Lottery Ticket Adaptation: Mitigating Destructive Interference in LLMs

Existing methods for adapting large language models (LLMs) to new tasks are not suited to multi-task adaptation because they modify all the model weights -- causing destructive interference between tasks. The resulting effects, such as catastrophic forgetting of earlier tasks, make it challenging to obtain good performance on multiple tasks at the same time. To mitigate this, we propose Lottery Ticket Adaptation (LoTA), a sparse adaptation method that identifies and optimizes only a sparse subnetwork of the model. We evaluate LoTA on a wide range of challenging tasks such as instruction following, reasoning, math, and summarization. LoTA obtains better performance than full fine-tuning and low-rank adaptation (LoRA), and maintains good performance even after training on other tasks -- thus, avoiding catastrophic forgetting. By extracting and fine-tuning over lottery tickets (or sparse task vectors), LoTA also enables model merging over highly dissimilar tasks. Our code is made publicly available at https://github.com/kiddyboots216/lottery-ticket-adaptation.

SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal Behaviors

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Data Shapley in One Training Run

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems are trained on large data corpora to generate new pieces of text, images, videos, and other media. There is growing concern that such systems may infringe on the copyright interests of training data contributors. To address the copyright challenges of generative AI, we propose a framework that compensates copyright owners proportionally to their contributions to the creation of AI-generated content. The metric for contributions is quantitatively determined by leveraging the probabilistic nature of modern generative AI models and using techniques from cooperative game theory in economics. This framework enables a platform where AI developers benefit from access to high-quality training data, thus improving model performance. Meanwhile, copyright owners receive fair compensation, driving the continued provision of relevant data for generative model training. Experiments demonstrate that our framework successfully identifies the most relevant data sources used in artwork generation, ensuring a fair and interpretable distribution of revenues among copyright owners.

Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

AI Risk Management Should Incorporate Both Safety and Security

The exposure of security vulnerabilities in safety-aligned language models, e.g., susceptibility to adversarial attacks, has shed light on the intricate interplay between AI safety and AI security. Although the two disciplines now come together under the overarching goal of AI risk management, they have historically evolved separately, giving rise to differing perspectives. Therefore, in this paper, we advocate that stakeholders in AI risk management should be aware of the nuances, synergies, and interplay between safety and security, and unambiguously take into account the perspectives of both disciplines in order to devise mostly effective and holistic risk mitigation approaches. Unfortunately, this vision is often obfuscated, as the definitions of the basic concepts of "safety" and "security" themselves are often inconsistent and lack consensus across communities. With AI risk management being increasingly cross-disciplinary, this issue is particularly salient. In light of this conceptual challenge, we introduce a unified reference framework to clarify the differences and interplay between AI safety and AI security, aiming to facilitate a shared understanding and effective collaboration across communities.

Certifiably Robust RAG against Retrieval Corruption

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been shown vulnerable to retrieval corruption attacks: an attacker can inject malicious passages into retrieval results to induce inaccurate responses. In this paper, we propose RobustRAG as the first defense framework against retrieval corruption attacks. The key insight of RobustRAG is an isolate-then-aggregate strategy: we get LLM responses from each passage in isolation and then securely aggregate these isolated responses. To instantiate RobustRAG, we design keyword-based and decoding-based algorithms for securely aggregating unstructured text responses. Notably, RobustRAG can achieve certifiable robustness: we can formally prove and certify that, for certain queries, RobustRAG can always return accurate responses, even when the attacker has full knowledge of our defense and can arbitrarily inject a small number of malicious passages. We evaluate RobustRAG on open-domain QA and long-form text generation datasets and demonstrate its effectiveness and generalizability across various tasks and datasets.

Position Paper: Beyond Robustness Against Single Attack Types

Current research on defending against adversarial examples focuses primarily on achieving robustness against a single attack type such as $\ell_2$ or $\ell_{\infty}$-bounded attacks. However, the space of possible perturbations is much larger and currently cannot be modeled by a single attack type. The discrepancy between the focus of current defenses and the space of attacks of interest calls to question the practicality of existing defenses and the reliability of their evaluation. In this position paper, we argue that the research community should look beyond single attack robustness, and we draw attention to three potential directions involving robustness against multiple attacks: simultaneous multiattack robustness, unforeseen attack robustness, and a newly defined problem setting which we call continual adaptive robustness. We provide a unified framework which rigorously defines these problem settings, synthesize existing research in these fields, and outline open directions. We hope that our position paper inspires more research in simultaneous multiattack, unforeseen attack, and continual adaptive robustness.

Teach LLMs to Phish: Stealing Private Information from Language Models

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

Assessing the Brittleness of Safety Alignment via Pruning and Low-Rank Modifications

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about $3\%$ at the parameter level and $2.5\%$ at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

Efficient Data Shapley for Weighted Nearest Neighbor Algorithms

This work aims to address an open problem in data valuation literature concerning the efficient computation of Data Shapley for weighted $K$ nearest neighbor algorithm (WKNN-Shapley). By considering the accuracy of hard-label KNN with discretized weights as the utility function, we reframe the computation of WKNN-Shapley into a counting problem and introduce a quadratic-time algorithm, presenting a notable improvement from $O(N^K)$, the best result from existing literature. We develop a deterministic approximation algorithm that further improves computational efficiency while maintaining the key fairness properties of the Shapley value. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate WKNN-Shapley's computational efficiency and its superior performance in discerning data quality compared to its unweighted counterpart.