Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.
Understanding the functional organization of higher visual cortex is a central focus in neuroscience. Past studies have primarily mapped the visual and semantic selectivity of neural populations using hand-selected stimuli, which may potentially bias results towards pre-existing hypotheses of visual cortex functionality. Moving beyond conventional approaches, we introduce a data-driven method that generates natural language descriptions for images predicted to maximally activate individual voxels of interest. Our method -- Semantic Captioning Using Brain Alignments ("BrainSCUBA") -- builds upon the rich embedding space learned by a contrastive vision-language model and utilizes a pre-trained large language model to generate interpretable captions. We validate our method through fine-grained voxel-level captioning across higher-order visual regions. We further perform text-conditioned image synthesis with the captions, and show that our images are semantically coherent and yield high predicted activations. Finally, to demonstrate how our method enables scientific discovery, we perform exploratory investigations on the distribution of "person" representations in the brain, and discover fine-grained semantic selectivity in body-selective areas. Unlike earlier studies that decode text, our method derives voxel-wise captions of semantic selectivity. Our results show that BrainSCUBA is a promising means for understanding functional preferences in the brain, and provides motivation for further hypothesis-driven investigation of visual cortex.
A long standing goal in neuroscience has been to elucidate the functional organization of the brain. Within higher visual cortex, functional accounts have remained relatively coarse, focusing on regions of interest (ROIs) and taking the form of selectivity for broad categories such as faces, places, bodies, food, or words. Because the identification of such ROIs has typically relied on manually assembled stimulus sets consisting of isolated objects in non-ecological contexts, exploring functional organization without robust a priori hypotheses has been challenging. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a data-driven approach in which we synthesize images predicted to activate a given brain region using paired natural images and fMRI recordings, bypassing the need for category-specific stimuli. Our approach -- Brain Diffusion for Visual Exploration ("BrainDiVE") -- builds on recent generative methods by combining large-scale diffusion models with brain-guided image synthesis. Validating our method, we demonstrate the ability to synthesize preferred images with appropriate semantic specificity for well-characterized category-selective ROIs. We then show that BrainDiVE can characterize differences between ROIs selective for the same high-level category. Finally we identify novel functional subdivisions within these ROIs, validated with behavioral data. These results advance our understanding of the fine-grained functional organization of human visual cortex, and provide well-specified constraints for further examination of cortical organization using hypothesis-driven methods.
To study information processing in the brain, neuroscientists manipulate experimental stimuli while recording participant brain activity. They can then use encoding models to find out which brain "zone" (e.g. which region of interest, volume pixel or electrophysiology sensor) is predicted from the stimulus properties. Given the assumptions underlying this setup, when stimulus properties are predictive of the activity in a zone, these properties are understood to cause activity in that zone. In recent years, researchers have used neural networks to construct representations that capture the diverse properties of complex stimuli, such as natural language or natural images. Encoding models built using these high-dimensional representations are often able to significantly predict the activity in large swathes of cortex, suggesting that the activity in all these brain zones is caused by stimulus properties captured in the representation. It is then natural to ask: "Is the activity in these different brain zones caused by the stimulus properties in the same way?" In neuroscientific terms, this corresponds to asking if these different zones process the stimulus properties in the same way. Here, we propose a new framework that enables researchers to ask if the properties of a stimulus affect two brain zones in the same way. We use simulated data and two real fMRI datasets with complex naturalistic stimuli to show that our framework enables us to make such inferences. Our inferences are strikingly consistent between the two datasets, indicating that the proposed framework is a promising new tool for neuroscientists to understand how information is processed in the brain.
Research on both natural intelligence (NI) and artificial intelligence (AI) generally assumes that the future resembles the past: intelligent agents or systems (what we call 'intelligence') observe and act on the world, then use this experience to act on future experiences of the same kind. We call this 'retrospective learning'. For example, an intelligence may see a set of pictures of objects, along with their names, and learn to name them. A retrospective learning intelligence would merely be able to name more pictures of the same objects. We argue that this is not what true intelligence is about. In many real world problems, both NIs and AIs will have to learn for an uncertain future. Both must update their internal models to be useful for future tasks, such as naming fundamentally new objects and using these objects effectively in a new context or to achieve previously unencountered goals. This ability to learn for the future we call 'prospective learning'. We articulate four relevant factors that jointly define prospective learning. Continual learning enables intelligences to remember those aspects of the past which it believes will be most useful in the future. Prospective constraints (including biases and priors) facilitate the intelligence finding general solutions that will be applicable to future problems. Curiosity motivates taking actions that inform future decision making, including in previously unmet situations. Causal estimation enables learning the structure of relations that guide choosing actions for specific outcomes, even when the specific action-outcome contingencies have never been observed before. We argue that a paradigm shift from retrospective to prospective learning will enable the communities that study intelligence to unite and overcome existing bottlenecks to more effectively explain, augment, and engineer intelligences.
