Adjudicated Captioning: Multi-Agent Alignment Scoring and Consensus-Distilled Beam Arbitration for Strict Zero-Shot Image Captioning

Zero-shot image captioning (ZIC) describes images without paired image-caption supervision during captioner training, relying on text-only corpora and frozen pretrained image-text scorers. Existing retrieval-augmented methods score image-text alignment once, at retrieval, then commit the captioner's autoregressive beam under language-model probability alone, leaving the decoder without further visual grounding feedback. Progress has stalled, with no method improving on the strict-regime best since 2024. We propose Adjudicated Captioning, an inference-time multi-agent framework that restores grounding feedback at multiple checkpoints over an unchanged IFCap captioner. First, we install a stronger frozen Retrieval Encoder at the input. Second, between retrieval and decoding we insert a frozen Cross-Attention Verifier that re-ranks the top-9 retrievals to top-5. Third, at the output beam we attach a learned Reranker pairing TriFuse, a multilayer perceptron, with MemAttend, a memory-attended transformer, the pipeline's only learned components; both are trained self-supervised by Borda-consensus distillation across the three frozen scorers, using no paired image-caption labels and no reference captions. Under the inductive headline protocol, with rerankers fit on the disjoint COCO Karpathy validation beam and applied frozen to test, the framework reaches CIDEr 117.6 and SPICE 21.9 on COCO Karpathy, up from 108.0 and 20.3 for IFCap, a +9.6 CIDEr gain, and +7.7 above NES, the strongest synthetic-image-augmented method at 109.9, without retraining the captioner. A training-free fixed-fusion baseline reaches 115.8 CIDEr, so +7.8 of the +9.6 gain comes from the non-learned architectural intervention and the remaining +1.8 from the learned rerankers. The same recipe transfers off-COCO without captioner retraining: +8.1 CIDEr on Flickr30k Karpathy and +5.7 on NoCaps overall.

DeePen: Penetration Testing for Audio Deepfake Detection

Deepfakes - manipulated or forged audio and video media - pose significant security risks to individuals, organizations, and society at large. To address these challenges, machine learning-based classifiers are commonly employed to detect deepfake content. In this paper, we assess the robustness of such classifiers through a systematic penetration testing methodology, which we introduce as DeePen. Our approach operates without prior knowledge of or access to the target deepfake detection models. Instead, it leverages a set of carefully selected signal processing modifications - referred to as attacks - to evaluate model vulnerabilities. Using DeePen, we analyze both real-world production systems and publicly available academic model checkpoints, demonstrating that all tested systems exhibit weaknesses and can be reliably deceived by simple manipulations such as time-stretching or echo addition. Furthermore, our findings reveal that while some attacks can be mitigated by retraining detection systems with knowledge of the specific attack, others remain persistently effective. We release all associated code.