Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in healthcare for tasks such as clinical question answering, diagnosis support, and report summarization. Despite their promise, these models remain highly sensitive to subtle prompt perturbations, both lexical and syntactic, posing serious risks in safety-critical clinical applications. In this study, we conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of both general-purpose (e.g., GPT-3.5, Llama3) and medical-specific LLMs (e.g., ClinicalBERT, BioLlama3, BioBERT) using the MedMCQA benchmark. We categorize perturbations into natural and adversarial types and examine their effect on model consistency, accuracy, and reliability in clinical reasoning tasks. Our findings reveal that medical LLMs are not intrinsically safe. Even minor variations in phrasing can alter clinical advice, and targeted adversarial prompts can provoke harmful outputs. In high-stakes settings like healthcare, such unpredictability is unacceptable-models that change diagnoses due to reworded inputs or hallucinate medications when slightly rephrased cannot be reliably trusted by clinicians. While models tend to show resilience to simple lexical substitutions or paraphrasing, they often break down under syntactic reordering or misleading contextual cues. This fragility is evident across both general-purpose and domain-specific LLMs. Notably, adversarial manipulations can lead to clinically dangerous outputs, such as recommending incorrect dosages or omitting critical findings.
The convergence of large language models and social bots allows malicious actors to manipulate the information ecosystem by generating human-like content at scale. Existing models for detecting AI-generated content often fail in the wild, primarily due to the lack of ground-truth data. We address this gap through an adversarial methodology that models the impersonation of real social media users by malicious actors. Using this methodology, we curate a multilingual, cross-platform dataset of paired human and AI-generated messages. Training on such adversarial data yields accurate detection of AI-generated text. Our approach significantly outperforms existing models for content-based bot detection in real-world, out-of-distribution data.
Vision-language models (VLMs) such as CLIP achieve strong zero-shot recognition but remain highly fragile under adversarial perturbations. Recent test-time adaptation defenses improve robustness by leveraging many augmented views, but this leads to impractical slowdown and a clear robustness-throughput trade-off. To address this challenge, we present Stability and Suitability-guided Test-time Prompt Tuning (SS-TPT), evaluating the quality of each augmented view via two complementary scores: (1) stability, measuring prediction invariance to weak augmentations, and (2) suitability, measuring feature-space density among views. These stability and suitability (SS) scores guide both adaptation and inference through an SS-guided consistency loss and an SS-weighted prediction, amplifying trustworthy views while suppressing corrupted ones. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SS-TPT significantly outperforms prior state-of-the-art methods, achieving superior robustness-throughput trade-offs across diverse datasets and varying numbers of views, thereby demonstrating both strong practicality and generality. Our code is available at https://github.com/sunoh-kim/SS-TPT.
Vision-language models such as CLIP have achieved remarkable zero-shot recognition capabilities, yet their robustness against adversarial perturbations remains limited. Test-time counterattack (TTC) was recently proposed to improve CLIP's robustness by perturbing an input image to steer it away from a corrupted state during inference. However, TTC remains fragile under strong attacks because its counterattack relies on a directly corrupted original view and employs a noise-driven hard-gating scheme that cannot adapt to varying corruption severity. To address these limitations, we introduce Multi-view guided Adaptive Counterattack (MAC), which performs counterattacks for multi-view with corruption-aware soft weighting. Specifically, MAC first constructs augmented views of an input image to obtain diverse embeddings. It then performs counterattacks to refine corrupted embeddings of views. Next, MAC adaptively scales the counterattack intensity for each view based on its estimated corruption degree. Finally, the adaptively counterattacked views are aggregated to yield a robust final prediction. Extensive experiments across 20 datasets and diverse attack scenarios demonstrate that MAC substantially improves robustness while preserving high inference speed and memory efficiency with its tuning-free design. Our code is available at https://github.com/sunoh-kim/MAC.
Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another, but assume address-based transport over HTTP(S). Such transports protect message content, increasingly with end-to-end encryption. What they leave in the clear is the communication graph: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are often capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships. It can infer the pending workflow, the task being assembled and the action likely to follow. At machine speed, it can act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone: predictive leverage over autonomous action. We give a threat model for the agent communication graph; identify what makes agent metadata distinctively revealing (semanticity, prospectivity, actuation); define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties and weigh candidate transports (SimpleX/SMP, Tor, mixnets) against them; and present an A2A case study in which a metadata-protecting binding is expressible but surfaces the protocol's identity assumptions. We test these on a generative model anchored to a real A2A capture. From passive metadata alone, with no payloads, a classifier recovers a task's class well above chance, from only the workflow's opening; applied together, the properties drive that recovery sharply back toward chance. Beyond what an observer can recover, we measure the leverage of acting on the leak: from a workflow's opening and under a fixed budget, an adversary choosing which workflows to act on realizes in this model most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage over a metadata-blind one, and the same properties suppress it.
Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems operating in real-time settings must process acoustic input under strict temporal constraints, where transcription decisions are inherently made on incomplete information. This causal constraint serves as an information bottleneck on attackers, significantly limiting attack performance. Our new Semantic Gambit attack breaks this causal limitation by augmenting the adversary with predictive context derived from a Large Language Model in real-time. Our experiments show that this form of augmentation can elevate the corpus-level Word Error Rate to 35.6% -- a three-fold increase over the current state-of-the-art. Ultimately, this work reveals how common, low-latency LLM tooling can be exploited to systematically subvert real-time ASR pipelines.
Achieving both anthropomorphic naturalness and robust terrain traversal remains a fundamental challenge in humanoid locomotion. Existing Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches typically rely on fixed motion priors, limiting their adaptability to varying environments. We propose Terrain-conditioned Generative Motion Priors (T-GMP), a module that captures a terrain-conditioned latent motion manifold from a few expert state-terrain demonstrations using a Conditional Variational Autoencoder (CVAE). The learned priors enable smooth style transitions, facilitating a unified policy that adapts to terrain variations. We integrate T-GMP into an adversarial learning pipeline with our proposed Foothold Penalty, where a discriminator dynamically modulates naturalness constraints conditioned on local terrain features, guiding the generation of versatile and human-like motions. Experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms existing baselines in traversal success rate and motion smoothness, while preserving biomimetically natural and physically coordinated motions.
AI sovereignty is the extent to which a nation independently controls its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The race toward ever-more-sophisticated frontier AI models is of increasing strategic importance, with nations considering how AI might improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power. However, the costs of AI sovereignty are enormous, and we lack definitions and conceptual models to navigate evolving AI sovereignty dynamics. We address this gap with definitions relevant to AI sovereignty, along with a first-of-its-kind qualitative model that incorporates micro, meso, and macro contributors. Model-based qualitative forecasts highlight competitive dynamics and evolving potential for AI-driven national power. The model identifies key leverage points that nations can use to enhance their own growth or degrade an adversary's, including consideration of accelerators, electricity, water, data sets and skilled workforce. These leverage points can be activated at strategic and operational levels through both direct kinetic actions, such as Iran's targeting of data centers with drones, and indirect non-kinetic effects including cyber, space, information, economic coercion and diplomacy. If our assumptions and hypotheses are valid, this strategic competition may come to define how nations improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power in the 21st Century.
Consistency training encourages models to behave similarly across different contexts, and has shown promise for reducing misalignment. We broaden the scope of consistency training in two ways. First, we introduce two new internal consistency targets: MLP Consistency Training (MLPCT), which matches post-activation MLP states, and Attention Consistency Training (AttCT), which matches per-head attention distributions. Second, we apply consistency training to four additional safety threats: persona in-context learning attacks, adversarial frustration, prefill attacks, and conditional misalignment. Across several models and threat settings, we find that consistency training reduces misalignment well beyond the sycophancy and jailbreak settings studied in prior work. We also find cases of cross-threat generalization, where training against one failure mode improves robustness to another, and identify a shared residual-stream mechanism underlying ACT, MLPCT, and AttCT, while distinguishing BCT as mechanistically distinct. Our results suggest that consistency training is a flexible and extensible framework for alignment, capable of unifying defenses against a broader class of model pathologies.
In this work, we propose a framework that combines multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) with model-based control to achieve safe, dynamically feasible actions in cooperative multi-agent tasks. Multi-agent reinforcement learning provides the advantage of learning cooperative policies for multi-agent teams from discrete non-differentiable rewards in a long planning horizon. Model-predictive control is robust and offers safe, dynamically feasible actions in a fast replanning framework for short horizons. We propose an algorithm that extends actor-critic model predictive control for MARL which we refer to as multi-agent actor-critic model predictive control (MA-AC-MPC). We demonstrate the capabilities of this algorithm by applying it to a multi-agent pursuit-evasion scenario. Specifically, we compare the evader team's strategy using the MA-AC-MPC model and a multi-layer perceptron model (MA-AC-MLP). The pursuer team uses augmented proportional navigation as it is accepted as an advanced adversarial control law. We also provide an example with a heterogeneous environment where a drone and omni-wheeled rover cooperate to achieve repeatable and successful landing with 100% success rate in hardware for MA-AC-MPC compared to 60% for MA-AC-MLP. We demonstrate the robustness of the proposed MA-AC-MPC algorithm in hardware for both environments.