Masked image modeling (MIM) revolutionizes self-supervised learning (SSL) for image pre-training. In contrast to previous dominating self-supervised methods, i.e., contrastive learning, MIM attains state-of-the-art performance by masking and reconstructing random patches of the input image. However, the associated security and privacy risks of this novel generative method are unexplored. In this paper, we perform the first security risk quantification of MIM through the lens of backdoor attacks. Different from previous work, we are the first to systematically threat modeling on SSL in every phase of the model supply chain, i.e., pre-training, release, and downstream phases. Our evaluation shows that models built with MIM are vulnerable to existing backdoor attacks in release and downstream phases and are compromised by our proposed method in pre-training phase. For instance, on CIFAR10, the attack success rate can reach 99.62%, 96.48%, and 98.89% in the downstream phase, release phase, and pre-training phase, respectively. We also take the first step to investigate the success factors of backdoor attacks in the pre-training phase and find the trigger number and trigger pattern play key roles in the success of backdoor attacks while trigger location has only tiny effects. In the end, our empirical study of the defense mechanisms across three detection-level on model supply chain phases indicates that different defenses are suitable for backdoor attacks in different phases. However, backdoor attacks in the release phase cannot be detected by all three detection-level methods, calling for more effective defenses in future research.
Text-to-image generation models have recently attracted unprecedented attention as they unlatch imaginative applications in all areas of life. However, developing such models requires huge amounts of data that might contain privacy-sensitive information, e.g., face identity. While privacy risks have been extensively demonstrated in the image classification and GAN generation domains, privacy risks in the text-to-image generation domain are largely unexplored. In this paper, we perform the first privacy analysis of text-to-image generation models through the lens of membership inference. Specifically, we propose three key intuitions about membership information and design four attack methodologies accordingly. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on two mainstream text-to-image generation models including sequence-to-sequence modeling and diffusion-based modeling. The empirical results show that all of the proposed attacks can achieve significant performance, in some cases even close to an accuracy of 1, and thus the corresponding risk is much more severe than that shown by existing membership inference attacks. We further conduct an extensive ablation study to analyze the factors that may affect the attack performance, which can guide developers and researchers to be alert to vulnerabilities in text-to-image generation models. All these findings indicate that our proposed attacks pose a realistic privacy threat to the text-to-image generation models.
Deepfakes pose severe threats of visual misinformation to our society. One representative deepfake application is face manipulation that modifies a victim's facial attributes in an image, e.g., changing her age or hair color. The state-of-the-art face manipulation techniques rely on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). In this paper, we propose the first defense system, namely UnGANable, against GAN-inversion-based face manipulation. In specific, UnGANable focuses on defending GAN inversion, an essential step for face manipulation. Its core technique is to search for alternative images (called cloaked images) around the original images (called target images) in image space. When posted online, these cloaked images can jeopardize the GAN inversion process. We consider two state-of-the-art inversion techniques including optimization-based inversion and hybrid inversion, and design five different defenses under five scenarios depending on the defender's background knowledge. Extensive experiments on four popular GAN models trained on two benchmark face datasets show that UnGANable achieves remarkable effectiveness and utility performance, and outperforms multiple baseline methods. We further investigate four adaptive adversaries to bypass UnGANable and show that some of them are slightly effective.
Traditional machine learning (ML) models usually rely on large-scale labeled datasets to achieve strong performance. However, such labeled datasets are often challenging and expensive to obtain. Also, the predefined categories limit the model's ability to generalize to other visual concepts as additional labeled data is required. On the contrary, the newly emerged multimodal model, which contains both visual and linguistic modalities, learns the concept of images from the raw text. It is a promising way to solve the above problems as it can use easy-to-collect image-text pairs to construct the training dataset and the raw texts contain almost unlimited categories according to their semantics. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training dataset to trigger malicious behaviors in it. Previous work mainly focuses on the visual modality. In this paper, we instead focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we conduct three types of poisoning attacks against CLIP, the most representative multimodal contrastive learning framework. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can perform well on the linguistic modality with only a relatively low poisoning rate and limited epochs. Also, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities, i.e., with lower MinRank in the visual modality and with higher Hit@K when K is small in the linguistic modality. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.
