This work reveals an evidential signal that emerges from the uncertainty value in Evidential Deep Learning (EDL). EDL is one example of a class of uncertainty-aware deep learning approaches designed to provide confidence (or epistemic uncertainty) about the current test sample. In particular for computer vision and bidirectional encoder large language models, the `evidential signal' arising from the Dirichlet strength in EDL can, in some cases, discriminate between classes, which is particularly strong when using large language models. We hypothesise that the KL regularisation term causes EDL to couple aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, we empirically investigate the correlations between misclassification and evaluated uncertainty, and show that EDL's `evidential signal' is due to misclassification bias. We critically evaluate EDL with other Dirichlet-based approaches, namely Generative Evidential Neural Networks (EDL-GEN) and Prior Networks, and show theoretically and empirically the differences between these loss functions. We conclude that EDL's coupling of uncertainty arises from these differences due to the use (or lack) of out-of-distribution samples during training.
A variety of explanation methods have been proposed in recent years to help users gain insights into the results returned by neural networks, which are otherwise complex and opaque black-boxes. However, explanations give rise to potential side-channels that can be leveraged by an adversary for mounting attacks on the system. In particular, post-hoc explanation methods that highlight input dimensions according to their importance or relevance to the result also leak information that weakens security and privacy. In this work, we perform the first systematic characterization of the privacy and security risks arising from various popular explanation techniques. First, we propose novel explanation-guided black-box evasion attacks that lead to 10 times reduction in query count for the same success rate. We show that the adversarial advantage from explanations can be quantified as a reduction in the total variance of the estimated gradient. Second, we revisit the membership information leaked by common explanations. Contrary to observations in prior studies, via our modified attacks we show significant leakage of membership information (above 100% improvement over prior results), even in a much stricter black-box setting. Finally, we study explanation-guided model extraction attacks and demonstrate adversarial gains through a large reduction in query count.
Federated learning is inherently vulnerable to model poisoning attacks because its decentralized nature allows attackers to participate with compromised devices. In model poisoning attacks, the attacker reduces the model's performance on targeted sub-tasks (e.g. classifying planes as birds) by uploading "poisoned" updates. In this report we introduce \algoname{}, a novel defense that uses global top-k update sparsification and device-level gradient clipping to mitigate model poisoning attacks. We propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the robustness of defenses against poisoning attacks, and provide robustness and convergence analysis of our algorithm. To validate its empirical efficacy we conduct an open-source evaluation at scale across multiple benchmark datasets for computer vision and federated learning.
Federated learning enables model training over a distributed corpus of agent data. However, the trained model is vulnerable to adversarial examples, designed to elicit misclassification. We study the feasibility of using adversarial training (AT) in the federated learning setting. Furthermore, we do so assuming a fixed communication budget and non-iid data distribution between participating agents. We observe a significant drop in both natural and adversarial accuracies when AT is used in the federated setting as opposed to centralized training. We attribute this to the number of epochs of AT performed locally at the agents, which in turn effects (i) drift between local models; and (ii) convergence time (measured in number of communication rounds). Towards this end, we propose FedDynAT, a novel algorithm for performing AT in federated setting. Through extensive experimentation we show that FedDynAT significantly improves both natural and adversarial accuracy, as well as model convergence time by reducing the model drift.
Federated Learning (FL) is an approach to conduct machine learning without centralizing training data in a single place, for reasons of privacy, confidentiality or data volume. However, solving federated machine learning problems raises issues above and beyond those of centralized machine learning. These issues include setting up communication infrastructure between parties, coordinating the learning process, integrating party results, understanding the characteristics of the training data sets of different participating parties, handling data heterogeneity, and operating with the absence of a verification data set. IBM Federated Learning provides infrastructure and coordination for federated learning. Data scientists can design and run federated learning jobs based on existing, centralized machine learning models and can provide high-level instructions on how to run the federation. The framework applies to both Deep Neural Networks as well as ``traditional'' approaches for the most common machine learning libraries. {\proj} enables data scientists to expand their scope from centralized to federated machine learning, minimizing the learning curve at the outset while also providing the flexibility to deploy to different compute environments and design custom fusion algorithms.
