Practice Makes Unsafe: Skill Misevolution in Self-Improving LLM Agents

Self-improving LLM agents convert successful trajectories into persistent cross-task state. An unsafe success can thereby become reusable policy after its triggering input disappears. Skill evolution makes this failure measurable by distilling operational trajectories into executable, transferable, and inspectable procedures. Because evolution optimizes task outcomes rather than procedure safety, compromised experience can cause skill misevolution. Existing benchmarks measure current behavior or static artifacts but cannot attribute risk across authoring, retrieval, and later execution. To expose this lifecycle, we introduce SkillMisevo-Gym, a lifecycle-aware harness that versions skill state across agent frameworks, and SkillMisevo-Bench, a frozen design from malicious exposure to carryover tasks, with concept-aligned benign tasks and nine lifecycle metrics. We also introduce SafeEvolve, a wrapper that repairs unsafe content and governs subsequent reuse. Across 25 agent-method configurations, each covering 525 tasks in 25 episodes, all 21 evolved configurations author unsafe artifacts, while only fifteen lead to fresh-session harm. In the exposure sweep, three malicious tasks raise carryover ASR from 16.0% to 35.3%. Across representative skill evolution methods, SafeEvolve reduces unsafe retrieval and fresh-session harm by 26.7 and 17.3 percentage points, respectively, while mean benign utility changes by only 0.4 points. Together, persistent-adaptation safety must govern what updates write and what future executors reuse. Code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/misevolve.

Agents Don't Just Agree, They Remember: Benchmarking Persistent Sycophancy in Stateful Personal Agents

Stateful personal agents increasingly maintain long-term user profiles, episodic memories, and reusable skills. This persistence turns conversational sycophancy into a state-writing failure: accepted user-centric claims can be committed as lasting preferences, background facts, or workflows and later reused after the original conversation is gone. We call this persistent sycophancy and introduce the Personal Agent Sycophancy Benchmark (PASB), a 1,600-task benchmark that traces whether a conversational claim is accepted, written into durable agent state, and reused in a later neutral query. Unlike prior benchmarks that provide pre-written memories, PASB evaluates real agents (Hermes-Agent and OpenClaw) that decide what to store. It isolates the write process by combining four scenario framings with four temporal delivery patterns and separating a five-turn persist stage from a cleared three-turn query stage, ensuring downstream effects arise only from durable state. Across twelve models, the commit boundary is the key inflection point: downstream failure increases from 45.0% in session-only episodes to 71.9% after commitment, a consistent increase of 27.0 percentage points. Committed claims exhibit three write-time patterns: status promotion, attribution removal, and scope broadening. These patterns become stronger under memory-like or procedural framing, repeated reinforcement, and even across domain boundaries. These results show that agent sycophancy is fundamentally a state-writing governance problem. Once user content is committed to durable memory, safety must govern what agents write, not only what they say. PASB identifies the write-time controls needed to gate risky commits while preserving the source, role, and scope of stored content beyond response-level mitigations.

Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teaming

Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools. Existing approaches mainly optimize attack success and preserve artifacts such as benchmarks, payloads, or attack programs, which record where attacks succeed but not the enabling conditions behind unsafe agent behavior. We study automated red-teaming for production LLM agents using one agentic research environment to discover reusable vulnerability knowledge about another. We present AHA, a falsifiable discovery loop that proposes a vulnerability hypothesis, constructs a falsifier, instantiates a valid attack, executes it in a sandboxed harness, reflects on the trajectory, and promotes confirmed findings into a Vulnerability Concept Graph (VCG). Each concept links an attacker-facing surface to an unsafe trajectory through a claim, enabling condition, falsifier, transfer prediction, and supporting evidence. Across Claude Code and Codex on three scenarios covering direct and indirect attacks, the discovered concepts reveal a reusable vulnerability core across models and agents. A frozen VCG requires no further search and outperforms the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 percentage points under the same single-shot protocol, while transferring across scenarios and attack channels. The resulting VCG provides an auditable artifact for production safety teams to inspect vulnerabilities, validate patches, and accumulate reusable safety knowledge. Our code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/Auto-research-red-teaming-in-sleep.

What Happens Inside Agent Memory? Circuit Analysis from Emergence to Diagnosis

Agent memory failures are silent: an LLM-based agent can produce a fluent response even when it fails to extract, retain, or retrieve the information needed across sessions. The write-manage-read loop describes the external pipeline of these systems but leaves open which internal computations implement each stage. Tracing internal feature circuits across the Qwen-3 family (0.6B--14B) and two memory frameworks (mem0 and A-MEM), we report three findings. First, control is detectable before content: routing circuitry is causally active at 0.6B, while content circuitry produces no detectable signal until 4B under our tracing setup, creating a deployment regime where small models route with apparent competence but silently fail at extraction and grounding. Second, within the content group, Write and Read share a late-layer hub that operates as a context-grounding substrate already present in the base model; only memory framing recruits a functional grounding direction on this substrate, and the hub transfers across both frameworks. Third, emergence does not imply steerability: although the content circuit becomes detectable at 4B, it becomes reliably steerable only at 8B, indicating that detection and intervention have distinct scale thresholds. As a practical implication, the feature-space separation between the two circuit groups enables per-operation failure localization at 76.2% accuracy without supervision, providing a stage-level diagnostic for otherwise silent agent-memory failures.