Public discourse and emerging policy typically assume that AI emotional support is a deliberate act: a lonely user consciously seeking comfort from a dedicated companion chatbot. In this paper, we draw on emerging empirical evidence and argue that this picture is inaccurate on two accounts, both in how AI emotional support arises and how it shapes future behavior. First, AI emotional support commonly emerges incidentally within task-oriented interactions on general-purpose platforms, much as workplace friendships deepen through collaboration. Second, these incidental encounters are path-dependent: positive experiences of AI emotional support update people's beliefs about AI's emotional capabilities and redirect their choices for future emotional support, increasing preference for AI and decreasing preference for humans. We review recent evidence, including a large-scale longitudinal study conducted in collaboration with OpenAI, showing that daily five-minute conversations with an AI about personal issues over 28 days led to a 10.3% decrease in the preference for seeking support from humans and an 11.6% increase in the preference for AI. These findings suggest that current policy, focused on companion apps and isolated interactions, cannot adequately protect human connection. Instead, effective regulations should extend to general-purpose AI systems and address cumulative, trajectory-level changes in how people seek support. Recognizing how people stumble into AI emotional support and how those encounters redirect human connections over time is essential to safeguarding human well-being.
Are utterances by AI chatbots meaningful? Concretely, if a user asks, say, Anthropic's agent Claude, "What is the capital of Spain?" and Claude answers, "Madrid is the capital of Spain," does that sentence have its ordinary meaning -- and does it express a true proposition? Most ordinary users, as well as AI engineers, take the answer to be trivially "yes." However, many cognitive scientists, linguists, and philosophers of language argue that dominant intentionalist accounts of language and meaning deliver the opposite conclusion. Theorists more sympathetic to ordinary users' intuitions have therefore advocated a radical "de-anthropomorphization" of language, revising our understanding of mental states, intentions, and semantic content to capture the intuition that the outputs of LLMs are meaningful. We take a different approach. While we, too, argue that LLM outputs are meaningful, we contend that a proper theory of human language already applies, as is, to current chatbots. Meaning is a low bar: claiming that LLM outputs are meaningful does not require positing mental states, intentions, rationality, or the cognitive capacities requisite for communication in LLMs -- or, indeed, making any other anthropomorphic assumptions. People do have communicative intentions (typically successful ones), but nevertheless, even in humans, language production can depart from what the speaker has in mind. Our view has important consequences for how we should theorize about -- and critically engage with -- both human linguistic output and synthetically generated text. In particular, to say that chatbots produce meaningful text is not by any means to endorse what they output, or to assume that the technology is (or is not) good, powerful, appropriate, or useful.
LLMs have evolved from basic chatbots to the backbone of the AI ecosystem, now widely used in healthcare, schools, and government services. The domain-wide adoption of LLMs necessitates continuous evaluation to ensure their safety and fairness. Common issues encountered after deploying LLMs include inconsistent outputs and hallucinations of incorrect information. Although numerous LLM evaluation tools exist, most are limited to testing a single parameter at a time or require massive computational resources that are not accessible to most researchers. TriEval addresses these challenges by evaluating LLM outputs across multiple parameters, including bias, toxicity, and truthfulness together, while minimizing computing resources. The pipeline is compatible with both open- and closed-source models and runs on a standard laptop without a GPU cluster. TriEval has been tested on four models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Gemma 2 9B, and Claude Haiku. The results show clear differences between open-source and closed-source models, especially in terms of toxicity and truthfulness. TriEval is being released as open source to enable broader access for researchers with limited computational resources.
