Is Feedback All You Need? Leveraging Natural Language Feedback in Goal-Conditioned Reinforcement Learning

Despite numerous successes, the field of reinforcement learning (RL) remains far from matching the impressive generalisation power of human behaviour learning. One possible way to help bridge this gap be to provide RL agents with richer, more human-like feedback expressed in natural language. To investigate this idea, we first extend BabyAI to automatically generate language feedback from the environment dynamics and goal condition success. Then, we modify the Decision Transformer architecture to take advantage of this additional signal. We find that training with language feedback either in place of or in addition to the return-to-go or goal descriptions improves agents' generalisation performance, and that agents can benefit from feedback even when this is only available during training, but not at inference.

Balancing utility and cognitive cost in social representation

To successfully navigate its environment, an agent must construct and maintain representations of the other agents that it encounters. Such representations are useful for many tasks, but they are not without cost. As a result, agents must make decisions regarding how much information they choose to represent about the agents in their environment. Using selective imitation as an example task, we motivate the problem of finding agent representations that optimally trade off between downstream utility and information cost, and illustrate two example approaches to resource-constrained social representation.

Selective imitation on the basis of reward function similarity

Imitation is a key component of human social behavior, and is widely used by both children and adults as a way to navigate uncertain or unfamiliar situations. But in an environment populated by multiple heterogeneous agents pursuing different goals or objectives, indiscriminate imitation is unlikely to be an effective strategy -- the imitator must instead determine who is most useful to copy. There are likely many factors that play into these judgements, depending on context and availability of information. Here we investigate the hypothesis that these decisions involve inferences about other agents' reward functions. We suggest that people preferentially imitate the behavior of others they deem to have similar reward functions to their own. We further argue that these inferences can be made on the basis of very sparse or indirect data, by leveraging an inductive bias toward positing the existence of different \textit{groups} or \textit{types} of people with similar reward functions, allowing learners to select imitation targets without direct evidence of alignment.