A Topological Perspective on Causal Inference

This paper presents a topological learning-theoretic perspective on causal inference by introducing a series of topologies defined on general spaces of structural causal models (SCMs). As an illustration of the framework we prove a topological causal hierarchy theorem, showing that substantive assumption-free causal inference is possible only in a meager set of SCMs. Thanks to a known correspondence between open sets in the weak topology and statistically verifiable hypotheses, our results show that inductive assumptions sufficient to license valid causal inferences are statistically unverifiable in principle. Similar to no-free-lunch theorems for statistical inference, the present results clarify the inevitability of substantial assumptions for causal inference. An additional benefit of our topological approach is that it easily accommodates SCMs with infinitely many variables. We finally suggest that the framework may be helpful for the positive project of exploring and assessing alternative causal-inductive assumptions.

Causal Abstractions of Neural Networks

Structural analysis methods (e.g., probing and feature attribution) are increasingly important tools for neural network analysis. We propose a new structural analysis method grounded in a formal theory of \textit{causal abstraction} that provides rich characterizations of model-internal representations and their roles in input/output behavior. In this method, neural representations are aligned with variables in interpretable causal models, and then \textit{interchange interventions} are used to experimentally verify that the neural representations have the causal properties of their aligned variables. We apply this method in a case study to analyze neural models trained on Multiply Quantified Natural Language Inference (MQNLI) corpus, a highly complex NLI dataset that was constructed with a tree-structured natural logic causal model. We discover that a BERT-based model with state-of-the-art performance successfully realizes the approximate causal structure of the natural logic causal model, whereas a simpler baseline model fails to show any such structure, demonstrating that neural representations encode the compositional structure of MQNLI examples.

Intention as Commitment toward Time

In this paper we address the interplay among intention, time, and belief in dynamic environments. The first contribution is a logic for reasoning about intention, time and belief, in which assumptions of intentions are represented by preconditions of intended actions. Intentions and beliefs are coherent as long as these assumptions are not violated, i.e. as long as intended actions can be performed such that their preconditions hold as well. The second contribution is the formalization of what-if scenarios: what happens with intentions and beliefs if a new (possibly conflicting) intention is adopted, or a new fact is learned? An agent is committed to its intended actions as long as its belief-intention database is coherent. We conceptualize intention as commitment toward time and we develop AGM-based postulates for the iterated revision of belief-intention databases, and we prove a Katsuno-Mendelzon-style representation theorem.

Probabilistic Reasoning across the Causal Hierarchy

We propose a formalization of the three-tier causal hierarchy of association, intervention, and counterfactuals as a series of probabilistic logical languages. Our languages are of strictly increasing expressivity, the first capable of expressing quantitative probabilistic reasoning---including conditional independence and Bayesian inference---the second encoding do-calculus reasoning for causal effects, and the third capturing a fully expressive do-calculus for arbitrary counterfactual queries. We give a corresponding series of finitary axiomatizations complete over both structural causal models and probabilistic programs, and show that satisfiability and validity for each language are decidable in polynomial space.

On Open-Universe Causal Reasoning

We extend two kinds of causal models, structural equation models and simulation models, to infinite variable spaces. This enables a semantics for conditionals founded on a calculus of intervention, and axiomatization of causal reasoning for rich, expressive generative models---including those in which a causal representation exists only implicitly---in an open-universe setting. Further, we show that under suitable restrictions the two kinds of models are equivalent, perhaps surprisingly as their axiomatizations differ substantially in the general case. We give a series of complete axiomatizations in which the open-universe nature of the setting is seen to be essential.

On the Conditional Logic of Simulation Models

We propose analyzing conditional reasoning by appeal to a notion of intervention on a simulation program, formalizing and subsuming a number of approaches to conditional thinking in the recent AI literature. Our main results include a series of axiomatizations, allowing comparison between this framework and existing frameworks (normality-ordering models, causal structural equation models), and a complexity result establishing NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem. Perhaps surprisingly, some of the basic logical principles common to all existing approaches are invalidated in our causal simulation approach. We suggest that this additional flexibility is important in modeling some intuitive examples.