natural tasks are learned and coded in biological brains.
Humans can learn several tasks in succession with minimal mutual interference but perform more poorly when trained on multiple tasks at once. The opposite is true for standard deep neural networks. Here, we propose novel computational constraints for artificial neural networks, inspired by earlier work on gating in the primate prefrontal cortex, that capture the cost of interleaved training and allow the network to learn two tasks in sequence without forgetting. We augment standard stochastic gradient descent with two algorithmic motifs, so-called "sluggish" task units and a Hebbian training step that strengthens connections between task units and hidden units that encode task-relevant information. We found that the "sluggish" units introduce a switch-cost during training, which biases representations under interleaved training towards a joint representation that ignores the contextual cue, while the Hebbian step promotes the formation of a gating scheme from task units to the hidden layer that produces orthogonal representations which are perfectly guarded against interference. Validating the model on previously published human behavioural data revealed that it matches performance of participants who had been trained on blocked or interleaved curricula, and that these performance differences were driven by misestimation of the true category boundary.
From social networks to traffic routing, artificial learning agents are playing a central role in modern institutions. We must therefore understand how to leverage these systems to foster outcomes and behaviors that align with our own values and aspirations. While multiagent learning has received considerable attention in recent years, artificial agents have been primarily evaluated when interacting with fixed, non-learning co-players. While this evaluation scheme has merit, it fails to capture the dynamics faced by institutions that must deal with adaptive and continually learning constituents. Here we address this limitation, and construct agents ("mechanisms") that perform well when evaluated over the learning trajectory of their adaptive co-players ("participants"). The algorithm we propose consists of two nested learning loops: an inner loop where participants learn to best respond to fixed mechanisms; and an outer loop where the mechanism agent updates its policy based on experience. We report the performance of our mechanism agents when paired with both artificial learning agents and humans as co-players. Our results show that our mechanisms are able to shepherd the participants strategies towards favorable outcomes, indicating a path for modern institutions to effectively and automatically influence the strategies and behaviors of their constituents.
Artificial learning agents are mediating a larger and larger number of interactions among humans, firms, and organizations, and the intersection between mechanism design and machine learning has been heavily investigated in recent years. However, mechanism design methods make strong assumptions on how participants behave (e.g. rationality), or on the kind of knowledge designers have access to a priori (e.g. access to strong baseline mechanisms). Here we introduce HCMD-zero, a general purpose method to construct mechanism agents. HCMD-zero learns by mediating interactions among participants, while remaining engaged in an electoral contest with copies of itself, thereby accessing direct feedback from participants. Our results on the Public Investment Game, a stylized resource allocation game that highlights the tension between productivity, equality and the temptation to free-ride, show that HCMD-zero produces competitive mechanism agents that are consistently preferred by human participants over baseline alternatives, and does so automatically, without requiring human knowledge, and by using human data sparingly and effectively Our detailed analysis shows HCMD-zero elicits consistent improvements over the course of training, and that it results in a mechanism with an interpretable and intuitive policy.
Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here, we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders, and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI may be a promising method for value-aligned policy innovation.