A New Approach to Voice Authenticity

Voice faking, driven primarily by recent advances in text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis technology, poses significant societal challenges. Currently, the prevailing assumption is that unaltered human speech can be considered genuine, while fake speech comes from TTS synthesis. We argue that this binary distinction is oversimplified. For instance, altered playback speeds can be used for malicious purposes, like in the 'Drunken Nancy Pelosi' incident. Similarly, editing of audio clips can be done ethically, e.g., for brevity or summarization in news reporting or podcasts, but editing can also create misleading narratives. In this paper, we propose a conceptual shift away from the binary paradigm of audio being either 'fake' or 'real'. Instead, our focus is on pinpointing 'voice edits', which encompass traditional modifications like filters and cuts, as well as TTS synthesis and VC systems. We delineate 6 categories and curate a new challenge dataset rooted in the M-AILABS corpus, for which we present baseline detection systems. And most importantly, we argue that merely categorizing audio as fake or real is a dangerous over-simplification that will fail to move the field of speech technology forward.

MLAAD: The Multi-Language Audio Anti-Spoofing Dataset

Text-to-Speech (TTS) technology brings significant advantages, such as giving a voice to those with speech impairments, but also enables audio deepfakes and spoofs. The former mislead individuals and may propagate misinformation, while the latter undermine voice biometric security systems. AI-based detection can help to address these challenges by automatically differentiating between genuine and fabricated voice recordings. However, these models are only as good as their training data, which currently is severely limited due to an overwhelming concentration on English and Chinese audio in anti-spoofing databases, thus restricting its worldwide effectiveness. In response, this paper presents the Multi-Language Audio Anti-Spoof Dataset (MLAAD), created using 52 TTS models, comprising 19 different architectures, to generate 160.1 hours of synthetic voice in 23 different languages. We train and evaluate three state-of-the-art deepfake detection models with MLAAD, and observe that MLAAD demonstrates superior performance over comparable datasets like InTheWild or FakeOrReal when used as a training resource. Furthermore, in comparison with the renowned ASVspoof 2019 dataset, MLAAD proves to be a complementary resource. In tests across eight datasets, MLAAD and ASVspoof 2019 alternately outperformed each other, both excelling on four datasets. By publishing MLAAD and making trained models accessible via an interactive webserver , we aim to democratize antispoofing technology, making it accessible beyond the realm of specialists, thus contributing to global efforts against audio spoofing and deepfakes.

Physical Adversarial Examples for Multi-Camera Systems

Neural networks build the foundation of several intelligent systems, which, however, are known to be easily fooled by adversarial examples. Recent advances made these attacks possible even in air-gapped scenarios, where the autonomous system observes its surroundings by, e.g., a camera. We extend these ideas in our research and evaluate the robustness of multi-camera setups against such physical adversarial examples. This scenario becomes ever more important with the rise in popularity of autonomous vehicles, which fuse the information of several cameras for their driving decision. While we find that multi-camera setups provide some robustness towards past attack methods, we see that this advantage reduces when optimizing on multiple perspectives at once. We propose a novel attack method that we call Transcender-MC, where we incorporate online 3D renderings and perspective projections in the training process. Moreover, we motivate that certain data augmentation techniques can facilitate the generation of successful adversarial examples even further. Transcender-MC is 11% more effective in successfully attacking multi-camera setups than state-of-the-art methods. Our findings offer valuable insights regarding the resilience of object detection in a setup with multiple cameras and motivate the need of developing adequate defense mechanisms against them.

Protecting Publicly Available Data With Machine Learning Shortcuts

Machine-learning (ML) shortcuts or spurious correlations are artifacts in datasets that lead to very good training and test performance but severely limit the model's generalization capability. Such shortcuts are insidious because they go unnoticed due to good in-domain test performance. In this paper, we explore the influence of different shortcuts and show that even simple shortcuts are difficult to detect by explainable AI methods. We then exploit this fact and design an approach to defend online databases against crawlers: providers such as dating platforms, clothing manufacturers, or used car dealers have to deal with a professionalized crawling industry that grabs and resells data points on a large scale. We show that a deterrent can be created by deliberately adding ML shortcuts. Such augmented datasets are then unusable for ML use cases, which deters crawlers and the unauthorized use of data from the internet. Using real-world data from three use cases, we show that the proposed approach renders such collected data unusable, while the shortcut is at the same time difficult to notice in human perception. Thus, our proposed approach can serve as a proactive protection against illegitimate data crawling.

