Abstract:Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is fundamental to modern LLM architectures and represents a critical intervention point for AI safety. However, CoT reasoning may exhibit failure modes that we note as pathologies, which prevent it from being useful for monitoring. Prior work has identified three distinct pathologies: post-hoc rationalization, where models generate plausible explanations backwards from predetermined answers; encoded reasoning, where intermediate steps conceal information within seemingly interpretable text; and internalized reasoning, where models replace explicit reasoning with meaningless filler tokens while computing internally. To better understand and discriminate between these pathologies, we create a set of concrete metrics that are simple to implement, computationally inexpensive, and task-agnostic. To validate our approach, we develop model organisms deliberately trained to exhibit specific CoT pathologies. Our work provides a practical toolkit for assessing CoT pathologies, with direct implications for training-time monitoring.




Abstract:As AI models are deployed with increasing autonomy, it is important to ensure they do not take harmful actions unnoticed. As a potential mitigation, we investigate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, wherein a weaker trusted monitor model continuously oversees the intermediate reasoning steps of a more powerful but untrusted model. We compare CoT monitoring to action-only monitoring, where only final outputs are reviewed, in a red-teaming setup where the untrusted model is instructed to pursue harmful side tasks while completing a coding problem. We find that CoT monitoring improves detection by up to 27 percentage points in scenarios where action-only monitoring fails to reliably identify sabotage. However, CoT traces can also contain misleading rationalizations that deceive the monitor, reducing performance in more obvious sabotage cases. To address this, we introduce a hybrid protocol that independently scores both reasoning and final outputs and combines them using a weighted average. This hybrid monitor consistently outperforms both CoT and action-only monitors across all tested models and tasks, with detection rates over four times higher than action-only monitoring for subtle deception scenarios.