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Authors:Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul W. Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer

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Abstract:We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication capabilities. In the framework of extensive-form games with imperfect recall, we analyze the computational complexities of finding equilibria in multiplayer settings across three different solution concepts: Nash, multiselves based on evidential decision theory (EDT), and multiselves based on causal decision theory (CDT). We are interested in both exact and approximate solution computation. As special cases, we consider (1) single-player games, (2) two-player zero-sum games and relationships to maximin values, and (3) games without exogenous stochasticity (chance nodes). We relate these problems to the complexity classes P, PPAD, PLS, $\Sigma_2^P$ , $\exists$R, and $\exists \forall$R.

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Abstract:Computational equilibrium finding in large zero-sum extensive-form imperfect-information games has led to significant recent AI breakthroughs. The fastest algorithms for the problem are new forms of counterfactual regret minimization [Brown and Sandholm, 2019]. In this paper we present a totally different approach to the problem, which is competitive and often orders of magnitude better than the prior state of the art. The equilibrium-finding problem can be formulated as a linear program (LP) [Koller et al., 1994], but solving it as an LP has not been scalable due to the memory requirements of LP solvers, which can often be quadratically worse than CFR-based algorithms. We give an efficient practical algorithm that factors a large payoff matrix into a product of two matrices that are typically dramatically sparser. This allows us to express the equilibrium-finding problem as a linear program with size only a logarithmic factor worse than CFR, and thus allows linear program solvers to run on such games. With experiments on poker endgames, we demonstrate in practice, for the first time, that modern linear program solvers are competitive against even game-specific modern variants of CFR in solving large extensive-form games, and can be used to compute exact solutions unlike iterative algorithms like CFR.

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Abstract:Given the apparent difficulty of learning models that are robust to adversarial perturbations, we propose tackling the simpler problem of developing adversarially robust features. Specifically, given a dataset and metric of interest, the goal is to return a function (or multiple functions) that 1) is robust to adversarial perturbations, and 2) has significant variation across the datapoints. We establish strong connections between adversarially robust features and a natural spectral property of the geometry of the dataset and metric of interest. This connection can be leveraged to provide both robust features, and a lower bound on the robustness of any function that has significant variance across the dataset. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that the adversarially robust features given by this spectral approach can be fruitfully leveraged to learn a robust (and accurate) model.

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Abstract:Machine learning is a tool for building models that accurately represent input training data. When undesired biases concerning demographic groups are in the training data, well-trained models will reflect those biases. We present a framework for mitigating such biases by including a variable for the group of interest and simultaneously learning a predictor and an adversary. The input to the network X, here text or census data, produces a prediction Y, such as an analogy completion or income bracket, while the adversary tries to model a protected variable Z, here gender or zip code. The objective is to maximize the predictor's ability to predict Y while minimizing the adversary's ability to predict Z. Applied to analogy completion, this method results in accurate predictions that exhibit less evidence of stereotyping Z. When applied to a classification task using the UCI Adult (Census) Dataset, it results in a predictive model that does not lose much accuracy while achieving very close to equality of odds (Hardt, et al., 2016). The method is flexible and applicable to multiple definitions of fairness as well as a wide range of gradient-based learning models, including both regression and classification tasks.

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