Measuring and Reducing LLM Hallucination without Gold-Standard Answers via Expertise-Weighting

LLM hallucination, i.e. generating factually incorrect yet seemingly convincing answers, is currently a major threat to the trustworthiness and reliability of LLMs. The first step towards solving this complicated problem is to measure it. However, existing hallucination metrics require to have a benchmark dataset with gold-standard answers, i.e. "best" or "correct" answers written by humans. Such requirement makes hallucination measurement costly and prone to human errors. In this work, we propose Factualness Evaluations via Weighting LLMs (FEWL), the first hallucination metric that is specifically designed for the scenario when gold-standard answers are absent. FEWL leverages the answers from off-the-shelf LLMs that serve as a proxy of gold-standard answers. The key challenge is how to quantify the expertise of reference LLMs resourcefully. We show FEWL has certain theoretical guarantees and demonstrate empirically it gives more accurate hallucination measures than naively using reference LLMs. We also show how to leverage FEWL to reduce hallucination through both in-context learning and supervised finetuning. Last, we build a large-scale benchmark dataset to facilitate LLM hallucination research.

Unfairness Despite Awareness: Group-Fair Classification with Strategic Agents

The use of algorithmic decision making systems in domains which impact the financial, social, and political well-being of people has created a demand for these decision making systems to be "fair" under some accepted notion of equity. This demand has in turn inspired a large body of work focused on the development of fair learning algorithms which are then used in lieu of their conventional counterparts. Most analysis of such fair algorithms proceeds from the assumption that the people affected by the algorithmic decisions are represented as immutable feature vectors. However, strategic agents may possess both the ability and the incentive to manipulate this observed feature vector in order to attain a more favorable outcome. We explore the impact that strategic agent behavior could have on fair classifiers and derive conditions under which this behavior leads to fair classifiers becoming less fair than their conventional counterparts under the same measure of fairness that the fair classifier takes into account. These conditions are related to the the way in which the fair classifier remedies unfairness on the original unmanipulated data: fair classifiers which remedy unfairness by becoming more selective than their conventional counterparts are the ones that become less fair than their counterparts when agents are strategic. We further demonstrate that both the increased selectiveness of the fair classifier, and consequently the loss of fairness, arises when performing fair learning on domains in which the advantaged group is overrepresented in the region near (and on the beneficial side of) the decision boundary of conventional classifiers. Finally, we observe experimentally, using several datasets and learning methods, that this fairness reversal is common, and that our theoretical characterization of the fairness reversal conditions indeed holds in most such cases.

Deception through Half-Truths

Deception is a fundamental issue across a diverse array of settings, from cybersecurity, where decoys (e.g., honeypots) are an important tool, to politics that can feature politically motivated "leaks" and fake news about candidates.Typical considerations of deception view it as providing false information.However, just as important but less frequently studied is a more tacit form where information is strategically hidden or leaked.We consider the problem of how much an adversary can affect a principal's decision by "half-truths", that is, by masking or hiding bits of information, when the principal is oblivious to the presence of the adversary. The principal's problem can be modeled as one of predicting future states of variables in a dynamic Bayes network, and we show that, while theoretically the principal's decisions can be made arbitrarily bad, the optimal attack is NP-hard to approximate, even under strong assumptions favoring the attacker. However, we also describe an important special case where the dependency of future states on past states is additive, in which we can efficiently compute an approximately optimal attack. Moreover, in networks with a linear transition function we can solve the problem optimally in polynomial time.