Chatbots are used in many applications, e.g., automated agents, smart home assistants, interactive characters in online games, etc. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure they do not behave in undesired manners, providing offensive or toxic responses to users. This is not a trivial task as state-of-the-art chatbot models are trained on large, public datasets openly collected from the Internet. This paper presents a first-of-its-kind, large-scale measurement of toxicity in chatbots. We show that publicly available chatbots are prone to providing toxic responses when fed toxic queries. Even more worryingly, some non-toxic queries can trigger toxic responses too. We then set out to design and experiment with an attack, ToxicBuddy, which relies on fine-tuning GPT-2 to generate non-toxic queries that make chatbots respond in a toxic manner. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that our attack is effective against public chatbot models and outperforms manually-crafted malicious queries proposed by previous work. We also evaluate three defense mechanisms against ToxicBuddy, showing that they either reduce the attack performance at the cost of affecting the chatbot's utility or are only effective at mitigating a portion of the attack. This highlights the need for more research from the computer security and online safety communities to ensure that chatbot models do not hurt their users. Overall, we are confident that ToxicBuddy can be used as an auditing tool and that our work will pave the way toward designing more effective defenses for chatbot safety.
Existing studies on neural architecture search (NAS) mainly focus on efficiently and effectively searching for network architectures with better performance. Little progress has been made to systematically understand if the NAS-searched architectures are robust to privacy attacks while abundant work has already shown that human-designed architectures are prone to privacy attacks. In this paper, we fill this gap and systematically measure the privacy risks of NAS architectures. Leveraging the insights from our measurement study, we further explore the cell patterns of cell-based NAS architectures and evaluate how the cell patterns affect the privacy risks of NAS-searched architectures. Through extensive experiments, we shed light on how to design robust NAS architectures against privacy attacks, and also offer a general methodology to understand the hidden correlation between the NAS-searched architectures and other privacy risks.
Machine learning models are vulnerable to membership inference attacks in which an adversary aims to predict whether or not a particular sample was contained in the target model's training dataset. Existing attack methods have commonly exploited the output information (mostly, losses) solely from the given target model. As a result, in practical scenarios where both the member and non-member samples yield similarly small losses, these methods are naturally unable to differentiate between them. To address this limitation, in this paper, we propose a new attack method, called \system, which can exploit the membership information from the whole training process of the target model for improving the attack performance. To mount the attack in the common black-box setting, we leverage knowledge distillation, and represent the membership information by the losses evaluated on a sequence of intermediate models at different distillation epochs, namely \emph{distilled loss trajectory}, together with the loss from the given target model. Experimental results over different datasets and model architectures demonstrate the great advantage of our attack in terms of different metrics. For example, on CINIC-10, our attack achieves at least 6$\times$ higher true-positive rate at a low false-positive rate of 0.1\% than existing methods. Further analysis demonstrates the general effectiveness of our attack in more strict scenarios.
Relying on the fact that not all inputs require the same amount of computation to yield a confident prediction, multi-exit networks are gaining attention as a prominent approach for pushing the limits of efficient deployment. Multi-exit networks endow a backbone model with early exits, allowing to obtain predictions at intermediate layers of the model and thus save computation time and/or energy. However, current various designs of multi-exit networks are only considered to achieve the best trade-off between resource usage efficiency and prediction accuracy, the privacy risks stemming from them have never been explored. This prompts the need for a comprehensive investigation of privacy risks in multi-exit networks. In this paper, we perform the first privacy analysis of multi-exit networks through the lens of membership leakages. In particular, we first leverage the existing attack methodologies to quantify the multi-exit networks' vulnerability to membership leakages. Our experimental results show that multi-exit networks are less vulnerable to membership leakages and the exit (number and depth) attached to the backbone model is highly correlated with the attack performance. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid attack that exploits the exit information to improve the performance of existing attacks. We evaluate membership leakage threat caused by our hybrid attack under three different adversarial setups, ultimately arriving at a model-free and data-free adversary. These results clearly demonstrate that our hybrid attacks are very broadly applicable, thereby the corresponding risks are much more severe than shown by existing membership inference attacks. We further present a defense mechanism called TimeGuard specifically for multi-exit networks and show that TimeGuard mitigates the newly proposed attacks perfectly.
Previous security research efforts orbiting around graphs have been exclusively focusing on either (de-)anonymizing the graphs or understanding the security and privacy issues of graph neural networks. Little attention has been paid to understand the privacy risks of integrating the output from graph embedding models (e.g., node embeddings) with complex downstream machine learning pipelines. In this paper, we fill this gap and propose a novel model-agnostic graph recovery attack that exploits the implicit graph structural information preserved in the embeddings of graph nodes. We show that an adversary can recover edges with decent accuracy by only gaining access to the node embedding matrix of the original graph without interactions with the node embedding models. We demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability of our graph recovery attack through extensive experiments.