Complex-valued neural networks for voice anti-spoofing

Current anti-spoofing and audio deepfake detection systems use either magnitude spectrogram-based features (such as CQT or Melspectrograms) or raw audio processed through convolution or sinc-layers. Both methods have drawbacks: magnitude spectrograms discard phase information, which affects audio naturalness, and raw-feature-based models cannot use traditional explainable AI methods. This paper proposes a new approach that combines the benefits of both methods by using complex-valued neural networks to process the complex-valued, CQT frequency-domain representation of the input audio. This method retains phase information and allows for explainable AI methods. Results show that this approach outperforms previous methods on the "In-the-Wild" anti-spoofing dataset and enables interpretation of the results through explainable AI. Ablation studies confirm that the model has learned to use phase information to detect voice spoofing.

Shortcut Detection with Variational Autoencoders

For real-world applications of machine learning (ML), it is essential that models make predictions based on well-generalizing features rather than spurious correlations in the data. The identification of such spurious correlations, also known as shortcuts, is a challenging problem and has so far been scarcely addressed. In this work, we present a novel approach to detect shortcuts in image and audio datasets by leveraging variational autoencoders (VAEs). The disentanglement of features in the latent space of VAEs allows us to discover correlations in datasets and semi-automatically evaluate them for ML shortcuts. We demonstrate the applicability of our method on several real-world datasets and identify shortcuts that have not been discovered before. Based on these findings, we also investigate the construction of shortcut adversarial examples.

Introducing Model Inversion Attacks on Automatic Speaker Recognition

Model inversion (MI) attacks allow to reconstruct average per-class representations of a machine learning (ML) model's training data. It has been shown that in scenarios where each class corresponds to a different individual, such as face classifiers, this represents a severe privacy risk. In this work, we explore a new application for MI: the extraction of speakers' voices from a speaker recognition system. We present an approach to (1) reconstruct audio samples from a trained ML model and (2) extract intermediate voice feature representations which provide valuable insights into the speakers' biometrics. Therefore, we propose an extension of MI attacks which we call sliding model inversion. Our sliding MI extends standard MI by iteratively inverting overlapping chunks of the audio samples and thereby leveraging the sequential properties of audio data for enhanced inversion performance. We show that one can use the inverted audio data to generate spoofed audio samples to impersonate a speaker, and execute voice-protected commands for highly secured systems on their behalf. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one extending MI attacks to audio data, and our results highlight the security risks resulting from the extraction of the biometric data in that setup.

Shortcut Removal for Improved OOD-Generalization

Machine learning is a data-driven discipline, and learning success is largely dependent on the quality of the underlying data sets. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that even high performance on held-out test data does not necessarily mean that a model generalizes or learns anything meaningful at all. One reason for this is the presence of machine learning shortcuts, i.e., hints in the data that are predictive but accidental and semantically unconnected to the problem. We present a new approach to detect such shortcuts and a technique to automatically remove them from datasets. Using an adversarially trained lens, any small and highly predictive clues in images can be detected and removed. We show that this approach 1) does not cause degradation of model performance in the absence of these shortcuts, and 2) reliably identifies and neutralizes shortcuts from different image datasets. In our experiments, we are able to recover up to 93,8% of model performance in the presence of different shortcuts. Finally, we apply our model to a real-world dataset from the medical domain consisting of chest x-rays and identify and remove several types of shortcuts that are known to hinder real-world applicability. Thus, we hope that our proposed approach fosters real-world applicability of machine learning.

R2-AD2: Detecting Anomalies by Analysing the Raw Gradient

Neural networks follow a gradient-based learning scheme, adapting their mapping parameters by back-propagating the output loss. Samples unlike the ones seen during training cause a different gradient distribution. Based on this intuition, we design a novel semi-supervised anomaly detection method called R2-AD2. By analysing the temporal distribution of the gradient over multiple training steps, we reliably detect point anomalies in strict semi-supervised settings. Instead of domain dependent features, we input the raw gradient caused by the sample under test to an end-to-end recurrent neural network architecture. R2-AD2 works in a purely data-driven way, thus is readily applicable in a variety of important use cases of anomaly detection.

Does Audio Deepfake Detection Generalize?

Current text-to-speech algorithms produce realistic fakes of human voices, making deepfake detection a much-needed area of research. While researchers have presented various techniques for detecting audio spoofs, it is often unclear exactly why these architectures are successful: Preprocessing steps, hyperparameter settings, and the degree of fine-tuning are not consistent across related work. Which factors contribute to success, and which are accidental? In this work, we address this problem: We systematize audio spoofing detection by re-implementing and uniformly evaluating architectures from related work. We identify overarching features for successful audio deepfake detection, such as using cqtspec or logspec features instead of melspec features, which improves performance by 37% EER on average, all other factors constant. Additionally, we evaluate generalization capabilities: We collect and publish a new dataset consisting of 37.9 hours of found audio recordings of celebrities and politicians, of which 17.2 hours are deepfakes. We find that related work performs poorly on such real-world data (performance degradation of up to one thousand percent). This may suggest that the community has tailored its solutions too closely to the prevailing ASVSpoof benchmark and that deepfakes are much harder to detect outside the lab than previously thought.