Organizations routinely run experiments for A/B testing, yet the data generated from one experiment is underutilized to inform subsequent intervention design. Significant barriers exist to extracting actionable knowledge from prior experimental data to inform new interventions. We study whether tool-augmented agentic AI can automatically learn from experimental data to generate new interventions in subsequent experiments. Through two-stage field experiments in healthcare prescription messaging (693,139 patient visits), we compare a Human + Chatbot method (Stage 1: behavioral experts with conversational AI co-designing 13 message variants, 444,691 patient visits) against a Tool-Augmented Agentic AI method (Stage 2: AI autonomously extracting principles from Stage 1 data to generate 17 new variants, 248,448 patient visits). The Agentic AI method, equipped with analytical tools, structured Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) reasoning agents, and transparent evidence chains, produces superior interventions: the best AI-generated message achieved a 69.8% CTR (+6.5 percentage points over baseline). Critically, our results suggest that the value comes from domain-specific experimental data, not from general reasoning ability: frontier LLMs operating without experimental data failed to predict which interventions would succeed. The field experiments also revealed that general-purpose behavioral theories used for intervention design do not extend uniformly to specific healthcare contexts, motivating an agentic AI approach to theory audits at field-experiment scale. Our research shows that tool-augmented AI can learn from experimental data and generate improved domain-relevant interventions, transforming behavioral experimentation from one-shot evaluation into a scalable system for cumulative design learning.
LLM chatbots increasingly serve as a first source of support for people in psychological distress, including those whose distress is entangled with delusional beliefs. Prior work on LLM mental-health safety largely evaluates general therapeutic quality or single-turn crisis detection, leaving unclear how models behave when distress is intertwined with delusion over sustained conversations. We address this gap with matched multi-turn simulations, across clinically grounded personas and six LLMs, that pair each delusional conversation with a distress-only control to isolate the effect of delusional framing. This reveals a recognition-intervention gap: models detect distress at comparable rates regardless of framing, yet sharply fail to act on it once distress is embedded in delusion, with safety interventions suppressed by up to 4.5x. The failure tracks accumulated acceptance of the user's premises rather than emotional validation. Worse, the intuitive fix of prompting models to assess user distress backfires under delusional framing; only delusion-aware prompting with explicit response guidance closes the gap, and even this depends on a delusion classifier that is itself unreliable on the most vulnerable models. Safe deployment therefore requires treating delusional framing as a distinct risk signal that overrides conversational accommodation.
Systematic characterization of drug-disease relationships is essential for drug discovery and repurposing, yet is hindered by the heterogeneity and rapid growth of biomedical literature. Existing datasets rely on labor-intensive curation and are often incomplete, while LLM-only approaches suffer from hallucination and weak evidence grounding. We introduce UniD$^3$, a unified framework that integrates Large Language Models with Knowledge Graph-enhanced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (KG-RAG) to extract, organize, and validate drug-disease knowledge across Drug-Disease Matching (DDM), Drug Effectiveness Assessment (DEA), and Drug-Target Analysis (DTA). UniD$^3$ processes 157,849 PubMed articles with Llama 3.3-70B and constructs knowledge graphs via a dual-stage strategy combining paper-level extraction with KG-level consolidation centered on drug and disease entities. These graphs support KG-RAG-based generation of structured datasets, evaluated through external benchmarks, fuzzy matching with curated resources, and clinician review. UniD$^3$ produces six knowledge graphs and large-scale datasets, including 28,915 DDM, 15,042 DEA, and over 4,000 DTA QA pairs. External validation shows strong performance (F1: 0.85-0.87 for DDM/DEA; 0.82 for DTA), with clinician review confirming high reliability (AUROC = 0.90). KG-RAG-augmented models outperform standalone LLMs, and the UniD$^3$ chatbot enables interpretable, citation-supported exploration of drug-disease relationships. UniD$^3$ provides a scalable, extensible framework for transforming unstructured biomedical literature into high-quality, structured drug-disease knowledge, supporting AI-driven discovery, repurposing, and precision medicine.
Turkey's e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet) serves over 68 million registered users with more than 9,200 government services, and is increasingly integrating artificial intelligence into citizen-facing applications such as chatbot assistants and eligibility assessments. However, no structured technical governance infrastructure currently connects high-level AI policy frameworks, such as the EU AI Act, OECD AI Principles, and Turkey's own National AI Strategy, to the operational reality of deploying AI within a centralized e-government platform. We propose GovAI-Pipe, a four-layer governance pipeline designed using Design Science Research methodology that maps the AI model lifecycle to governance checkpoints: (1) pre-deployment validation for bias testing, explainability, and privacy impact assessment; (2) deployment governance for risk-tier classification and approval workflows; (3) runtime monitoring for drift detection, fairness tracking, and human-in-the-loop escalation; and (4) post-incident governance for audit trails, rollback, and citizen redress. Each layer is anchored to specific provisions of the EU AI Act, the GDPR data protection framework, and the National AI Strategy. We demonstrate the framework through two high-risk e-Devlet use cases, showing how GovAI-Pipe operationalizes governance principles as auditable, technical pipeline components.