Similar to how differences in the proficiency of the cardiovascular and musculoskeletal system predict an individual's athletic ability, differences in how the same brain region encodes information across individuals may explain their behavior. However, when studying how the brain encodes information, researchers choose different neuroimaging tasks (e.g., language or motor tasks), which can rely on processing different types of information and can modulate different brain regions. We hypothesize that individual differences in how information is encoded in the brain are task-specific and predict different behavior measures. We propose a framework using encoding-models to identify individual differences in brain encoding and test if these differences can predict behavior. We evaluate our framework using task functional magnetic resonance imaging data. Our results indicate that individual differences revealed by encoding-models are a powerful tool for predicting behavior, and that researchers should optimize their choice of task and encoding-model for their behavior of interest.
How meaning is represented in the brain is still one of the big open questions in neuroscience. Does a word (e.g., bird) always have the same representation, or does the task under which the word is processed alter its representation (answering "can you eat it?" versus "can it fly?")? The brain activity of subjects who read the same word while performing different semantic tasks has been shown to differ across tasks. However, it is still not understood how the task itself contributes to this difference. In the current work, we study Magnetoencephalography (MEG) brain recordings of participants tasked with answering questions about concrete nouns. We investigate the effect of the task (i.e. the question being asked) on the processing of the concrete noun by predicting the millisecond-resolution MEG recordings as a function of both the semantics of the noun and the task. Using this approach, we test several hypotheses about the task-stimulus interactions by comparing the zero-shot predictions made by these hypotheses for novel tasks and nouns not seen during training. We find that incorporating the task semantics significantly improves the prediction of MEG recordings, across participants. The improvement occurs 475-550ms after the participants first see the word, which corresponds to what is considered to be the ending time of semantic processing for a word. These results suggest that only the end of semantic processing of a word is task-dependent, and pose a challenge for future research to formulate new hypotheses for earlier task effects as a function of the task and stimuli.
Progress in natural language processing (NLP) models that estimate representations of word sequences has recently been leveraged to improve the understanding of language processing in the brain. However, these models have not been specifically designed to capture the way the brain represents language meaning. We hypothesize that fine-tuning these models to predict recordings of brain activity of people reading text will lead to representations that encode more brain-activity-relevant language information. We demonstrate that a version of BERT, a recently introduced and powerful language model, can improve the prediction of brain activity after fine-tuning. We show that the relationship between language and brain activity learned by BERT during this fine-tuning transfers across multiple participants. We also show that, for some participants, the fine-tuned representations learned from both magnetoencephalography (MEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are better for predicting fMRI than the representations learned from fMRI alone, indicating that the learned representations capture brain-activity-relevant information that is not simply an artifact of the modality. While changes to language representations help the model predict brain activity, they also do not harm the model's ability to perform downstream NLP tasks. Our findings are notable for research on language understanding in the brain.
Neural network models for NLP are typically implemented without the explicit encoding of language rules and yet they are able to break one performance record after another. Despite much work, it is still unclear what the representations learned by these networks correspond to. We propose here a novel approach for interpreting neural networks that relies on the only processing system we have that does understand language: the human brain. We use brain imaging recordings of subjects reading complex natural text to interpret word and sequence embeddings from 4 recent NLP models - ELMo, USE, BERT and Transformer-XL. We study how their representations differ across layer depth, context length, and attention type. Our results reveal differences in the context-related representations across these models. Further, in the transformer models, we find an interaction between layer depth and context length, and between layer depth and attention type. We finally use the insights from the attention experiments to alter BERT: we remove the learned attention at shallow layers, and show that this manipulation improves performance on a wide range of syntactic tasks. Cognitive neuroscientists have already begun using NLP networks to study the brain, and this work closes the loop to allow the interaction between NLP and cognitive neuroscience to be a true cross-pollination.