This paper studies distributed online learning under Byzantine attacks. The performance of an online learning algorithm is often characterized by (adversarial) regret, which evaluates the quality of one-step-ahead decision-making when an environment provides adversarial losses, and a sublinear bound is preferred. But we prove that, even with a class of state-of-the-art robust aggregation rules, in an adversarial environment and in the presence of Byzantine participants, distributed online gradient descent can only achieve a linear adversarial regret bound, which is tight. This is the inevitable consequence of Byzantine attacks, even though we can control the constant of the linear adversarial regret to a reasonable level. Interestingly, when the environment is not fully adversarial so that the losses of the honest participants are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed), we show that sublinear stochastic regret, in contrast to the aforementioned adversarial regret, is possible. We develop a Byzantine-robust distributed online momentum algorithm to attain such a sublinear stochastic regret bound. Extensive numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical analysis.
We propose a Byzantine-robust variance-reduced stochastic gradient descent (SGD) method to solve the distributed finite-sum minimization problem when the data on the workers are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). During the learning process, an unknown number of Byzantine workers may send malicious messages to the master node, leading to remarkable learning error. Most of the Byzantine-robust methods address this issue by using robust aggregation rules to aggregate the received messages, but rely on the assumption that all the regular workers have i.i.d. data, which is not the case in many federated learning applications. In light of the significance of reducing stochastic gradient noise for mitigating the effect of Byzantine attacks, we use a resampling strategy to reduce the impact of both inner variation (that describes the sample heterogeneity on every regular worker) and outer variation (that describes the sample heterogeneity among the regular workers), along with a stochastic average gradient algorithm (SAGA) to fully eliminate the inner variation. The variance-reduced messages are then aggregated with a robust geometric median operator. Under certain conditions, we prove that the proposed method reaches a neighborhood of the optimal solution with linear convergence rate, and the learning error is much smaller than those given by the state-of-the-art methods in the non-i.i.d. setting. Numerical experiments corroborate the theoretical results and show satisfactory performance of the proposed method.
This paper deals with distributed finite-sum optimization for learning over networks in the presence of malicious Byzantine attacks. To cope with such attacks, most resilient approaches so far combine stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with different robust aggregation rules. However, the sizeable SGD-induced stochastic gradient noise makes it challenging to distinguish malicious messages sent by the Byzantine attackers from noisy stochastic gradients sent by the 'honest' workers. This motivates us to reduce the variance of stochastic gradients as a means of robustifying SGD in the presence of Byzantine attacks. To this end, the present work puts forth a Byzantine attack resilient distributed (Byrd-) SAGA approach for learning tasks involving finite-sum optimization over networks. Rather than the mean employed by distributed SAGA, the novel Byrd- SAGA relies on the geometric median to aggregate the corrected stochastic gradients sent by the workers. When less than half of the workers are Byzantine attackers, the robustness of geometric median to outliers enables Byrd-SAGA to attain provably linear convergence to a neighborhood of the optimal solution, with the asymptotic learning error determined by the number of Byzantine workers. Numerical tests corroborate the robustness to various Byzantine attacks, as well as the merits of Byrd- SAGA over Byzantine attack resilient distributed SGD.