We present GuidaPA, a privacy-preserving chatbot for the Italian Public Administration (PA) trained via Federated Learning (FL) on documentation from two national PA platforms, SIGESON and SIDFORS. Our corpus includes approximately 8 pages of SIGESON manuals and 31 pages of SIDFORS manuals/FAQs; while this study uses public documentation as a safe proxy, the intended deployment extends to restricted internal sources (e.g., tickets, officer manuals, database extracts) that can not be centrally pooled due to regulatory and organizational constraints. GuidaPA integrates role-based access control, secure client-side preprocessing, explicit monitoring of non-IID effects, and parameter-efficient federated fine-tuning of large language models. Using QLoRA (4-bit) over 15 federated rounds with an 80/20 train-test split per client, we evaluate answer quality with ROUGE, BLEU-4, and METEOR. The best federated model achieves ROUGE-1/2/L of 61.10/55.77/59.44, BLEU-4 of 45.02, and METEOR of 63.94-close to private centralized fine-tuning while keeping data on-site. Compared to the general-purpose baseline, domain fine-tuning improves ROUGE-1 from 41.45 to 62.18 and BLEU-4 from 26.97 to 50.90. Overall, the results indicate that FL can deliver high-quality conversational AI for public services without centralized data sharing
Modern KV cache management assumes the chatbot workload: prompts arrive once and the cache grows append-only, so prefix caching and forward-only eviction are correct by construction. Agentic LLMs break this assumption. Their conversations evolve through policy-driven editing: failed tool calls are retried, stale outputs dropped, trajectories pivoted. Two distinct cache problems result. First, identical content moves to new positions between turns, invalidating exact-prefix caches even though the underlying KV would still be valid; recent work on position-independent caching for MLA addresses this reuse problem. Second, and this paper's focus, a policy may need to direct the serving system to actively remove or replace a span of cached content and continue without re-prefilling everything that came after. No existing primitive offers this. Production agentic harnesses fall back to re-prefill on every edit, paying full prefix-recomputation cost; kernel-level eviction methods make their own decisions and cannot accept policy directives from outside the kernel. We introduce Leyline, a serving-side primitive that closes this gap. A declarative directive 4-tuple separates what to edit from how to preserve position correctness. The policy declares the edit and its mode (in-place splice or prefix-trimmed re-prefill for semantic forgetting); an architecture-agnostic interface routes to a per-architecture kernel that restores attention math via a closed-form RoPE-rotation correction. The splice kernel lifts replay cache-hit by +11.2 pp and cuts latency by up to 241 ms. A ten-line truncation rule routed through the same interface lifts agentic solve rate by +14.3 pp on debug-gym. The mechanism is open; the policy space it enables is the agenda.
Patient-facing medical chatbots are commonly evaluated on single-turn prompts, yet real users push back after refusals, add urgency, and invoke authority. We introduce MultiTurnPSB, a four-turn adversarial extension of PatientSafetyBench, and evaluate GPT-4.1-mini under fixed template, template-adaptive, and live adversarial attacks. Unsafe responses rise from 35% to nearly 80% by Turn 4 under live attack. Under the same adversary, GPT-4.1-mini and Claude Sonnet 4.5 are statistically indistinguishable at baseline but diverge to a 19x gap by Turn 4, a difference invisible to single-turn evaluation. We characterize four degradation trajectory signatures and identify a two-element attack formula responsible for most catastrophic failures. A lightweight input-side classifier reduces Turn 4 unsafe responses by 52 percentage points despite severe accuracy degradation, but the 45% false alarm rate on benign queries is the primary deployment constraint. A methodological finding also emerges: Claude Sonnet refused to generate adversarial messages in over half of late-turn conversations despite explicit red team framing, suggesting safety training may generalize to the attacker role.