From Supervision to Exploration: What Does Protein Language Model Learn During Reinforcement Learning?

Protein language models (PLMs) have advanced computational protein science through large-scale pretraining and scalable architectures. In parallel, reinforcement learning (RL) has broadened exploration and enabled precise multi-objective optimization in protein design. Yet whether RL can push PLMs beyond their pretraining priors to uncover latent sequence-structure-function rules remains unclear. We address this by pairing RL with PLMs across four domains: antimicrobial peptide design, kinase variant optimization, antibody engineering, and inverse folding. Using diverse RL algorithms and model classes, we ask if RL improves sampling efficiency and, more importantly, if it reveals capabilities not captured by supervised learning. Across benchmarks, RL consistently boosts success rates and sample efficiency. Performance follows a three-factor interaction: task headroom, reward fidelity, and policy capacity jointly determine gains. When rewards are accurate and informative, policies have sufficient capacity, and tasks leave room beyond supervised baselines, improvements scale; when rewards are noisy or capacity is constrained, gains saturate despite exploration. This view yields practical guidance for RL in protein design: prioritize reward modeling and calibration before scaling policy size, match algorithm and regularization strength to task difficulty, and allocate capacity where marginal gains are largest. Implementation is available at https://github.com/chq1155/RL-PLM.

Data Poisoning Attacks and Defenses to Crowdsourcing Systems

A key challenge of big data analytics is how to collect a large volume of (labeled) data. Crowdsourcing aims to address this challenge via aggregating and estimating high-quality data (e.g., sentiment label for text) from pervasive clients/users. Existing studies on crowdsourcing focus on designing new methods to improve the aggregated data quality from unreliable/noisy clients. However, the security aspects of such crowdsourcing systems remain under-explored to date. We aim to bridge this gap in this work. Specifically, we show that crowdsourcing is vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, in which malicious clients provide carefully crafted data to corrupt the aggregated data. We formulate our proposed data poisoning attacks as an optimization problem that maximizes the error of the aggregated data. Our evaluation results on one synthetic and two real-world benchmark datasets demonstrate that the proposed attacks can substantially increase the estimation errors of the aggregated data. We also propose two defenses to reduce the impact of malicious clients. Our empirical results show that the proposed defenses can substantially reduce the estimation errors of the data poisoning attacks.