AI Assistance Reduces Persistence and Hurts Independent Performance

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

Reward Models Inherit Value Biases from Pretraining

Reward models (RMs) are central to aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values but have received less attention than pre-trained and post-trained LLMs themselves. Because RMs are initialized from LLMs, they inherit representations that shape their behavior, but the nature and extent of this influence remain understudied. In a comprehensive study of 10 leading open-weight RMs using validated psycholinguistic corpora, we show that RMs exhibit significant differences along multiple dimensions of human value as a function of their base model. Using the "Big Two" psychological axes, we show a robust preference of Llama RMs for "agency" and a corresponding robust preference of Gemma RMs for "communion." This phenomenon holds even when the preference data and finetuning process are identical, and we trace it back to the logits of the respective instruction-tuned and pre-trained models. These log-probability differences themselves can be formulated as an implicit RM; we derive usable implicit reward scores and show that they exhibit the very same agency/communion difference. We run experiments training RMs with ablations for preference data source and quantity, which demonstrate that this effect is not only repeatable but surprisingly durable. Despite RMs being designed to represent human preferences, our evidence shows that their outputs are influenced by the pretrained LLMs on which they are based. This work underscores the importance of safety and alignment efforts at the pretraining stage, and makes clear that open-source developers' choice of base model is as much a consideration of values as of performance.

Self-Blinding and Counterfactual Self-Simulation Mitigate Biases and Sycophancy in Large Language Models

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Reward Model Interpretability via Optimal and Pessimal Tokens

Reward modeling has emerged as a crucial component in aligning large language models with human values. Significant attention has focused on using reward models as a means for fine-tuning generative models. However, the reward models themselves -- which directly encode human value judgments by turning prompt-response pairs into scalar rewards -- remain relatively understudied. We present a novel approach to reward model interpretability through exhaustive analysis of their responses across their entire vocabulary space. By examining how different reward models score every possible single-token response to value-laden prompts, we uncover several striking findings: (i) substantial heterogeneity between models trained on similar objectives, (ii) systematic asymmetries in how models encode high- vs low-scoring tokens, (iii) significant sensitivity to prompt framing that mirrors human cognitive biases, and (iv) overvaluation of more frequent tokens. We demonstrate these effects across ten recent open-source reward models of varying parameter counts and architectures. Our results challenge assumptions about the interchangeability of reward models, as well as their suitability as proxies of complex and context-dependent human values. We find that these models can encode concerning biases toward certain identity groups, which may emerge as unintended consequences of harmlessness training -- distortions that risk propagating through the downstream large language models now deployed to millions.