Humans can learn new concepts from a small number of examples by drawing on their inductive biases. These inductive biases have previously been captured by using Bayesian models defined over symbolic hypothesis spaces. Is it possible to create a neural network that displays the same inductive biases? We show that inductive biases that enable rapid concept learning can be instantiated in artificial neural networks by distilling a prior distribution from a symbolic Bayesian model via meta-learning, an approach for extracting the common structure from a set of tasks. By generating the set of tasks used in meta-learning from the prior distribution of a Bayesian model, we are able to transfer that prior into a neural network. We use this approach to create a neural network with an inductive bias towards concepts expressed as short logical formulas. Analyzing results from previous behavioral experiments in which people learned logical concepts from a few examples, we find that our meta-trained models are highly aligned with human performance.
Large language models (LLMs) can produce long, coherent passages of text, suggesting that LLMs, although trained on next-word prediction, must represent the latent structure that characterizes a document. Prior work has found that internal representations of LLMs encode one aspect of latent structure, namely syntax; here we investigate a complementary aspect, namely the document's topic structure. We motivate the hypothesis that LLMs capture topic structure by connecting LLM optimization to implicit Bayesian inference. De Finetti's theorem shows that exchangeable probability distributions can be represented as a mixture with respect to a latent generating distribution. Although text is not exchangeable at the level of syntax, exchangeability is a reasonable starting assumption for topic structure. We thus hypothesize that predicting the next token in text will lead LLMs to recover latent topic distributions. We examine this hypothesis using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an exchangeable probabilistic topic model, as a target, and we show that the representations formed by LLMs encode both the topics used to generate synthetic data and those used to explain natural corpus data.
The success of methods based on artificial neural networks in creating intelligent machines seems like it might pose a challenge to explanations of human cognition in terms of Bayesian inference. We argue that this is not the case, and that in fact these systems offer new opportunities for Bayesian modeling. Specifically, we argue that Bayesian models of cognition and artificial neural networks lie at different levels of analysis and are complementary modeling approaches, together offering a way to understand human cognition that spans these levels. We also argue that the same perspective can be applied to intelligent machines, where a Bayesian approach may be uniquely valuable in understanding the behavior of large, opaque artificial neural networks that are trained on proprietary data.
The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.
Humans can learn languages from remarkably little experience. Developing computational models that explain this ability has been a major challenge in cognitive science. Bayesian models that build in strong inductive biases - factors that guide generalization - have been successful at explaining how humans might generalize from few examples in controlled settings but are usually too restrictive to be tractably applied to more naturalistic data. By contrast, neural networks have flexible representations that allow them to learn well from naturalistic data but require many more examples than humans receive. We show that learning from limited naturalistic data is possible with an approach that combines the strong inductive biases of a Bayesian model with the flexible representations of a neural network. This approach works by distilling a Bayesian model's biases into a neural network. Like a Bayesian model, the resulting system can learn formal linguistic patterns from a small number of examples. Like a neural network, it can also learn aspects of English syntax from a corpus of natural language - and it outperforms a standard neural network at acquiring the linguistic phenomena of recursion and priming. Bridging the divide between Bayesian models and neural networks makes it possible to handle a broader range of learning scenarios than either approach can handle on its own.
When acquiring syntax, children consistently choose hierarchical rules over competing non-hierarchical possibilities. Is this preference due to a learning bias for hierarchical structure, or due to more general biases that interact with hierarchical cues in children's linguistic input? We explore these possibilities by training LSTMs and Transformers - two types of neural networks without a hierarchical bias - on data similar in quantity and content to children's linguistic input: text from the CHILDES corpus. We then evaluate what these models have learned about English yes/no questions, a phenomenon for which hierarchical structure is crucial. We find that, though they perform well at capturing the surface statistics of child-directed speech (as measured by perplexity), both model types generalize in a way more consistent with an incorrect linear rule than the correct hierarchical rule. These results suggest that human-like generalization from text alone requires stronger biases than the general sequence-processing biases of standard neural network architectures.
Machine translation has seen rapid progress with the advent of Transformer-based models. These models have no explicit linguistic structure built into them, yet they may still implicitly learn structured relationships by attending to relevant tokens. We hypothesize that this structural learning could be made more robust by explicitly endowing Transformers with a structural bias, and we investigate two methods for building in such a bias. One method, the TP-Transformer, augments the traditional Transformer architecture to include an additional component to represent structure. The second method imbues structure at the data level by segmenting the data with morphological tokenization. We test these methods on translating from English into morphologically rich languages, Turkish and Inuktitut, and consider both automatic metrics and human evaluations. We find that each of these two approaches allows the network to achieve better performance, but this improvement is dependent on the size of the dataset. In sum, structural encoding methods make Transformers more sample-efficient, enabling them to perform better from smaller amounts of data.
What explains the dramatic progress from 20th-century to 21st-century AI, and how can the remaining limitations of current AI be overcome? The widely accepted narrative attributes this progress to massive increases in the quantity of computational and data resources available to support statistical learning in deep artificial neural networks. We show that an additional crucial factor is the development of a new type of computation. Neurocompositional computing adopts two principles that must be simultaneously respected to enable human-level cognition: the principles of Compositionality and Continuity. These have seemed irreconcilable until the recent mathematical discovery that compositionality can be realized not only through discrete methods of symbolic computing, but also through novel forms of continuous neural computing. The revolutionary recent progress in AI has resulted from the use of limited forms of neurocompositional computing. New, deeper forms of neurocompositional computing create AI systems that are more robust, accurate, and comprehensible.
Current language models can generate high-quality text. Are they simply copying text they have seen before, or have they learned generalizable linguistic abstractions? To tease apart these possibilities, we introduce RAVEN, a suite of analyses for assessing the novelty of generated text, focusing on sequential structure (n-grams) and syntactic structure. We apply these analyses to four neural language models (an LSTM, a Transformer, Transformer-XL, and GPT-2). For local structure - e.g., individual dependencies - model-generated text is substantially less novel than our baseline of human-generated text from each model's test set. For larger-scale structure - e.g., overall sentence structure - model-generated text is as novel or even more novel than the human-generated baseline, but models still sometimes copy substantially, in some cases duplicating passages over 1,000 words long from the training set. We also perform extensive manual analysis showing that GPT-2's novel text is usually well-formed morphologically and syntactically but has reasonably frequent semantic issues (e.g., being self-contradictory).
As the name implies, contextualized representations of language are typically motivated by their ability to encode context. Which aspects of context are captured by such representations? We introduce an approach to address this question using Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA). As case studies, we investigate the degree to which a verb embedding encodes the verb's subject, a pronoun embedding encodes the pronoun's antecedent, and a full-sentence representation encodes the sentence's head word (as determined by a dependency parse). In all cases, we show that BERT's contextualized embeddings reflect the linguistic dependency being studied, and that BERT encodes these dependencies to a greater degree than it encodes less linguistically-salient controls. These results demonstrate the ability of our approach to adjudicate between hypotheses about which aspects of context are encoded in representations of language.