Abstract:While voice control is rapidly becoming a ubiquitous vector of human-AI communication, the risks facing these systems remain poorly understood. This is, in part, a product of the difficulties in scaling strictly digital adversarial workflows to the physical world. These scale barriers have led the community to abstract away key acoustic factors relating to detectability and the influence of geometry on acoustics. These methodological and metrological shortcomings undermine our understanding of risk. We illuminate these issues through real-world testing, conceptual discussions, and a novel, high-throughput reality simulation framework. By testing over 8 million adversarial evaluations, we demonstrate that acoustic awareness yields relative Word Error Rate increases of up to 94.5\% under Whisper and wav2vec. We employ this framework to explore a formalize and operationalize a Dual-Form Signal to Noise Ratio to decouple source stealth from victim attack efficacy, resolving a crucial limitation in current works. This lays the groundwork for repeatable, verifiable research that embraces, rather than abstracts, the acoustic environment.
Abstract:Automatic Speech Recognition systems are notoriously both sensitive to adversarial and benign perturbations. While this has been repeatedly demonstrated using reference datasets, detecting such behaviors in deployed systems is incredibly challenging, due to the absence of oracle knowledge of the true transcription. We demonstrate that employing a certification-inspired mechanism can significantly decrease WER, increase recall, and decrease the Spearman correlation between confidence and WER. We achieve this through a dual-gate diagnostic pipeline: a Two-Sided Atomic Audit that accumulates statistical wealth to certify both token existence and adversarial exclusion, and a Rank-Based Tournament that selects the winning sequence. Our evaluations across four diverse architectures demonstrate up to a 55% relative reduction in Word Error Rate, while also providing granular word- and sentence-level certifications to enhance acoustic security.
Abstract:Randomized Smoothing (RS) provides rigorous robustness guarantees for neural networks without architectural constraints, yet its adoption is limited by extreme computational costs. Standard RS requires tens of thousands of model evaluations per input and forces practitioners to commit to fixed sample sizes a priori. In this work, we present a novel meta-learning framework for anytime-valid certified robustness that adaptively deploys computational resources. By using a lightweight meta-learner to predict image-specific priors for a sequential E-process, we achieve a 20-fold reduction in sample complexity compared to traditional methods while maintaining rigorous statistical guarantees. Beyond raw efficiency, we demonstrate how anytime-validity enables adaptively allocating compute based upon application-specific risk thresholds, a form of resource triage impossible under classic certification frameworks. That this is achievable while also providing similar certification performance demonstrates that our approach provides a pathway for real-time, safety-critical certification deployments.
Abstract:Vision-language models (VLMs) are now widely used in downstream tasks. However, real-world applications often expose VLMs to distribution shifts induced by semantic variation (e.g., shape, size, and style). Robustness certification determines if a model's prediction changes when transformations are applied to its input. While most certification frameworks study geometric or pixel-level transformations over inputs, this work proposes a novel framework that enables certifying VLM robustness under semantic-level transformations. Leveraging the open-vocabulary capability of VLMs, we use text prompts as semantic proxies to construct transformations parameterized by an extent that controls the degree of semantic variation. By characterizing the VLM decision boundary in closed form, our framework quantitatively certifies extent intervals for which the predicted class remains unchanged under the semantic transformation. Our framework is the first to certify VLM robustness under semantic-level variations without requiring additional data for each variation, making it practical to apply. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world data show that our framework enables certifying robustness under diverse semantic variations across scenarios.
Abstract:Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems operating in real-time settings must process acoustic input under strict temporal constraints, where transcription decisions are inherently made on incomplete information. This causal constraint serves as an information bottleneck on attackers, significantly limiting attack performance. Our new Semantic Gambit attack breaks this causal limitation by augmenting the adversary with predictive context derived from a Large Language Model in real-time. Our experiments show that this form of augmentation can elevate the corpus-level Word Error Rate to 35.6% -- a three-fold increase over the current state-of-the-art. Ultimately, this work reveals how common, low-latency LLM tooling can be exploited to systematically subvert real-time ASR pipelines.
