When Eyes Betray AI: Social Gaze Consistency as a Semantic Cue for AI-Generated Image Detection

Recent generative models have largely closed the gap on low-level artifacts - pixel fingerprints, frequency anomalies, upsampling traces - particularly in person-centric and partial-edit settings where the manipulated region is small and surrounded by photometrically authentic content. We introduce Social Gaze Consistency, a high-level semantic cue defined as the mutual coherence of gaze direction, head-eye alignment, and pupil placement between interacting individuals, and show that it constitutes a previously underutilized detection axis orthogonal to existing low-level paradigms. We instantiate this insight through three coupled mechanisms: (i) a controlled diagnostic dataset with region-specific perturbations of gaze-consistent imagery, where strict pair-level grouping forecloses generator-fingerprint memorization as an optimization-time shortcut rather than relying on augmentation; (ii) Block-Compositional Caption Supervision, which holds a single 5-block reasoning skeleton invariant across 1,250 macro-combined captions, decoupling reasoning consistency from surface diversity; (iii) Cross-architecture validation showing the same supervision improves a vision-language backbone (FakeVLM) by +3.7 pp on the COCOAI Interaction subset (balanced accuracy 67.8 -> 71.5) and +1.3 pp on the COCOAI Person subset (83.0 -> 84.3), with consistent gains on a vision-only backbone (Effort), evidencing a backbone-agnostic cue. Real- and fake-class recalls rise simultaneously, ruling out a "predict-all-fake" artifact. A four-step mechanistic account - paired-edit shortcut blocking, hard-to-easy difficulty transfer, CLIP prior preservation, and diffusion-family shared spectral weakness in periocular structure - explains why training on a single inpainter (FLUX.1-Fill) transfers to multi-generator suites. We will release the code upon acceptance to facilitate reproducibility.

DeePen: Penetration Testing for Audio Deepfake Detection

Deepfakes - manipulated or forged audio and video media - pose significant security risks to individuals, organizations, and society at large. To address these challenges, machine learning-based classifiers are commonly employed to detect deepfake content. In this paper, we assess the robustness of such classifiers through a systematic penetration testing methodology, which we introduce as DeePen. Our approach operates without prior knowledge of or access to the target deepfake detection models. Instead, it leverages a set of carefully selected signal processing modifications - referred to as attacks - to evaluate model vulnerabilities. Using DeePen, we analyze both real-world production systems and publicly available academic model checkpoints, demonstrating that all tested systems exhibit weaknesses and can be reliably deceived by simple manipulations such as time-stretching or echo addition. Furthermore, our findings reveal that while some attacks can be mitigated by retraining detection systems with knowledge of the specific attack, others remain persistently effective. We release all associated code.