A small subset of explainability techniques developed initially for image recognition models has recently been applied for interpretability of 3D Convolutional Neural Network models in activity recognition tasks. Much like the models themselves, the techniques require little or no modification to be compatible with 3D inputs. However, these explanation techniques regard spatial and temporal information jointly. Therefore, using such explanation techniques, a user cannot explicitly distinguish the role of motion in a 3D model's decision. In fact, it has been shown that these models do not appropriately factor motion information into their decision. We propose a selective relevance method for adapting the 2D explanation techniques to provide motion-specific explanations, better aligning them with the human understanding of motion as conceptually separate from static spatial features. We demonstrate the utility of our method in conjunction with several widely-used 2D explanation methods, and show that it improves explanation selectivity for motion. Our results show that the selective relevance method can not only provide insight on the role played by motion in the model's decision -- in effect, revealing and quantifying the model's spatial bias -- but the method also simplifies the resulting explanations for human consumption.
Adversarial training (AT) has become a popular choice for training robust networks. However, by virtue of its formulation, AT tends to sacrifice clean accuracy heavily in favor of robustness. Furthermore, AT with a large perturbation budget can cause models to get stuck at poor local minima and behave like a constant function, always predicting the same class. To address the above concerns we propose Adversarial Training with Early Stopping (ATES). The design of ATES is guided by principles from curriculum learning that emphasizes on starting "easy" and gradually ramping up on the "difficulty" of training. We do so by early stopping the adversarial example generation step in AT, progressively increasing difficulty of the samples the network trains on. This stabilizes network training even for large perturbation budgets and allows the network to operate at a better clean accuracy versus robustness trade-off curve compared to AT. Functionally, this leads to a significant improvement in both clean accuracy and robustness for ATES models.
Saliency maps are a popular approach to creating post-hoc explanations of image classifier outputs. These methods produce estimates of the relevance of each pixel to the classification output score, which can be displayed as a saliency map that highlights important pixels. Despite a proliferation of such methods, little effort has been made to quantify how good these saliency maps are at capturing the true relevance of the pixels to the classifier output (i.e. their "fidelity"). We therefore investigate existing metrics for evaluating the fidelity of saliency methods (i.e. saliency metrics). We find that there is little consistency in the literature in how such metrics are calculated, and show that such inconsistencies can have a significant effect on the measured fidelity. Further, we apply measures of reliability developed in the psychometric testing literature to assess the consistency of saliency metrics when applied to individual saliency maps. Our results show that saliency metrics can be statistically unreliable and inconsistent, indicating that comparative rankings between saliency methods generated using such metrics can be untrustworthy.
Federated learning distributes model training among a multitude of agents, who, guided by privacy concerns, perform training using their local data but share only model parameter updates, for iterative aggregation at the server. In this work, we explore the threat of model poisoning attacks on federated learning initiated by a single, non-colluding malicious agent where the adversarial objective is to cause the model to misclassify a set of chosen inputs with high confidence. We explore a number of strategies to carry out this attack, starting with simple boosting of the malicious agent's update to overcome the effects of other agents' updates. To increase attack stealth, we propose an alternating minimization strategy, which alternately optimizes for the training loss and the adversarial objective. We follow up by using parameter estimation for the benign agents' updates to improve on attack success. Finally, we use a suite of interpretability techniques to generate visual explanations of model decisions for both benign and malicious models and show that the explanations are nearly visually indistinguishable. Our results indicate that even a highly constrained adversary can carry out model poisoning attacks while simultaneously maintaining stealth, thus highlighting the vulnerability of the federated learning setting and the need to develop effective defense strategies.
There is general consensus that it is important for artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning systems to be explainable and/or interpretable. However, there is no general consensus over what is meant by 'explainable' and 'interpretable'. In this paper, we argue that this lack of consensus is due to there being several distinct stakeholder communities. We note that, while the concerns of the individual communities are broadly compatible, they are not identical, which gives rise to different intents and requirements for explainability/interpretability. We use the software engineering distinction between validation and verification, and the epistemological distinctions between knowns/unknowns, to tease apart the concerns of the stakeholder communities and highlight the areas where their foci overlap or diverge. It is not the purpose of the authors of this paper to 'take sides' - we count ourselves as members, to varying degrees, of multiple communities - but rather to help disambiguate what stakeholders mean when they ask 'Why?' of an AI.