Diagnosing and Rectifying Fake OOD Invariance: A Restructured Causal Approach

Invariant representation learning (IRL) encourages the prediction from invariant causal features to labels de-confounded from the environments, advancing the technical roadmap of out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization. Despite spotlights around, recent theoretical results verified that some causal features recovered by IRLs merely pretend domain-invariantly in the training environments but fail in unseen domains. The \emph{fake invariance} severely endangers OOD generalization since the trustful objective can not be diagnosed and existing causal surgeries are invalid to rectify. In this paper, we review a IRL family (InvRat) under the Partially and Fully Informative Invariant Feature Structural Causal Models (PIIF SCM /FIIF SCM) respectively, to certify their weaknesses in representing fake invariant features, then, unify their causal diagrams to propose ReStructured SCM (RS-SCM). RS-SCM can ideally rebuild the spurious and the fake invariant features simultaneously. Given this, we further develop an approach based on conditional mutual information with respect to RS-SCM, then rigorously rectify the spurious and fake invariant effects. It can be easily implemented by a small feature selection subnet introduced in the IRL family, which is alternatively optimized to achieve our goal. Experiments verified the superiority of our approach to fight against the fake invariant issue across a variety of OOD generalization benchmarks.

An Investigation of Darwiche and Pearl's Postulates for Iterated Belief Update

Belief revision and update, two significant types of belief change, both focus on how an agent modify her beliefs in presence of new information. The most striking difference between them is that the former studies the change of beliefs in a static world while the latter concentrates on a dynamically-changing world. The famous AGM and KM postulates were proposed to capture rational belief revision and update, respectively. However, both of them are too permissive to exclude some unreasonable changes in the iteration. In response to this weakness, the DP postulates and its extensions for iterated belief revision were presented. Furthermore, Rodrigues integrated these postulates in belief update. Unfortunately, his approach does not meet the basic requirement of iterated belief update. This paper is intended to solve this problem of Rodrigues's approach. Firstly, we present a modification of the original KM postulates based on belief states. Subsequently, we migrate several well-known postulates for iterated belief revision to iterated belief update. Moreover, we provide the exact semantic characterizations based on partial preorders for each of the proposed postulates. Finally, we analyze the compatibility between the above iterated postulates and the KM postulates for belief update.