An Investigation of Darwiche and Pearl's Postulates for Iterated Belief Update

Belief revision and update, two significant types of belief change, both focus on how an agent modify her beliefs in presence of new information. The most striking difference between them is that the former studies the change of beliefs in a static world while the latter concentrates on a dynamically-changing world. The famous AGM and KM postulates were proposed to capture rational belief revision and update, respectively. However, both of them are too permissive to exclude some unreasonable changes in the iteration. In response to this weakness, the DP postulates and its extensions for iterated belief revision were presented. Furthermore, Rodrigues integrated these postulates in belief update. Unfortunately, his approach does not meet the basic requirement of iterated belief update. This paper is intended to solve this problem of Rodrigues's approach. Firstly, we present a modification of the original KM postulates based on belief states. Subsequently, we migrate several well-known postulates for iterated belief revision to iterated belief update. Moreover, we provide the exact semantic characterizations based on partial preorders for each of the proposed postulates. Finally, we analyze the compatibility between the above iterated postulates and the KM postulates for belief update.