Abstract:Diverse outputs in text generation are necessary for effective exploration in complex reasoning tasks, such as code generation and mathematical problem solving. Such Pass@$k$ problems benefit from distinct candidates covering the solution space. However, traditional sampling approaches often waste computational resources on repetitive failure modes. While Diffusion Language Models have emerged as a competitive alternative to the prevailing Autoregressive paradigm, they remain susceptible to this redundancy, with independent samples frequently collapsing into similar modes. To address this, we propose a training free, low cost intervention to enhance generative diversity in Diffusion Language Models. Our approach modifies intermediate samples in a batch sequentially, where each sample is repelled from the feature space of previous samples, actively penalising redundancy. Unlike prior methods that require retraining or beam search, our strategy incurs negligible computational overhead, while ensuring that each sample contributes a unique perspective to the batch. We evaluate our method on the HumanEval and GSM8K benchmarks using the LLaDA-8B-Instruct model. Our results demonstrate significantly improved diversity and Pass@$k$ performance across various temperature settings. As a simple modification to the sampling process, our method offers an immediate, low-cost improvement for current and future Diffusion Language Models in tasks that benefit from diverse solution search. We make our code available at https://github.com/sean-lamont/odd.
Abstract:Certified defenses promise provable robustness guarantees. We study the malicious exploitation of probabilistic certification frameworks to better understand the limits of guarantee provisions. Now, the objective is to not only mislead a classifier, but also manipulate the certification process to generate a robustness guarantee for an adversarial input certificate spoofing. A recent study in ICLR demonstrated that crafting large perturbations can shift inputs far into regions capable of generating a certificate for an incorrect class. Our study investigates if perturbations needed to cause a misclassification and yet coax a certified model into issuing a deceptive, large robustness radius for a target class can still be made small and imperceptible. We explore the idea of region-focused adversarial examples to craft imperceptible perturbations, spoof certificates and achieve certification radii larger than the source class ghost certificates. Extensive evaluations with the ImageNet demonstrate the ability to effectively bypass state-of-the-art certified defenses such as Densepure. Our work underscores the need to better understand the limits of robustness certification methods.
Abstract:While certified robustness is widely promoted as a solution to adversarial examples in Artificial Intelligence systems, significant challenges remain before these techniques can be meaningfully deployed in real-world applications. We identify critical gaps in current research, including the paradox of detection without distinction, the lack of clear criteria for practitioners to evaluate certification schemes, and the potential security risks arising from users' expectations surrounding ``guaranteed" robustness claims. This position paper is a call to arms for the certification research community, proposing concrete steps to address these fundamental challenges and advance the field toward practical applicability.
Abstract:Similar to other machine learning frameworks, Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) is shown to be vulnerable to poisoning attacks, due to its reliance on externally sourced datasets, a vulnerability that is exacerbated by its sequential nature. To mitigate the risks posed by RL poisoning, we extend certified defenses to provide larger guarantees against adversarial manipulation, ensuring robustness for both per-state actions, and the overall expected cumulative reward. Our approach leverages properties of Differential Privacy, in a manner that allows this work to span both continuous and discrete spaces, as well as stochastic and deterministic environments -- significantly expanding the scope and applicability of achievable guarantees. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our approach ensures the performance drops to no more than $50\%$ with up to $7\%$ of the training data poisoned, significantly improving over the $0.008\%$ in prior work~\citep{wu_copa_2022}, while producing certified radii that is $5$ times larger as well. This highlights the potential of our framework to enhance safety and reliability in offline RL.
Abstract:The current state-of-the-art backdoor attacks against Reinforcement Learning (RL) rely upon unrealistically permissive access models, that assume the attacker can read (or even write) the victim's policy parameters, observations, or rewards. In this work, we question whether such a strong assumption is required to launch backdoor attacks against RL. To answer this question, we propose the \underline{S}upply-\underline{C}h\underline{a}in \underline{B}ackdoor (SCAB) attack, which targets a common RL workflow: training agents using external agents that are provided separately or embedded within the environment. In contrast to prior works, our attack only relies on legitimate interactions of the RL agent with the supplied agents. Despite this limited access model, by poisoning a mere $3\%$ of training experiences, our attack can successfully activate over $90\%$ of triggered actions, reducing the average episodic return by $80\%$ for the victim. Our novel attack demonstrates that RL attacks are likely to become a reality under untrusted RL training supply-chains.