UnUnlearning: Unlearning is not sufficient for content regulation in advanced generative AI

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Beyond the Mean: Differentially Private Prototypes for Private Transfer Learning

Machine learning (ML) models have been shown to leak private information from their training datasets. Differential Privacy (DP), typically implemented through the differential private stochastic gradient descent algorithm (DP-SGD), has become the standard solution to bound leakage from the models. Despite recent improvements, DP-SGD-based approaches for private learning still usually struggle in the high privacy ($\varepsilon\le1)$ and low data regimes, and when the private training datasets are imbalanced. To overcome these limitations, we propose Differentially Private Prototype Learning (DPPL) as a new paradigm for private transfer learning. DPPL leverages publicly pre-trained encoders to extract features from private data and generates DP prototypes that represent each private class in the embedding space and can be publicly released for inference. Since our DP prototypes can be obtained from only a few private training data points and without iterative noise addition, they offer high-utility predictions and strong privacy guarantees even under the notion of pure DP. We additionally show that privacy-utility trade-offs can be further improved when leveraging the public data beyond pre-training of the encoder: in particular, we can privately sample our DP prototypes from the publicly available data points used to train the encoder. Our experimental evaluation with four state-of-the-art encoders, four vision datasets, and under different data and imbalancedness regimes demonstrate DPPL's high performance under strong privacy guarantees in challenging private learning setups.

Phantom: General Trigger Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Noise Masking Attacks and Defenses for Pretrained Speech Models

Speech models are often trained on sensitive data in order to improve model performance, leading to potential privacy leakage. Our work considers noise masking attacks, introduced by Amid et al. 2022, which attack automatic speech recognition (ASR) models by requesting a transcript of an utterance which is partially replaced with noise. They show that when a record has been seen at training time, the model will transcribe the noisy record with its memorized sensitive transcript. In our work, we extend these attacks beyond ASR models, to attack pretrained speech encoders. Our method fine-tunes the encoder to produce an ASR model, and then performs noise masking on this model, which we find recovers private information from the pretraining data, despite the model never having seen transcripts at pretraining time! We show how to improve the precision of these attacks and investigate a number of countermeasures to our attacks.

Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models

This paper studies extractable memorization: training data that an adversary can efficiently extract by querying a machine learning model without prior knowledge of the training dataset. We show an adversary can extract gigabytes of training data from open-source language models like Pythia or GPT-Neo, semi-open models like LLaMA or Falcon, and closed models like ChatGPT. Existing techniques from the literature suffice to attack unaligned models; in order to attack the aligned ChatGPT, we develop a new divergence attack that causes the model to diverge from its chatbot-style generations and emit training data at a rate 150x higher than when behaving properly. Our methods show practical attacks can recover far more data than previously thought, and reveal that current alignment techniques do not eliminate memorization.

Privacy Side Channels in Machine Learning Systems

Most current approaches for protecting privacy in machine learning (ML) assume that models exist in a vacuum, when in reality, ML models are part of larger systems that include components for training data filtering, output monitoring, and more. In this work, we introduce privacy side channels: attacks that exploit these system-level components to extract private information at far higher rates than is otherwise possible for standalone models. We propose four categories of side channels that span the entire ML lifecycle (training data filtering, input preprocessing, output post-processing, and query filtering) and allow for either enhanced membership inference attacks or even novel threats such as extracting users' test queries. For example, we show that deduplicating training data before applying differentially-private training creates a side-channel that completely invalidates any provable privacy guarantees. Moreover, we show that systems which block language models from regenerating training data can be exploited to allow exact reconstruction of private keys contained in the training set -- even if the model did not memorize these keys. Taken together, our results demonstrate the need for a holistic, end-to-end privacy analysis of machine learning.

Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

A Note On Interpreting Canary Exposure

Canary exposure, introduced in Carlini et al. is frequently used to empirically evaluate, or audit, the privacy of machine learning model training. The goal of this note is to provide some intuition on how to interpret canary exposure, including by relating it to membership inference attacks and differential privacy.

PaLM 2 Technical Report

We introduce PaLM 2, a new state-of-the-art language model that has better multilingual and reasoning capabilities and is more compute-efficient than its predecessor PaLM. PaLM 2 is a Transformer-based model trained using a mixture of objectives. Through extensive evaluations on English and multilingual language, and reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that PaLM 2 has significantly improved quality on downstream tasks across different model sizes, while simultaneously exhibiting faster and more efficient inference compared to PaLM. This improved efficiency enables broader deployment while also allowing the model to respond faster, for a more natural pace of interaction. PaLM 2 demonstrates robust reasoning capabilities exemplified by large improvements over PaLM on BIG-Bench and other reasoning tasks. PaLM 2 exhibits stable performance on a suite of responsible AI evaluations, and enables inference-time control over toxicity without additional overhead or impact on other capabilities. Overall, PaLM 2 achieves state-of-the-art performance across a diverse set of tasks and capabilities. When discussing the PaLM 2 family, it is important to distinguish between pre-trained models (of various sizes), fine-tuned variants of these models, and the user-facing products that use these models. In particular, user-facing products typically include additional pre- and post-processing steps. Additionally, the underlying models may evolve over time. Therefore, one should not expect the performance of user-facing products to exactly match the results reported in this report.

Privacy Auditing with One (1) Training Run

We propose a scheme for auditing differentially private machine learning systems with a single training run. This exploits the parallelism of being able to add or remove multiple training examples independently. We analyze this using the connection between differential privacy and statistical generalization, which avoids the cost of group privacy. Our auditing scheme requires minimal assumptions about the algorithm and can be applied in the black-box or white-box setting.